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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation for Present Research 
Steady state and time domain simulation tools are an integral part in the design, 
optimization, and operation of large interconnected power system. The purpose of simulation 
is online monitoring, tracking, and devising preventive or correcting action strategies for 
mitigating the frequency and impact of high consequence events. Common to both steady 
state and dynamic simulation is the processing of data from power system SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition). It collects data from various sensors at a factory, 
plant, or in other remote locations, and then sends this data to a central computer which then 
manages and controls the data. The data is primarily used for topology processing, state 
estimation for steady state power flow solutions, contingency selection and assessment of 
power system security. Most control centers around the world perform steady state 
contingency analysis because of speed requirements for online security assessment. Online 
dynamic simulation still remains a goal to achieve for most control centers. The power 
system response to disturbances is decided not only by fast dynamics of its machines, but 
also by the action of slow processes such as tap changers and load dynamics. They often 
cause voltage problems and/or thermal loading problems after an extended period. Thus, 
extended term (1-2 hours) time domain simulator is the preferred tool to unearth the power 
system’s ability to withstand large disturbances over extended periods of time. This would 
provide operators with a capability enhancement tool to deal with unforeseen initiating 
events/severe disturbances and complex unfolding of sequence of events, which can lead to 
cascading. Such information is not available today in control centers with dynamic 
simulation tools.  
A common perspective today is that a key to cascading outage defense is the level of 
situational awareness held by grid operators, and limitations are associated with the limited 
monitoring and data exchange capabilities beyond the control areas [1]. Yet, modern power 
system operators are supervising one of the most complex systems of the society and are 
expected to take apt, correct and alert actions to ensure operational reliability and security of 
the power system. Under normal conditions they are able to sufficiently control the power 
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system with sufficient automatic control support. Severe disturbances and complex unfolding 
of post disturbance phenomena, including interdependent events, demand critical actions to 
be taken on the part of the operators which make them even more dependent on decision 
support and automatic controls at different levels [2, 3]. 
The market liberalization and push to operate the power system close to operational 
limits with less redundancy due to constraints placed by economical and environmental 
factors have made the operation more complex and exposed the power system to greater 
vulnerability to a disturbance, especially severe disturbances. There is indication in other 
industries (e.g., airline, nuclear, process control) that they employ a computational capability 
which provides operators with ways to predict system response and identify corrective 
actions. We think that power system operators should have a similar capability. The evolving 
power system demands ongoing and online operator training and capability enhancement tool 
to deal with any unforeseen initiating event/severe disturbance and unpredictable unfolding 
sequence of events. 
On line dynamic simulation of power systems will have significant impact on their future 
design and operation. It will enhance power system security and reliability and hence 
customer satisfaction and utility profits, and will promote secure power grid expansion. To 
meet this challenging task of proper operator response and training, the attributes of an on-
line mid-term simulator are proposed. This simulator will be used on-line to prepare the 
operators against extreme contingencies. It is expected to be a generalized event based 
corrective control/decision support for the operators. This motivates the research.  
1.2 Nature of the Problem 
To get an idea about the size of the problem which the big control centers deal with in 
practice, we can consider the example of Midwest ISO (MISO) and PJM ISO. MISO is 
responsible for monitoring and control of a large portion of the eastern US interconnection 
spanning 15 states and part of Canada, where the model represents approximately 33,000 
buses and 120,000 branches. PJM model has 2500 generators, and 13,500 buses. The 
magnitude of the problem is in terms of tens of thousands of differential algebraic equations.  
This chapter outlines the need for an extended term time domain simulator as an on-line 
cascading event tracking & avoidance decision support tool. At the outset, it discusses the 
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blackout attributes, derived from a study of blackouts around the world over the past 40 
years. This forms the foundation for the desirable simulator attributes. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the simulator attributes. 
1.3  Attributes of Blackout 
We performed an extensive study of the blackouts around the world in the past 40 years 
(see www.ece.cmu.edu/cascadingfailures). A condensed version of this study is summarized 
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. We summarize our observations as follows: 
• three of the 4 largest blackouts occurred in last 10 years 
• the number of blackouts greater than 1000 MW doubles every 10 years 
• 50% of them involved generation and 90% involved transmission 
• 40% involved proper protection action 
• 50% were slow (more than 3 minutes) 
• 60% involved number of dependent events 
• 50% had significant time between initiating and pre-collapse events 
 
Fig. 1: Blackout Impact 
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Fig. 2: Nature of Blackout 
This study indicates that the nature of the blackouts with respect to time may be roughly 
classified as either fast (less than 3 minutes) or slow. And when they are slow, they always 
involve a cascading sequence. It is for the slow types that we propose a simulator as a 
decision support tool for the operators.  There are four typical stages of such cascading 
sequences [4]. 
1. Initiating contingency; 
2. Steady-state progression (slow succession);  
o System becomes stressed with heavy loading on lines, transformers, and 
generator; 
o Successive events occur, typically the trip of other components with fairly 
large inter-event time intervals. 
3. Transient progression (fast succession); 
o System goes under-frequency and/or under-voltage; 
o Large number of components begins tripping quickly. 
4. Uncontrolled islanding and blackout. 
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An important attribute of the events in stage two is that they are almost always dependent 
events in that their occurrence depends on the occurrence of one or more earlier events. It is 
recognized that the probability of occurrence of successive events increases dramatically 
following the occurrence of a contingency. The time interval between an initiating event and 
successive events varies greatly. For example, the time between a fault and an inadvertent 
relay trip can be less than a second. However, if a fault followed by line clearing causes line 
overload and/or generator over-excitation, subsequent tripping may follow minutes or even 
hours later. The time interval may be long enough for an operator to initiate actions to 
mitigate the undesirable trend.  
1.4  Simulator Attributes  
The methodology discussed in Chapter 2 forms the foundation for continuous tracking of 
the system topology to generate high risk extended contingencies list for online security 
assessment. The proposed simulator should have the following features [5]: 
• Intelligently select triggering events based on substation topology using switch-breaker 
data already existing in topology processor (chapter 2) 
• Simulate conditions in the mid-term time frame (hours) very fast (chapter 3) 
• Have detailed protective relaying and control system modeling (chapter 4) 
• Provide decision support in the face of unfolding events (chapter 5) 
• Provide “blackout avoidance” training tool for operators (chapter 5) 
• Continuously identify catastrophic event sequences together with actions operators can 
take to mitigate them (chapter 5) 
• Use current or forecasted conditions 
• Store results for fast retrieval should an event occur 
In keeping with the above a time domain simulator is the preferred analysis tool. 
However, it must be specialized to perform extended-term (several hours) of simulation very 
fast, as suggested by the second bullet above. This means it must model both fast and slow 
dynamics and be capable of lengthening time steps when fast dynamics are inactive. In 
addition, it must have the necessary intelligence to recognize when failure conditions are 
encountered, retrieve earlier conditions, and determine appropriate actions; it must also have 
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modeling capability for a wide range of protection devices. Fig. 3 illustrates a typical output 
from the proposed time domain simulator with desired capabilities of fast, long term, 
adaptive time step dynamic simulation of slow and fast dynamics and appropriate control 
action determination to arrest unfolding cascading event. The philosophy is to prepare and 
revise, track and defend. 
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Fig. 3: Time domain simulator 
  Finally, in order to combine it with contingency identification and apply it online, it 
should be able to integrate with system real time information seamlessly, including switch-
breaker data for automatic initiating event identification. Fig. 4 captures the proposed 
simulator’s desired attributes in three dimensions of versatility namely: 1) Simulation model 
complexity 2) Computational characteristics 3) Decision Set Priority 
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Fig. 4: Simulator attributes (in terms of Decision set priority, Computational characteristics, and 
simulation model complexity) 
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In this research, all the aspects of the proposed simulator’s desired attributes have been 
addressed with the exception of its deploying to multiple CPUs, a task which is being 
pursued in a follow up PSerc project. 
1.5 Research Problem Statement  
The research problem statement is “to provide operators with a very fast (online) 
computational capability to predict system response and identify corrective actions through 
analytical modeling and fast numerical simulation studies for low probability, high-
consequence catastrophic events by exploiting the state of the art in software and hardware”.  
This is accomplished in terms of the following intermediate goals: 
 
i) Development of a systematic methodology for the identification of high order N-
k protection related inadvertent tripping contingencies from substation topology 
and switch/breaker status and verify against test systems. 
ii) Establishing the importance of generator protection modeling in dynamic 
simulation and implementation of generator protection models for generator 
protection under abnormal conditions. 
iii) Development of Depth First Search based algorithms to simulate cascading 
phenomena in the face of evolution of multiple islands. Island detection is done 
through graph search algorithms based on Breadth First Search techniques to 
check the connectivity of the components.  
iv) Implementation and development of efficient numerical techniques to gain high 
computational efficiency 
a. Implementation of available multifrontal algorithms for the solution of 
sparse linear system in time domain simulation. 
b. Optimization of multifrontal algorithms for power systems to achieve 
high speed. 
c. Implementation of other sparse solvers available in Matlab and 
comparison with multifrontal methods. 
d. Development of new preconditioned iterative algorithms for power 
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system time domain simulation. 
1.6 Thesis organization 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters and its outline is described as given below. 
 Chapter One: Introduction. 
Importance and Impact of dynamic simulation, blackout attributes, simulator attributes, 
objectives of the research and outline of the thesis. 
 Chapter Two: N-k Contingency Selection. 
This chapter describes a topological graph search algorithm to identify inadvertent 
tripping contingencies and their associated probability magnitudes, given an initial 
outage. The computed probability magnitudes serve to identify critical protection systems 
in the network. We use them to extend the conventional contingency list to include these 
high risk multi-element contingencies. The developed methodology is illustrated through 
five substation configurations including single breaker-single bus, ring bus, double 
breaker-double bus, single-bus connected with bus tie, and breaker and a half. Results of 
its validation and application to test systems are also reported. 
 Chapter Three: Numerical methods – Direct methods  
In this chapter the nature and the uniqueness of the differential-algebraic equations 
(DAE), and potential targets for enhancing computational efficiency is discussed. This 
chapter proposes the application of Unsymmetric Multifrontal method to solve the linear 
equations formed as a result of the solution of the DAE encountered in the power system 
dynamic simulation. The frontal and multifrontal methods and the advantages of 
multifrontal methods are identified. The proposed method is compared with the full 
Gaussian Elimination solver and other sparse solvers and the results are reported.  
 Chapter Four: Numerical methods – Iterative methods  
Multifrontal based preconditioner is developed for iterative methods for the solution of 
the linear equations. It is compared with ILU preconditioner based other iterative 
methods and multifrontal based direct methods.  
 Chapter Five: Modeling and protection. 
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This chapter describes the modeling of the power system components and generator 
protection adopted for this research. Importance of generator protection with reference to 
past 40 years of blackouts is presented. Detailed explanation of generator protection 
modeling used in this research is given. DFS based algorithms are developed for graph 
traversal in the case of a cascading event leading to the formation of multiple islands. 
 Chapter Six: Results and discussion. 
Validation of the simulator developed. Results and discussion of the implementation of 
the above described component modeling and generator protection and graph search 
based island detection and simulation are illustrated on a test system.  
 Chapter Seven: Conclusions. 
 Chapter Eight: Future Recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 N-k CONTINGENCY SELECTION 
There is a growing need to provide operators with enhanced on-line information 
regarding system security levels, their influencing factors, and associated corrective actions. 
Amongst several causes of cascading [6] one of the major contributions comes from high 
order initiating contingencies—removal of several power system components in a relatively 
very short time, typically within seconds. We refer to such events as N-k events where it is 
implicit that k>1. Contingency set identification is an essential step in monitoring the power 
system security level [6]. Generally, various screening methods are used for selecting and 
ranking contingencies using an appropriate severity index from a presumed N-1 credible set 
[7, 8] on contingency selection emphasizes screening methods to select contingencies from a 
presumed N−1 contingency set plus a limited number of high order contingencies, ranking 
them using an appropriate severity index.  
Although some exceptions [9,10,11] include studies on the effect of multiple component 
contingencies caused by substation and protection failures, the research on systematic 
selection of high order contingencies is limited.  [12] and [13] proposed the on-line detection 
of hidden failure in protection device to prevent cascading failure. These proposed methods 
require extensive information on the logic of protection devices installed in power systems, 
which makes their implementation difficult.  
It can be argued that most of these contingencies are so low in probability that they do 
not warrant attention. However, N−k events do occur, and when they do, consequences can 
be severe. In addition, different N-k events have different probabilities, some commensurate 
with N-1 events. These very practical facts motivate identification of inadvertent tripping 
contingencies (ITC) for on-line security assessment. ITC comprises almost 59% of the 
protection related N-k contingencies. Reference [14] has described a method for identifying 
the remaining 41% of the protection related high order N-k contingencies which include 
breaker failure and protection failure to trip. The composition of these two sets can be added 
to the standard contingency list used by the energy management system (EMS) for 
transmission security assessment. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate a systematic analytical methodology for 
automatic identification of ITC together with their probabilities. A graph search algorithm for 
automatic identification of ITC from topology data is developed to gain computational 
efficiency over the analytical method for identification of the ITC. A systematic method to 
calculate the probabilities of N-k inadvertent contingencies for online security assessment is 
proposed and validated.  
The developed methodology is illustrated through five substation configurations 
including single breaker-single bus, ring bus, double breaker-double bus, single-bus 
connected with bus tie, and breaker and a half. The difference between these five 
configurations lies in their robustness to N-k contingencies as illustrated in the probability 
calculation. The developed algorithms are implemented in Visual C++ and tested on a test 
system and IEEE-RTS 24 bus test system given in Appendix D and Appendix F.  
Section 2.1 identifies the causes and types of high order N-k contingencies as a result of 
topological variation, presents an analysis of the database provided by the (NERC) 
Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG) on large disturbances that have occurred in 
the bulk transmission systems in North America from 1984-2002. Section 2.2 uses an 
example to describe the graph theoretic representation of the power system in terms of edges, 
vertices, and a corresponding incidence matrix. Section 2.3 develops equations for computing 
probability of inadvertent tripping contingency and generalizes the equations developed in 
section 2.3 and presents a method to calculate the probability of inadvertent tripping or 
protection system misoperation following an initial event. Section 2.4 illustrates the method 
using five basic substation topological configurations. Section 2.5 further illustrates using 
two test systems, and Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.1 System Topology and Primary Multiple Contingencies 
Transmission substations are normally designed to ensure that a single fault results in at 
most the loss of a single circuit. However, the actual substation topology, at any given 
moment, may differ from the designed configuration, as the topological configuration of a 
substation, in terms of the connectivity of the elements through the switching devices 
(switches and breakers), may change. Variations in substation topology can occur as a result 
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of operator action for purposes of facility maintenance and for purposes of mitigating 
undesirable operating conditions such as high circuit loading or out-of-limit voltages. To a 
lesser extent, topological variation may also occur as a result of forced outages. 
Substation topological variation may, in some instances, result in situations where the 
operation of the protective systems, in response to the occurrence of a fault in the network, 
removes two or more elements when clearing the fault. Such topologies significantly increase 
the risk-level of the network, as it exposes the system to a multi-outage contingency as a 
result of a single fault, whose probability is equivalent to that of an N-1 contingency. As N-k 
contingencies are inherently more severe than N-1 contingencies, an N-k contingency having 
a probability of the same order of magnitude as an N-1 contingency may cause a very high 
amount of risk, since risk associated with a specific contingency is the expected value of the 
contingency consequence [15]. 
We will classify event probabilities by their probability order [16, 17, 18] which is best 
described by an example. If the probability of an event, say a fault at a particular location, 
occurring in the next hour, is 10-5, then the probability of two independent faults occurring in 
the next time hour is 10-10, and three independent faults 10-15, and so on. We say, then, that 
any event (or event combination, independent or not) with probability having order of 
magnitude -5 is an order 1 event, any event with probability having order of magnitude -10 is 
an order 2 event, any event with probability having order of magnitude -15 is an order 3 
event, and so on. A detailed discussion on probability precision based on rare event 
approximation and probability orders is given in Appendix A. 
An operator may not be aware of increased N-k likelihood that results from switching 
actions. In this case, automated detection is critical. Even if the operator is aware of the 
increased likelihood, the question remains as to its severity and therefore its risk. A search 
algorithm and the associated code have been developed to detect these situations and the 
pseudo code is given in Appendix B. It is discussed in detail in [4]. The inputs required for 
the algorithm include the breaker-switch status data obtained from the SCADA system. As 
this data is also used for EMS topology processing, it is available in most control centers.  
Another cause of N-k events is the failure of a breaker to open or protection failure to trip 
under a faulted condition. Such an event is of lower probability than that of an N-1 outage, as 
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it is comprised of a fault and a protection system failure. Because these are two independent 
events, it is of order 2. Yet, the severity, in terms of number of outaged elements, may be 
extreme, and therefore the risk may not be negligible. The graph-search algorithm given in 
Appendix B also detects this situation. This is also discussed in detail in [4].A systematic 
methodology for the probability calculation of inadvertent tripping or protection system 
misoperation leading to N-k events is developed in the current research and illustrated 
through five substation topologies [19]. This is an order 2 or higher order contingency. 
The NERC Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG) provides a database on large 
disturbances that have occurred in the bulk transmission systems in North America since 
1984 [20]. The analysis of this information has resulted in a classification of three types 
among those related to protection failures: (1) inadvertent tripping, (2) protection relay fail to 
trip, and (3) breaker failure. A summary of the DAWG database in terms of this classification 
is given in Table 1. The approach developed in this work identifies the highest probability 
occurrence of the first category of these three different kinds of protection failure events. 
Table 1: Summary on disturbances caused by protection system failures 
     Year 
Inadvertent  
Tripping 
Protection 
fails to trip
Breaker  
Failure 
Total No. protection  
malfunction 
1984 4 0 1 5 
1985 2 0 5 7 
1986 1 1 2 4 
1987 2 0 0 2 
1988 6 0 0 6 
1989 6 0 0 6 
1990 0 2 1 3 
1991 3 1 1 5 
1992 1 1 2 4 
1993 1 0 3 4 
1994 2 0 3 5 
1995 5 1 1 7 
1996 2 0 1 3 
1997 1 0 2 3 
1998 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 1 0 1 
2000 2 0 2 4 
2001 4 1 0 5 
2002 5 0 1 6 
Total 47 8 25 80 
Percentage 58.75% 10% 31.25% 100% 
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2.2 Graph Theoretic Representations of Power System Topology  
The one-line diagram in Fig. 5 shows part of a real power system with bus bar segment 
BS-7 out for maintenance. Every component is tagged with a unique ID. Each of the 
components other than a bus section connects two different bus sections. In reality not all 
non-bus-section components (line, breaker, capacitor, generator, and switches) are joined by 
two bus bars. In this case a bus section is inserted between two non-bus-section components. 
This ensures that the data format for the topology of the power system is the same as those in 
EMS. A bus section is connected by one or more other types of components. If we take all 
the breakers and open switches (which form a cut set) away from the diagram, the whole 
diagram is decomposed into seven isolated parts. Each of the isolated parts is contained 
within a dashed circle. The components contained in each dashed circle of form a functional 
group (Fig. 5) A functional group does not include any circuit breaker and open switch, 
which forms the interface between two different functional groups. Generally, there is only 
one interfacing component, a breaker or a switch, connecting two functional groups. 
The functional groups are identified with dashed circles as in the one-line diagram in Fig. 
5, and each one is assigned a label FG i− . The interfacing components between each 
functional group are indicated with a grey ellipse, i.e., components BR-1, BR-2, BR-3, SW-
2, and SW-3. 
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Fig. 5: One-line diagram of actual system illustrating functional groups 
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The expressions iFTP , 
i
FLP  and 
i
PDP  are three different reliability indices defined for power 
system components. iFTP  is the probability that component has a ground fault contingency 
and iFLP  means the probability that the component fails and has to be forced out from 
operation. Since fault contingency is only one of the different modes of failure, iFLP  must be 
greater than or equal to iFTP . 
i
PDP  is called per demand fail probability, i.e. the conditional 
probability that the component fails to perform an action when the component is demanded 
to perform that action. Not all components require all three reliability indices. Both iFTP  and 
i
FLP  are defined for non bus-section and non switching-components (line, capacitor and 
generator) because these components have many failure modes in addition to ground fault. 
Since these components are static devices that do not receive any command from control and 
perform any action, they do not have an iFDP  index. Only 
i
FLP  is defined for bus sections since 
they are static and fault is virtually the only possible failure mode for them. Only iPDP  is 
defined for switching components (breakers and switches) as they receive command from 
protection relay to connect or disconnect actions. Although it is possible for a switch 
component to have ground fault or other mode of failure, this probability is transferred to that 
of the two components the switch component connects by increasing the iFTP  and
i
FLP . The 
value of iPDP  depends on the switching status of the component. If the component is already 
in OPEN (or OFF) state, then iPDP  is zero, otherwise, it is the conditional probability that the 
component fails to open when required.  
The previous discussion is summarized in Table 2 and Table 3, for the specific sample 
system of Fig. 5. All the components treated as vertices are listed in Table 2, and all the 
components treated as edges are listed in Table 3. Each component is assigned a number I.D. 
in addition to the name I.D. 
Table 2: List of vertex components of the power system diagram in Fig. 5 
-$.$ &	  &	/ &	
 &	0 &	" &	1 &	2 &	3 &	4 &	 !
  2  3  4 /! /  // /
 /0 /" /1
+$
17
FTP 
18
FTP 
19
FTP 
20
FTP 
21
FTP 
22
FTP 
23
FTP 
24
FTP 
25
FTP 
26
FTP 
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Since each functional group is tripped by protection relays as a whole entity, any fault or 
failure of a component within the group will cause the whole group to be tripped. The 
probability a functional group is tripped can be calculated as
∈ iSi
i
FLP , where the elements of 
iS  are the indices of all the components in functional group i . The probability that a 
functional group is tripped due to fault can be calculated as 
i
i
FT
i S
P
∈
  in the same way. 
Table 3: List of edge components for the power system in Fig. 5 

&
+#
-$.$ -$.$
 
 
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We assume the availability of the connection data for each power substation and the 
components within and between them, as summarized in the 3rd and 4th columns of Table 3. 
The equations for each individual group are summarized in the last two columns of Table 4. 
We perform a graph search using this information to identify the functional groups. The 
results of this search for this example are provided in the first four columns of Table 4.  
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Table 4: List of functional groups and their failure probabilities 
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The fifth column of Table 4 provides the failure probabilities of the functional groups, 
which are the summation of the failure probabilities of the non-interfacing components 
comprising the functional group. 
If we take each functional group as a graph theoretic vertex, and any component (a 
breaker or an open switch) between two functional groups as an edge then Fig. 5 can be 
reduced as in Fig. 6. If we define ( )- ,  -FG i FG j  to be the component joining -FG i  and 
-FG j , the new graph can be expressed by ( ),  G X E=  
where { }  -1,  - 2,  - 3,  - 4,  -5,  - 7,  - 7X FG FG FG FG FG FG FG=  
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){  -1,  - 2 ,  - 2,  -3 ,  - 3,  - 4 ,  -3,  -5 ,E FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG=  
( ) ( )}-5, - 6 ,  - 6,  - 7FG FG FG FG  
{ }  -1,  - 2,  -3,  - 2,  - 3,  - 4BR BR BR SW SW BR=  
Fig. 6 shows the graph defined by ( ),  G X E= . Since the graph is an undirected graph, the 
pairs in E  are defined as exchangeable, i.e. ( ) ( )- ,  - - ,  -FG i FG j FG j FG i= . 
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Fig. 6: Reduced functional group graph for Fig. 5 
 
The results of the graph search also enable identification of the interconnections between 
functional groups, as summarized in Table 5. Each column in the table corresponds to a 
functional group, while each row corresponds to an interfacing component. There are two 
ones in each row, which indicate the interfacing component joint the two corresponding 
functional groups. The rest of the elements are all zeros. The array of elements in Table 3 can 
be represented via a matrix B in (1) where each row of B corresponds to an interfacing 
component, and each column corresponds to a functional group. This matrix is also called 
incidence matrix in graph theory [21]. 
 
Table 5: Connections for the interfacing components and the functional group (1- connected, 0- not 
connected) 
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2.3 High-order Contingencies due to inadvertent tripping 
 Inadvertent tripping after an initial fault or failure often leads to higher order 
contingencies. Inadvertent tripping generally occurs in the vicinity of the initial fault. 
Inadvertent tripping contingency forms the major part (about 55%) of the large system 
disturbances due to protection related cascading as given in Table 1. From practical 
experience it is seen that CT saturation causes misoperation of differential relays during 
external faults and delayed operation during internal faults. Inadvertent tripping often occurs 
at off-nominal frequency and due to outdated settings, human errors or overlapping zones of 
protection. The Northeast blackout on November 9, 1965, resulted in the loss of over 20,000 
MW of load and affected 30 million people. It was a result of a faulty relay setting resulting 
in the tripping of one of five heavily loaded 230-kV transmission lines and the system 
cascaded in 2.5 seconds. On December 14, 1995, a fault occurred on a 345 kV line in 
southern Idaho, which tripped correctly, followed by an incorrect trip of a parallel line and a 
third line tripped on overloading. System instability resulted in the formation of four islands, 
with system frequency dropping to 58.75 Hz and 3,000 MW of load curtailed by under 
frequency load shedding. The blackout of West Coast on July 2, 1996 resulted in the loss of 
11,850 MW of load and affected 2 million. Again it was a result of incorrect tripping of a 
parallel line after the initial contingency of a line sagging into a tree and resulted in the 
formation of five islands. In all the above cascading events inadvertent tripping played an 
important role. The table below summarizes an US utility experience with inadvertent 
tripping, and Table 7 summarizes the survey result conducted by Working Group I17 
Transmission System Relay Performance Comparison on misoperation [22]. The percentage 
misoperations are calculated via the misoperation formula given below  
% *100
#
All misoperations
misoperation
Total of events K= +
               (2) 
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 Table 6: A US Utility experience with misoperation 
Utility: Time Period: Jan. - Dec. 2004
Voltage: Dependability System Restoration
Total 
Misoperations
138 kV Failure to Trip Failure to Interrupt Slow Trip
Unnecessary Trip 
During Fault
Unnecessary 
Trip Other Than 
Fault
Failure to 
Reclose
Relay System 2 0 19 18 5 7 51
Circuit Breaker 1 1 0 0 3 2 7
Total Protective 
System 3 1 19 18 8 9 58
Percent Incorrect 
Operation Relay 
System
0.5% 0.0% 4.7% 4.5% 1.2% 1.7% 12.7%
Percent Incorrect 
Operation Circuit 
Breaker
0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.5% 1.8%
Percent Incorrect 
Operation 
Protective System
0.7% 0.2% 4.7% 4.5% 2.0% 2.2% 14.4%
138 kV Relay K = 5
Breaker K = 0
Total Operations: 397
Security
 
Table 7: Survey of US Utilities on Relay misoperation 
Company Total Events K Factor
Relay 
Misoperations Voltage
Failure to 
Trip
Failure to 
Interrupt Slow Trip
Unnecessary 
Trip During 
Fault
Unnecessary 
Trip Other 
Than Fault
Failure to 
Reclose
Total 
Misoperations
A
B
C 3 0 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3%
D
E
F
H
I
A 23 0 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.7% 8.7% 0.0% 17.4%
B 136 2 20 0.7% 0.0% 1.4% 5.1% 2.2% 5.1% 14.5%
C 22 1 13 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.0% 39.1% 4.3% 56.5%
D
E 16 4 7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.0% 35.0%
F 1 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
H
I 9 0 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3%
A
B
C 9 1 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0%
D
E 1 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
F
H
I
A 72 0 22 1.4% 0.0% 1.4% 19.4% 8.3% 0.0% 30.6%
B 303 9 46 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 6.7% 0.6% 4.5% 14.7%
C 128 0 29 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.8% 7.0% 7.8% 22.7%
D
E 115 3 23 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 14.4% 4.2% 0.0% 19.5%
F 15 1 10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 12.5% 0.0% 62.5%
H
I 10 6 11 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 6.3% 37.5% 68.8%
A 105 0 7 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 0.0% 1.0% 6.7%
B 697 1 12 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.6% 1.7%
C 397 1 24 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.8% 2.3% 6.0%
D
E 291 5 30 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 6.4% 1.0% 1.7% 10.1%
F
H
I 47 0 6 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 4.3% 4.3% 2.1% 12.8%
101 - 200
51 - 100
% INCORRECT OPERATIONS, YEAR 2003
Above 400
301 - 400
201 - 300
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It is assumed that only line or functional group connected to the initial contingent 
functional group or line will suffer inadvertent tripping. This assumption for the derivation of 
Inadvertent Tripping Contingency is based on the zones of protection in the real system.  The 
bases of this assumption are:  
1. Anecdotal evidence suggests that inadvertent tripping of an element is more likely with 
the size of transients experienced by the element, and the further the element is from the 
disturbance; the less likely will be the inadvertent trip. 
2. We have no information of more than one simultaneous inadvertent tripping from the 
open literature.  
If there is more than one functional group that can suffer inadvertent tripping than it is 
assumed that only one of them can suffer inadvertent tripping at a time. However, one can 
extend the equations developed below to account for exceptions in case the situation 
demands. 
A systematic methodology for the probability calculation of inadvertent tripping is 
developed and illustrated through the five substation topologies discussed above.  
The total probability of an inadvertent tripping contingency (ITC) k  involving line i  and 
line j  can be calculated by  
[ ]))Pr(*)Pr(/())Pr()(Pr(
*)Pr(
)Pr(/)Pr(
)Pr(/)Pr(
)Pr()Pr(
tripsjlinetripsilinetripsjlinetripsiline
tripsilinetripsjline
tripsjlinetripsjlinetripsiline
tripsilinetripsilinetripsjline
tripsjlinetripsilinetripsilinetripsjlineP
kITC
+
=
+
=
+=



   (3) 
assuming that the probability of failure/fault to be same for each line. Let  
i
lfp   : fault probability of line i . It is assumed to be the same (denoted as lp ) for all 
transmission lines; 
Therefore, 
)/1(*2*)Pr(
)]/()*2)[(Pr( 2
l
llITC
ptripsilinetripsjline
pptripsilinetripsjlineP
k


=
=
               (4) 
The result generalizes in terms of the functional group concept discussed earlier. Let us 
consider two functional groups represented by FG-i and FG-j. The probability that a 
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functional group FG-i is tripped due to failure of a component can be calculated as
∈ iSi
j
FLP , 
where the elements of iS  are the indices of all the components in functional group i . The 
probability that a functional group is tripped due to fault can be calculated as 
∈ iSi
j
FTP  in the 
same way. 
The probability of an ITC k  due to failure that involved FG- i  and FG- j  can be 
calculated by  
Pr( ) Pr( )
Pr( ) Pr( ) / Pr( )
kITC
P FG j trips FG i trips FG i trips FG j trips
where
FG jtrips FG i trips FG j trips FG i trips FG i trips
= − − + − −
− − = − − −
              (5) 
[ ]
Pr( ) / Pr( )
Pr( ) / Pr( )
Pr( ) *
(Pr( ) Pr( )) /( Pr( ) * Pr( )
Pr( )
kITC
i j
FL FL
i S
P FG j trips FG i trips FG i trips
FG i trips Fg j trips FG j trips
FG j trips FG i trips
FG i trips FG j trips FG i trips FG j trips
FG j trips FG i trips P P
∈
= − − −
+ − − −
= − −
− + − − −
= − − +



 / *
i i i i
i j
FL FL
i S i S i S
P P
∈ ∈ ∈
 	 	    
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Similarly the probability of an ITC k  due to fault that involved FG- i  and FG- j  can be 
calculated by  
kITC
P
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i
FT PPPPtripsiFGtripsjFG */)Pr(       (6) 
In the above case it was considered that there is a possibility of only one additional 
functional group suffering inadvertent tripping. When there are more functional groups 
which can trip inadvertently then one can similarly find an expression of the total probability 
by conditioning on each functional group sequentially and adding their probabilities. For 
example when the failure of one can initiate inadvertent tripping of either of the two then the 
expression for total ITC probability will look like  
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)Pr(
)Pr(
)Pr(
tripsiFGtripskFGortripsjFG
tripsjFGtripskFGortripsiFG
tripskFGtripsjFGortripsiFGP
lITC
−−−+
−−−+
−−−=
               (7) 
2.3.1 Generalized form for Inadvertent Tripping Contingency 
In this section a generalized method from the system topology to find the total probability 
of ITC after an initial contingency is developed. As it was discussed above, the power system 
can be represented as an undirected graph with functional groups as the vertices and the 
interfacing elements as the edges. The graph search algorithm developed enables 
identification of the interconnections between functional groups. The methodology will be 
illustrated with the example of the power system shown in Fig. 5 and the result generalized. 
For the power system shown in Fig. 5, the result of the graph search is summarized in Table 
5. Each column in the table corresponds to a functional group, while each row corresponds to 
an interfacing component. There are two ones in each row, which indicate the interfacing 
component joining the two corresponding functional groups. The rest of the elements are all 
zeros. This is represented as the incidence matrix in (1) which is reproduced below 
 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
B
 
 
 
 
=  
 
 
  
 
                                                                                               (8) 
The new matrix TB in (9) is obtained by taking the transpose of the matrix B in (1)  
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
TB
 
 
 
 
 
=  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                             (9) 
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Each column in (9) corresponds to an interfacing component, while each row corresponds 
to a functional group.  
{ }  -1,  - 2,  -3,  - 4,  - 5,  - 6,  - 7X FG FG FG FG FG FG FG=                              (10) 
( * ( ))K P B diag X=                                                                                       (11) 
( )D diag K=                                                                                                    (12) 
(1) (1 1 1 ....)C =                                                                                                  (13) 
where C(1) is the unit column matrix of order (1*7), P is the joint probability of failure 
of the functional groups in each row of the matrix * ( )B diag X  which can be approximately 
calculated from the outage data base available in the utilities for past many years.  
Then all the equations in (5) and (6) can be summarized in the matrix form as  
   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FG FG FG FGP P P P P P P P=                      (14) 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                            (15)                      
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FGITC
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
P
P
P
PP
P
P
P
 
 
 
 
 
=  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                   (16)  
and 
1
ITC
FGP is the total probability of ITC given the fault/ failure in functional group 1. It is 
assumed that 
i
FT
FGP  is not identically equal to zero. In other words it is not a bus section. The 
case where iFG  is a bus section is discussed as a special case below. 
Equation (16) is the general formula for any power system whose topology is known in 
terms of the switching elements and components of the functional group.  So for the power 
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system example in Fig. 5, the ITC probability for each functional group can be calculated as 
below. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
[ * ( )] * (1)
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC FT T
FG IFG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
P
P
P
P A diag P C
P
P
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                    (17) 
where 
1 2
2 3
3 4
3
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
                                                                            0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
( ) 0 0 0 0 0
0 ( ) 0 0 0 0
0 0 ( ) 0 0 0
* 
0 0 0 (
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P FG FG
P FG FG
P FG FG
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∩
∩
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In the same way the ITC can be found for any power system once the functional groups 
are identified. With the changing topology of the power system the functional groups can be 
identified in an updating mode and continuous tracking of increased ITC probability can be 
very useful in real time operations.  
2.3.2 Special Case 
When all the functional group(s) connected by the interfacing element(s) of the failed or 
faulted functional group contains/contain only bus sections as their components then all the 
functional groups connected to these bus sections will have equal probability to suffer 
inadvertent tripping. This special case is incorporated by modifying the matrix B . The 
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modified matrix is obtained by subtracting the column corresponding to the faulted 
functional group from the sum of the columns of the functional groups connected to the 
faulted functional group through the interfacing elements of the faulted functional group. In 
the next step the columns corresponding to the functional groups connected to the faulted 
functional group are made zero. To find the ITC corresponding to this special case only the 
transpose of the column corresponding to the faulted functional group in the TB matrix is 
needed. This gives the ITC probability of the functional group which is connected only to the 
bus section through all interfacing elements. From practical experience the probability of a 
fault in a bus section is once in a lifetime and is ‘almost zero’ compared to other components 
fault probability. Thus the probability of bus fault is assumed to be zero. Similarly the 
probability of simultaneous outage of two functional groups where one of the functional 
group is a bus section is zero. Hence the ITC probability for an initial contingency on a bus 
section is zero and is not calculated.  
The analytical equations developed above give a concise mathematical form to identify 
ITC from the system point of view and calculate their probabilities. They form the 
foundation for the ITC probability calculation for any power system. However with the size 
of the system, the size of B becomes very large and sparsity technology has to be used to 
handle it efficiently. Other matrix operations as in the case of the special case discussed 
above are also memory intensive.  
Therefore based on the analytical foundation, a computer based graph search algorithm is 
also developed to search for functional groups, its components, the interfacing elements, and 
to get the ITCs without formulating the B matrix. Once the ITC’s are identified their 
probabilities are calculated as discussed in equations (5) and (6). 
In the next section, the probability calculation for the typical substation topologies are 
illustrated directly from the topology and with the help of the formula developed. This will 
illustrate the effectiveness of the concise formula developed for a large system where it is not 
easy to enumerate all the different possibilities easily. A systematic method is indispensable 
for a large system.  
  
27 
2.4 Probability calculation illustration for the Typical Substation 
Topologies 
2.4.1 Ring Bus 
This configuration is simple and straightforward. From Fig. 7, there are a total of four 
functional groups and four breakers. In this simple configuration from the topology it is 
evident that a fault on a single line can trigger inadvertent tripping on either of the two lines 
connected to the same bus through an electrical distance of one breaker. For illustration 
purposes it is assumed that the fault occurs on line 3 or FG-3 and is tripped correctly.  
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
B
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 
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Fig. 7: Ring bus station with B-matrix 
 
Now one of the two functional groups FG-2 or FG-4 can trip inadvertently. The 
functional group fault probability is calculated as in (12), and assuming the failure 
probability of bus 0bfp  . So the probability of ITC when FG-3 trips is  
 
1
Pr( 2 4 3 )ITCP FG trips or FG trips FG trips= − − −                        (18) 
Since the inadvertent tripping of any of the functional groups is independent of each other 
and assuming they are disjoint the above expression becomes. 
( )
1
32 3 3 4
Pr( 2 3 ) Pr( 4 3 )
[ ( ) ( )] 1 /
ITC
FT
FG
P FG trips FG trips FG trips FG trips
P FG FG P FG FG P
= − − + − −
= ∩ + ∩
   (19) 
The ITC probability calculations using equations (10)-(16) are also shown below. 
1 2 3 4
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FGP P P P P=                                                            (20) 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                                  (21)  
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1
2
3
4
1 2
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3 4
1 4
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   
   
=   ∩ + ∩   
       
                                  (22) 
which is same as obtained from the topology in (19). 
2.4.2 Breaker and a Half Bus (B-HB) 
The configuration of B-HB is shown in Fig. 8, having a total of six functional groups and 
six breakers. In this simple bus configuration a fault on a single line can trigger inadvertent 
tripping on only lines connected between the same pair of buses through an electrical 
distance of one breaker and on the same side. For illustration purposes it is assumed that the 
fault occurs on line 3 or FG-4. 
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Fig. 8: Breaker and a half bus 
 
Now only FG-5 can trip inadvertently which is on the same side as FG-4 and between the 
same pair of buses. The functional group fault probabilities are calculated, assuming the 
failure probability of bus 0bfp  . So the probability of ITC contingency when FG-4 trips 
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2
Pr( 5 4 )ITCP FG trips FG trips= − −                      (23) 
         = ( )45 4[ ( )] 1/ FTFGP FG FG P∩  
Now from equations (10)-(16) the corresponding equations for a breaker and half are as 
follows  
1 2 3 4 5 6
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FG FG FGP P P P P P P=                                  (24) 
where 
3
FT
FGP and 6
FT
FGP are zero. But all the terms of the form ( )( )* 1/ iFTj i FGP FG FG P∩ are 
zero where i = 3, 6 j i≠ . 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                            (25) 
( )
1
2
44
6
5 4
..
..
[ ( )] 1/
..
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
FTITC
FGFG
ITC
FG
P
P
P FG FG PP
P
   
   
   
=   ∩   
       
                                                         (26) 
which is same as calculated from the topology. In the final expression the terms 
3
ITC
FGP and 
6
ITC
FGP are not included because they are bus sections and ITC corresponding to them is zero as 
explained earlier. 
2.4.3 Single Bus Connected with Tie Breaker (SB-TB) 
This configuration SB-TB in Fig. 9 is adapted from SB-SB by splitting the bus and 
adding a tie-breaker between the two buses. From the topology it is evident that a fault on a 
single line can trigger inadvertent tripping on only lines connected to the same bus through 
an electrical distance of one breaker and on the same side of the tie breaker. For illustration 
purposes it is assumed that the fault occurs on line 1 or FG-1.  
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Fig. 9: Single bus connected with tie-breaker and it's B-matrix 
 
So now only FG-2 can trip inadvertently. The functional group fault probability is 
calculated assuming the failure probability of the bus 0bfp  . So the probability of ITC 
contingency when FG-1 trips is  
 )12Pr(
3
tripsFGtripsFGPITC −−=                       (27) 
          = ( )12 1[ ( )] 1/ FTFGP FG FG P∩  
Now from equations (10)-(16) the corresponding equations for this configuration are as 
follows  
1 2 3 4 5 6
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FG FG FGP P P P P P P=                                  (28) 
where 
5
FT
FGP and 6
FT
FGP are zero. But all the terms of the form ( )( )* 1/ iFTj i FGP FG FG P∩ are 
zero where i = 5, 6 j i≠ . 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                            (29) 
( )1 1
2
3
4
2 1[ ( )] 1/
                  
                  
                  
ITC
FTFG
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
ITC
FG
P P FG FG P
P
P
P
   ∩   
   
=   
   
       



                                                           (30) 
which is same as calculated from the topology. In the final expression the terms 
5
ITC
FGP and 
6
ITC
FGP are not included because they are bus sections and ITC corresponding to them is zero as 
explained earlier 
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2.4.4 Single Breaker and Single Bus (SB-SB) 
In the simple configuration in Fig. 10, a fault on a single line can trigger inadvertent 
tripping on any one of the remaining three lines since all are connected to the same bus 
through an electrical distance of one breaker. For illustration purposes it is assumed that the 
fault occurs on line 3 or FG-3. 
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Fig. 10: Single breaker single bus substation and it's B-matrix 
 
Now one or more of the remaining functional groups can trip inadvertently. The 
functional group fault probability, which is the summation of the fault probability of each 
component in the functional group, is calculated assuming the failure probability of the 
bus 0bfp  . So the probability of ITC when FG-3 trips is  
 
4
Pr( 1 2 4 3 )ITCP FG tripsor FG trips or FG trips FG trips= − − − −  (31) 
Since the inadvertent tripping of any of the functional groups is independent of each other 
and assuming they are disjoint the above expression becomes. 
4
Pr( 1 3 ) Pr( 2 3 )
Pr( 4 3 )
ITCP FG trips FG trips FG trips FG trips
FG trips FG trips
= − − + − −
+ − −
  (32) 
( )
31 3 2 3 4 3
[ ( ) ( ) ( )] 1/ FTFGP FG FG P FG FG P FG FG P= ∩ + ∩ + ∩                 (33) 
This configuration falls under the category of special case where the faulted functional 
group is connected only to a bus section. So to calculate its ITC probability through (10)-(16) 
the matrix B is modified as explained earlier. So in this case the B matrix for ITC probability 
of FG-3 becomes 
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'
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
B
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
                                                                                          (34) 
( )' 1 1 0 1TB =  row corresponding to FG-3                                                     (35) 
 
1 2 3 4 5
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FG FGP P P P P P=                                             (36) 
where 
5
FT
FGP is zero. But all the terms of the form ( )( )* 1/ iFTj i FGP FG FG P∩ are zero where 
i = 5 and j i≠ . 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                            (37) 
( )3 31 3 2 3 4 3[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] 1/ITC FTFG FGP P FG FG P FG FG P FG FG P= ∩ + ∩ + ∩                    (38) 
which is same as calculated from the topology. In this configuration all the non bus section 
functional groups are connected only to the bus section and ITC is calculated similarly for 
each of them. 
2.4.5 Double Breaker and Double Bus (DB-DB) 
The configuration of DB-DB is shown in Fig. 11, and there are a total of six functional 
groups and eight breakers, much more than other types of substations. In this configuration a 
fault on a single line can trigger inadvertent tripping on any one of the remaining three lines 
since all are connected to the same bus through an electrical distance of one breaker. For 
illustration purposes it is assumed that the fault occurs on line 1 or FG-1. The functional 
group fault probabilities are calculated assuming the failure probability of the bus 0bfp  . 
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Fig. 11: Double breaker and double bus and it's B-matrix 
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So the probability of ITC contingency when FG-1 trips is  
 
5
Pr( 2 3 4 1 )ITCP FG tripsor FG trips or FG trips FG trips= − − − −        (39) 
Since the inadvertent tripping of any of the functional groups is independent of each other 
and assuming they are disjoint the above expression becomes. 
5
Pr( 2 1 ) Pr( 3 1 )
Pr( 4 1 )
ITCP FG trips FG trips FG trips FG trips
FG trips FG trips
= − − + − −
+ − −
 (40) 
( )
11 2 1 3 1 4
[ ( ) ( ) ( )] 1/ FTFGP FG FG P FG FG P FG FG P= ∩ + ∩ + ∩               (41) 
This configuration is similar to SB-SB in that the faulted functional groups are connected 
only to functional groups containing a bus section. So to calculate its ITC probability the 
matrix B is modified as explained earlier. So in this case the B matrix for ITC probability of 
FG-1 becomes 
'
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
B
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                         (42) 
( )' 0 1 11 0 1 11TB =  row corresponding to FG-1                                                 (43) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
(1/ , 1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ ,1/ )FT FT FT FT FT FT FT TIFG FG FG FG FG FG FGP P P P P P P=                                  (44) 
where 
5
FT
FGP and 6
FT
FGP are zero. But all the terms of the form ( )( )* 1/ iFTj i FGP FG FG P∩ are 
zero where i = 5, 6 and j i≠ . 
[( * ) * ( )] * (1)T T FT TITC IFGP B D diag P C=                                                                  (45) 
( )1 11 2 1 3 1 42*[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] 1/ITC FTFG FGP P FG FG P FG FG P FG FG P= ∩ + ∩ + ∩                 (46) 
This is twice as calculated from the topology. This makes sense because both the functional 
groups connected to the faulted functional group are in turn connected to same set of 
functional groups. And with large number of breakers, relays and overlapping zones of 
protection, along with advantages comes disadvantages of higher likelihood of misoperation 
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or inadvertent tripping. So ITC probability after an initial contingency is higher than 
expected. Similarly the ITC probabilities for other non bus section functional groups are 
computed. Table 8 gives a summary of the topological analysis results for higher order stuck 
breaker and inadvertent tripping contingencies. In Table 8, the smallest ITC probability 
(
2ITC
P k= ) is much smaller than the smallest stuck breaker contingency probability 
(4×psb×plb).  
Table 8 The probability of high-order contingency for different substations 
Type Prob (Fault plus stuck breaker) 
Prob (Fault plus 
ITC) 
SB-SB 4×psb×plb 3*k 
Ring 8×psb×plb 2*k 
SB-TL 4×psb×plb k 
DB-DB 8×psb×plb 3*k 
B-HB 8×psb×plb k 
 
2.5 Test System 
The developed methodology is implemented in Visual C++ computer language. The 
program includes the algorithms to calculate the probabilities of functional group and stuck 
breaker contingencies developed in [14]. Results for the probabilities of these contingencies 
are the same as in [14]. 
 The approach is tested on a test system given in Appendix D with 12 substations, 6 
generators, 10 transformers, 119 bus section nodes and 39 line nodes. The test system data 
are given in Table 30 and Table 31 (APPENDIX E), and the result for the test system is 
summarized below in Table 9. The algorithm is also tested on IEEE-RTS 24 bus test system 
given in Appendix F. The results for the IEEE-RTS system are summarized in Table 10. In 
both the cases the full run of the program takes less than a second.  
Table 9: Result of N-k contingency selection algorithm on Test System 
Type Functional Group Stuck Breaker Inadvertent Tripping 
Number 71 126 125 
 
Table 10: Result of N-k contingency selection algorithm on IEEE-RTS 24 Bus Test System 
Type Functional Group Stuck Breaker Inadvertent Tripping 
Number 117 196 147 
  
35 
In both the above cases the results found by the program are the same as those found by 
inspection. For example, one observes in the 21 bus test system that a fault on line L107 
could result in an ITC at bus section 12 removing line L108. The program found this ITC and 
computed its probability to be 10-7. 
Statistics of all the N-k, k1 contingencies for both the systems are shown in Table 1 to 
Table 16. In each of the following tables the first line in this table shows the number of 
components lost in a contingency; the second line indicates the number of such contingencies 
identified. Table 11 and Table 14 show the statistics on contingencies caused by faults (order 
P) for the 21 bus system and the IEEE RTS96 systems respectively. Table 12 and Table 15 
show the statistics on contingencies caused fault followed by breaker failure (order P2) for 
the 21 bus system and the IEEE RTS96 systems respectively. Similarly Table 13 and Table 
16 show the statistics on contingencies caused by an initial fault followed by an ITC (order 
P2) for the 21 bus system and the IEEE RTS96 systems respectively. We only count lines, 
transformers, generators, and shunts. Loads, switches, breakers, and bus sections are not 
counted. 
From Table 11-Table 16, we observe there are some N-k (k>1) events that have 
probabilities on the order of N-1 events. Such events are extremely high-risk events. 
Similarly, there are some N-k (k>2) events that have probabilities on the order of N-2 events. 
These events are high-risk events. 
Table 11 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from a single fault (Order P) for 21 Bus 
System 
k 1 2 
No. 42 6 
 
Table 12 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from a fault/breaker failure (order P2) for 21 
Bus System 
k 1 2 
No. 59 67 
 
Table 13 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from ITC (Order P2) for 21 Bus System 
k 2 3 
No. 86 39 
 
Table 14 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from a single fault (Order P) for IEEE 
RTS96 
k 1 2 
No. 63 4 
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Table 15 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from a fault/breaker failure (order P2) for 
IEEE RTS96 
k 1 2 3 4 
No. 82 88 1 3 
 
 
Table 16 Number of contingencies of type N-k resulting from ITC (Order P2) for IEEE RTS96 
k 2 3 4 
No. 137 5 5 
 
Thus, the developed methodology is powerful yet simple to implement and has immense 
value in on line tracking of the system’s exposure to vulnerability via changes in the system 
topology.  
The topology of the power system is continuously changing and hence the approach can 
be used in an updating mode, taking into consideration of the changes in the status of the 
switch-breaker which would normally result in the formation of one or more new functional 
groups or merging into smaller number of functional groups. This makes the process very 
computationally efficient 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter documents systematic method for computing probability order of 
inadvertent tripping contingencies as a function of the switch-breaker data commonly 
available within the EMS.  In many decision problems, knowledge of the “probability order” 
of the significant events is sufficient to distinguish between alternatives because probability 
order is a reasonable measure of event’s probability. Rare event approximations (Appendix 
A) underpin the selection of high order contingencies for online security assessment. This 
makes sense because the probability of a compound event is dominated by the lowest order 
terms. 
Five substation configurations, including single-bus connected with bus tie, ring bus, 
double breaker-double bus, single breaker-single bus, and breaker and a half are used in the 
illustrations of the probability calculation approach developed for N-k (k>2 implied) 
contingencies, and the results are summarized in Table 8.  
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The methodology developed for probability calculation is simple and needs no extra 
information other that switch-breaker data which is available in most control centers. The 
approach can be used in an updating mode with the changes in the topology of the system, 
taking into consideration changes in the status of the switches and breakers which normally 
results in formation of one or more new functional groups or merging into smaller number of 
functional groups. Thus continuous tracking of system topology generates the higher order 
contingencies based on probability order for online security assessment. 
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CHAPTER 3 NUMERICAL METHODS – DIRECT METHODS 
The long-term dynamic simulation of a power system is of interest in this research 
because it enables the evaluation and analysis of events which may lead to cascading 
outages. However, in order for such simulation to be of value in an operational context, it 
must be able to perform simulations very fast. This chapter is motivated by the desire to 
make algorithmic improvements to power system time domain simulation methods that will 
enhance computational efficiency.  
Power system response to disturbances is decided not only by fast dynamics of its 
machines, but also by the action of slow processes, such as tap changers and the load 
dynamics. They often cause voltage problems and/or thermal loading problems after an 
extended period. Over the decades there has been intense intellectual labor and resulting 
technological advancement in speed of computers and numerical algorithms. The availability 
of these sophisticated numerical integration algorithms with variable time steps has made 
large simulation time steps possible. Commercial programs such as EUROSTAG, GE’s 
EXSTAB, and Powertech’s TSAT have successfully implemented the so called “A-stable” 
implicit method of performing numerical integration  [23].  
In general, there are two broad categories of numerical methods - the explicit and the 
implicit. In the explicit methods, the next step calculation uses only the solution information 
known; whereas the implicit methods use the unknown solution information of next-step(s). 
Iterative methods, such as Newton method are needed to solve the implicit non-linear 
equations. One attractive feature of implicit methods lies in the fact that they allow very large 
time steps. Reference [24] reports the usage of 20 seconds in EXSTAB and [23] reports the 
usage of 10 seconds time step in EUROSTAG without the loss of numerical stability.  
Although some companies have implemented on-line transient instability analysis for 
detection of early-swing problems, we are aware of no company that has implemented long-
term simulation capability for on-line purposes. Reasons for this are (a) perceived need and 
(b) technological capability. We have addressed the operational need for such simulation 
capability in Chapter 1, with underlying rationale being it will provide ability to prepare for 
multi-element (N-k) events that can result in severe impact. In this chapter, we address one 
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aspect of the technological capability issue, and that is algorithmic speed. Given the 
complexity of the interconnected power grid, it is difficult to gain significant scaling in 
computational speed without exploiting the structure and the nature of the differential 
equations governing the power system. In this research we employ advanced numerical 
algorithms which take advantage of the power system governing equations.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents in summary form the 
differential-algebraic equations (DAE which will be derived in Chapter 4), and we discuss 
their nature and uniqueness. Section 3.2 discusses potential targets for enhancing 
computational efficiency. Section 3.3 focuses on the algorithmic targets of enhancing 
computational efficiency, including application of unsymmetric multifrontal methods to the 
linear system solution step of the implicit integration procedure. The frontal and multifrontal 
methods and the advantages of multifrontal methods are identified. Section 3.4 illustrates the 
method on a test system, and Section 3.5 provides a quantitative comparison of the 
multifrontal methods with the Gaussian elimination and other sparse solvers.  
3.1  Formulation of Dynamic Algebraic Equations 
Chapter 4 discusses in detail the individual power system component modeling and 
problem formulation for dynamic simulation studies. For the sake of completion, we preempt 
the derivations here, and present the resulting differential algebraic equations (DAE) 
developed in Chapter 4. The equations developed are for all the generations including the 
exciter, the governor, and the AGC models. The two axis model for the generator is used in 
the present study. For generators, the notation used is the same as in [25]. The limiter for 
each variable is implemented in program logic, and is not shown in the equations. The set of 
differential equations are as follows 
1
t
δ
ω
∂
= −
∂
                    (47) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )' ' ' '1r d d q q q d q d jY P Ds E I E I X X I I Ttω ω∂  	= × − − − + − − ∂     (48) 
( )' ' ' '0∂ = − − −∂  	 d d q q q q
E
E X X I T
t
             (49) 
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           (53) 
The set of algebraic equations are as follows, where i is the index of the generator, and j 
is the index of the generator bus. 
'
'
0
−
− + =
      
      
      
i i i i i
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V E X r I             (54) 
for each generator; 
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for each generator bus; 
cos , sin
0
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−
− =
    
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   
j jj j
x q
j jj j
y d
I I
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for each generator bus; 
1 1
1 1
0× − =
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                (57) 
for the whole linear impedance network with n voltage bus ( busY  is the system admittance 
matrix); 
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for each load bus with constant P and Q. The loads in our test system are modeled as constant 
active and reactive power injection.  
Equations (54) to (56) are for each individual generator. Equations (57) and (58) are for 
the whole network and each voltage bus respectively. The differential algebraic equation 
(DAE) developed in (47) through (58) can be summarized as 
( ),dx f x y
dt
=                     (59) 
( )0 ,g x y=                     (60) 
where  
x is a vector of state variables in (47)~(53) 
(59) is the group of equations in (47)~(53) 
y is a vector of the additional variables in (54)~(58)  
(60) is the group of equations in (54)~(58). 
 
The DAE have been called singular, implicit, differential-algebraic, descriptor, 
generalized state space, noncanonic, noncausal, degenerate, semistate, constrained, reduced 
order model, and nonstandard systems depending on the area of application it emerged from.    
At this point, we would like to discuss the reasons to consider the equations (83)-(84) in 
this form, rather than trying to convert it as an ODE to solve. Just like in the present 
formulation, the formulation of many physical systems takes the form of a DAE depicting a 
collection of relationships between variables of interest and some of their derivatives. These 
variables usually have a physical significance. Attempting to covert the DAE to an ODE may 
result in the loss of their direct meanings and physical significance. Also in many cases it 
may be time consuming or impossible to obtain an explicit ODE model.  
  Often parameters are associated with applications like power systems. Changing 
parameter values can alter the relationships between variables, and may require different 
explicit models with solution manifolds of different dimensions. If we can solve the DAE 
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directly, then it becomes easier to study the effect of modeling changes and parametric 
variations. It also facilitates the interfacing of modeling software with the design software. 
The change to explicit form can destroy sparsity and prevent the exploitation of system 
structure, which is one of the major area we take advantage of in this research. All the above 
advantages and numerical reasons have led to significant research in the development of 
algorithms for solving DAE. None of the currently available numeric techniques support 
working with all DAE. Some additional conditions, either on the structure of the DAE and 
/or the numerical method, need to be satisfied for each case.  
In the literature [26], there has been a significant effort to develop A-stable, accurate, and 
fast numerical integration methods with variable time steps. Although the different numerical 
integration schemes differ in their convergence, order, stability, and other properties, they do 
not necessarily offer considerable improvement in computational efficiency. In the next 
section, we discuss the solution strategy for the integration of DAE which are well suited for 
power systems.  
3.2 Solution Strategy  
One of the aims of this research is to obtain high speed to simulate extended time domain 
simulation for the purpose of online monitoring, tracking, and devising correcting action 
strategies for mitigating the frequency and impact of high consequence events. Most of the 
current methods for solving the power system dynamic simulation problems are developed 
for use on conventional sequential machines. This leads to the natural conclusion that there 
are two viable options to reduce the wall-clock time to solve a computationally intensive 
problem like power system time domain simulation. These are i) advanced hardware 
technology in terms of speed, memory, I/O, architecture and so on, and ii) more efficient 
algorithm. Although the emphasis is generally on the hardware, nevertheless efficient 
algorithms can offer great advantage in achieving the desired speed. There exists a symbiotic 
relationship between the two. We focus on the efficient algorithms to achieve high 
computational gain.  
We can safely divide our simulator software into three parts, namely 1) a user interface 2) 
DAE solver kernel and 3) the output assembler. The maximum time amounting to almost 
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90%-95% of the total time is spent on the DAE solver. Any DAE solver requires three 
categories of numerical analysis techniques: 
• Numerical Integration schemes 
• Solution of non linear equations 
• Solution of linear equations 
In the following subsections we discuss the implementation of these numerical 
techniques.  
3.3  Integration Scheme for DAE 
As seen in the previous section, the power system is modeled, in summary by a set of 
thousands of differential and algebraic equations. These have inherent nonlinearities in them 
and the resulting DAE is highly stiff in nature. Switching events, contingencies, forced 
outages introduce significant discontinuities in the system variables. The numerical scheme 
must converge quickly, give desired accuracy, be reliable and stable. The implicit integration 
scheme called Theta method [27] satisfies all the above requirements and is used in our 
simulator. It does not have the infamous Hyper Stability problem [23], which means that an 
algorithm will falsely report stability when the physical system is actually unstable. Theta 
Method is an example of a general approach to designing algorithms in which geometric 
intuition is replaced by Taylor series expansion. Invariably the implicit function theorem is 
also used in the design and analysis of the scheme. This method is also known as the 
weighted method.  
Consider         ( ),dx f t y
dt
=                    (61) 
The theta method can be expressed in the general form as  
1 1 1[ ( , ) +(1- ) ( , )]   0,1,...n n n n n ny y h f t y f t y nθ θ+ + += + =            (62) 
where 
n
h  is the time step of integration at time n , n =0,1,2..  
1
2
0;    Explicit Euler
1;     Implicit Euler
;   Trapezoidal
θ
θ
θ
=
=
=
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The 1θ =  case is very practical. At 1θ = , it is called the ``Backward Euler'' or ``Implicit 
Euler'' scheme. It is a simple yet robust method for solving stiff ODEs. The difference 
between the exact solution and the above approximation at 
n
t t=  is  
( ) ( ) ( )2 3 41 1 12 2 3n n nh y t h y t hθ θ θ    ′′′− + − +      
            (63) 
Hence, the method is order 2 for 12θ =  which corresponds to Trapezoidal integration 
method, and otherwise it is of order 1. The concept of order is based on assumption that error 
is concentrated on the leading order of the Taylor series expansion (on real computers, h  is 
small, but finite). For example at 2 3θ = , ( )3O h  are removed while retaining ( )2O h . Hence, 
for different types of ( ),f t y one can tune θ  to control whether ( )3O h and higher order 
terms, or ( )2O h and higher order terms contribute to the overall error when h  is finite. It 
may be possible to choose θ  that generates a more optimal or smaller error.  
One can show easily that for 0h >  and sufficiently small,  
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Similarly, using the implicit function theorem  
3 41 1
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1 2 31 1
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               (65) 
where  error at  iterationth
n
e n=  
Both the Euler and Trapezoidal integration scheme fit the equation of the above form. 
The choice of the Theta method is preferred over the Trapezoidal rule as it avoids the 
numerical oscillations following the occurrence of switching events, where such oscillations 
can occur when using the Trapezoidal rule [28].  
Discretizing (59) and (60) using Theta-method, we find 
[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 11 , 0n n n n nx x h x hf x yθ θ+ + +− − − − =
             (66) 
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( )1 1, 0n ng x y+ + =
                    (67) 
Note that in (66) and (67), only xn+1 and yn+1 are unknown variables and the rest are all 
known. Equations (66) and (67) constitute one set of nonlinear algebraic equations of the 
form 
( )1 1, 0n nF x y+ + =                                 (68) 
The DAE equations now are transformed into a set of purely algebraic equations, which 
can be solved efficiently by the established Newton-Raphson method. We choose  = 0.47 
for the work reported, as suggested in [23]. 
3.3.1 Nonlinear Equation Solution 
The set of nonlinear equations in (68), are solved at each time step using the Newton-
Raphson method where, at the ith iteration, the unknowns are updated as follows:  
( ) 1
1 1
i i
n n
x x xγ−+ += − ∆
                      (69)  
( ) 1
1 1
i i
n n
y x yγ−+ += − ∆                               (70)  
where x∆ and y∆ are obtained by solving the set of linear equations:  
x
y
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J
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                     (71) 
which can be represented by  
Ax b=                        (72) 
where:  
A=J=Jacobian matrix 
Rx=differential equation residual  
Ry=algebraic equation residual  
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The Newton iterations are stopped when the residual vectors are “smaller” than pre-
specified tolerances based on norm and rate of convergence. The computation of the 
correction vector [ ], Tx y∆ ∆  requires the solution of the set of linear equations given by (96) 
which is discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2 Linear equation Solver 
As seen in the previous section the core of any iterative solver like Newton-Raphson is 
the solution of a system of equations represented by (72). In case of the power system, the 
Jacobian matrix A is highly sparse and the fill-in is very low. This is taken advantage of in 
the current research to gain high computational efficiency by employing a multifrontal based 
sparse linear solver. Multifrontal methods have been used earlier in the power system studies 
in the solution of sparse linear systems arising in the power flow studies. However the 
matrices in power flow studies have symmetric zero pattern and non zero diagonal elements. 
On serial platforms the multifrontal methods were used for power flow in references [29] and 
[30]. Reference [29] implements an older version of multifrontal methods and since then 
there has been lot of research in the area of multifrontal methods and we have much more 
advanced algorithms for ordering to reduce fill-in, many new features, higher speed and 
performance [31, 32, 33, 34, 35].   In reference [30], the main focus of the paper is to 
promote the FPGA technology for hardware implementation of sparse linear solver as 
compared to the software solution for multifrontal solver UMFPACK [31]. However from 
the open literature we have no information of any precedence of the application of 
multifrontal methods in time domain simulation of power system where the Jacobian is 
highly unsymmetric and unsymmetric zero pattern.   
Steady state and dynamic simulation tools are an integral part in the design, optimization, 
and operation of large interconnected power system. Advances in numerical methods, 
sophisticated algorithms for exploiting sparsity and high performance computational 
resources have made real time tracking of cascading events a conceivable and achievable 
goal for the power industry. 
In the solution of the DAE arising out of the dynamic modeling of the power system, the 
most vital and computationally intensive steps are the Jacobian building and the solution of 
the sparse system of linear equations. However the purpose of Jacobian is to provide 
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adequate convergence and as long as it is achieved, one can use the same partial derivatives 
[23].  Thus the key computational step amounting to 80%-90% of the machine cycle is the 
solution of the sparse linear system of equations.  
In the solution of the linear equations, the Jacobian matrices do not have any of the 
desirable structural or numerical properties such as symmetry, positive definiteness, diagonal 
dominance, and bandedness, which are generally associated with sparse matrices, to exploit 
in developing efficient algorithms for linear direct solvers. In general, the algorithms for 
sparse matrices are more complicated than for dense matrices. The complexity is mainly 
attributed to the need to efficiently handle the fill-in in the factor matrices. A typical sparse 
solver consists of four distinct steps as opposed to two in the dense case: 
1. The ordering step minimizes the fill-in, and exploits special structures, such as block 
triangular form. 
2. An analysis step or symbolic factorization determines the nonzero structures of the 
factors, and creates suitable data structures for the factors. 
3. Numerical factorization computes the factor matrices. 
4. The solve step performs forward and/or backward substitutions. 
This research offers a new dimension into the solution technique of sparse linear systems 
arising in the power system dynamic simulation through the implementation of multifrontal 
methods. Multifrontal methods are a generalization of the frontal methods developed 
primarily for finite element problems [36] for symmetric positive definite system which were 
extended to unsymmetric systems [37]. These methods were then applied to general class of 
problems in reference [38]. In the next section, we discuss the fundamentals of the frontal 
and the multifrontal methods.  
3.3.3 Frontal method 
Frontal methods were originally developed for solving banded matrices from finite 
element problems [36]. The motivation was to limit computation on small matrices to solve 
problems on machines with small core memories. Presently frontal codes are widely used in 
finite element problem because very efficient dense matrix kernels, particularly Level 3 
Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) [39], can be designed over a wide range of 
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platforms. A frontal matrix is a small dense submatrix that holds one or more pivot rows and 
their corresponding pivot columns.  
The frontal elimination scheme can be summarized as follows: 
1. Assemble a row into the frontal matrix. 
2. Determine if any columns are fully summed in the frontal matrix. A column is fully 
summed if it has all of its nonzero elements in the frontal matrix.  
3. If there are fully summed columns, then perform partial pivoting in those columns, 
eliminating the pivot rows and columns and doing an outer-product update on the 
remaining part of the frontal matrix. 
4. Repeat until all the columns have been eliminated and matrix factorization is 
complete.  
The basic idea in frontal methods is to restrict elimination operations to a frontal matrix, 
on which dense matrix operations are performed using Level 3 BLAS. In frontal scheme, the 
factorization proceeds as a sequence of partial factorization on frontal matrices, which can be 
represented as: 
11 12
21 22
 
 
F F
F
F F
 	
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                          (73) 
Pivots can be chosen from the matrix 11F  since there are no other entries in these rows 
and columns in the overall matrix. Subsequently, 11F  is factorized, multipliers are stored over 
12F , and the Schur complement 
1
22 12 11 12
TF F F F−−  is formed, using full matrix kernels. At the 
next stage, further entries from the original matrix are assembled with this Schur complement 
to form another frontal matrix. For example, consider the 6 by 6 matrix shown in Fig. 12(a). 
The non-zero entries in the matrix are represented by dots. The frontal method to factorize 
the matrix proceeds as follows: 
In this example, the process begins by assembling row 1 into an empty frontal matrix 
shown in Fig. 12(b). At this point, none of the variables are fully summed. Subsequently, we 
assemble row 2 to get the matrix in Fig. 12(c). Now variable 4 is fully summed, and hence, 
column 4 can be eliminated. To eliminate a column, a pivot needs to be selected in that 
column. Let it be selected from row 2.  
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`  
Fig. 12: Example for frontal method 
 
Rearranging the matrix to bring the pivot element (2, 4) to the top left position, we get the 
matrix in Fig. 12(d). Here, u indicates an element of the upper triangular matrix, and l 
denotes an element of the lower triangular matrix. After elimination, the updated frontal 
matrix would be as shown in Fig. 12(e). In this way, we proceed with assembling rows. 
Again, when rows 3 and 4 are assembled, variable 1 is fully summed, and hence the column 
1 can be eliminated. Choosing the pivot element to be (4, 1), the matrix with pivot element 
moved to top left corner is shown in Fig. 12(f), and the updated frontal matrix after 
elimination is shown in Fig. 12(g).  In this way, the frontal method continues until matrix 
factorization is complete. 
In the frontal method, the pivot order of the columns is dependent on the row ordering, 
and the pivot order of the rows can vary only within certain constraints. A row can become 
pivotal any time between the time it is entered into the frontal matrix and the end of the 
factorization. Rows are entered into the frontal matrix in a predefined order. The pivot 
column ordering depends solely on the initial preordering of the rows. Frontal matrix sizes, 
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and thus the computational performance, depend on row ordering. Thus, there arises a need 
for a good row ordering to keep the size of the matrix small. There is a vast literature 
addressing this issue [40].   
Frontal methods [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46] have demonstrated great potential as a sparse 
linear equation solver. Although with frontal methods one can achieve large computational 
gain [47, 48, 49, 50], there are many unnecessary operations on the frontal matrices which 
are often large and sparse and thus it lowers the overall performance. If we view the 
factorization in terms of a computational tree where nodes correspond to factorizations of the 
form as in (97), and edges correspond to the transfer of the Schur complement data, then the 
computational tree of the method just described would be a chain. Data must be received 
from the child to complete computation at the parent node. Thus frontal methods offer little 
scope for parallelism other than that which can be obtained within the higher level BLAS. 
These deficiencies can be at least partially overcome through allowing the use of more 
than one front called multifrontal method [51, 52, 53, 54]. This permits pivot orderings that 
are better at preserving sparsity and also gives more possibility for exploitation of parallelism 
through working simultaneously on different fronts  
Thus, in our research we have proposed multifrontal methods as a viable solution 
methodology for large unsymmetric sparse matrices which are common in power system 
online dynamic simulation. The fundamentals of the multifrontal methods are discussed in 
the next section. 
3.3.4 Multifrontal method 
The multifrontal method, is a generalization of the frontal method, and was originally 
developed for symmetric systems [51]. Subsequently, unsymmetric multifrontal algorithm 
UMFPACK [31, 32, 33, 34, 35] was developed for general sparse unsymmetric matrices. The 
advent of multifrontal solvers has greatly increased the efficiency of direct solvers for sparse 
systems. They make full use of the high performance computer architecture by invoking the 
level 3 Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) library. Thus memory requirement is 
greatly reduced and the computing speed is greatly enhanced. 
In this section, we give an overview of the multifrontal method for the solution of large 
sparse matrices. There is a vast literature on the subject. Beginning with its development in 
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1983 by Duff and Reid [51], it has undergone many developments at different stages of its 
formulation, and different algorithms perform best for different classes of matrices. Broadly 
speaking, one can categorize them into following classes: (1) symmetric positive definite 
matrices [55, 56, 57, 58]; (2) symmetric indefinite matrices [51, 59, 60]; (3) unsymmetric 
matrices with actual or implied symmetric nonzero pattern [53, 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 ]; (4) 
unsymmetric matrices where the unsymmetric nonzero pattern is partially preserved [65]; (5) 
unsymmetric matrices where the unsymmetric nonzero pattern is fully preserved [31, 66, 67, 
68, 69]; and (6) QR factorization of rectangular matrices [70, 71]. There are significant 
differences amongst the various approaches. In this report, we present the fundamentals of 
the multifrontal method for symmetric positive definite linear systems, which is easier to 
understand and forms the foundation for multifrontal approach to other classes of matrices.   
The method reorganizes the overall factorization of a sparse matrix into a sequence of 
subtasks, each of which involves partial factorizations of smaller dense matrices. 
Reference [58] forms the foundation for the concepts presented below on the theory of 
multifrontal methods. 
Cholesky factorization of an n by n symmetric positive definite matrix is defined by  
TA LL=                      (74) 
Depending on the order in which the matrix entries are accessed and/or updated for 
factorization, the Cholesky factorization can be classified into row, column, or submatrix 
Cholesky schemes. In row Cholesky, each step computes a factor-row by solving a triangular 
system, whereas in column Cholesky, the factor matrix is computed column by column with 
updates from previous column followed by scaling. In submatrix-Cholesky scheme, as each 
factor column is formed, all its updates to the submatrix remaining to be factored are 
computed. Based on the above classification, multifrontal method performs Cholesky 
factorization by submatrices. However, the novel feature of the multifrontal method is that 
the update contributions from a factor column to the remaining submatrix are computed, but 
not applied directly to the matrix entries. They are aggregated with contributions from other 
factor columns before the actual updates are performed. 
We will explain the main concepts of the multifrontal method through an example. 
Consider a sparse symmetric positive definite n by n matrix A and its Cholesky factor as 
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shown Fig. 13. Each "• " represents an original nonzero in the matrix A, and "o" a fill in for 
the factor matrix L. 
 
Fig. 13: Example symmetric positive definite matrix and it’s Cholesky factor matrix 
 
The elimination tree of the matrix A represented by T(A) is defined to be the structure 
with n nodes {1,...,n} such that node p is the parent of j if and only if  
min{ | 0}ijp i j l= > ≠                          (75) 
The elimination tree is a tree if A is irreducible, otherwise it will be a forest. For our 
purposes, we assume it to be tree. There are as many nodes in the tree as there are columns in 
the matrix or the Cholesky factor. In this example, we have eight nodes. From Fig. 13, we 
can see that for the fourth node d4, the parent node is f6 and for f6 the parent node is h8. 
Similarly for each node we can derive the parent node. Thus, traversing the path for all the 
nodes, we get the elimination tree shown in Fig. 14 for the example in Fig. 13.  
a1
b2 c3
d4 e5
f6 g7
h8
 
Fig. 14: Elimination tree for matrix A 
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The most fundamental elements in understanding the multifrontal method are the 
concepts of frontal matrix, subtree update matrix, and the update matrix. To explain these 
concepts, we will first introduce the concept of descendents of a node in the elimination tree.  
The descendants of the node j in the elimination tree T(A) contains j and the set of nodes 
in the subtree rooted at the node j. The symbol T[j] is used to represent the set of 
descendents. 
Theorem 1:  If node k is a descendant of j in the elimination tree, then the structure of the 
vector ( , )Tjk jkl l  is contained in the structure of ( , )Tjj jkl l  
Theorem 2: If 0jkl ≠  0 and k < j, then the node k is a descendant of j in the elimination tree.  
For the above example the descendent of 1 is T[1] = {1}, descendents of 2 are 
T[2]={1,2}, descendent of 3 is T[3] = {3}, descendents  of 4 are T[4] = {1,2,4} and of 6 are 
T[6] = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. 
Subtree Update Matrix and Frontal Matrix:  Let 0 1 2( , , )ri i i i be nonzero row subscripts in 
the jth column of the Cholesky factor, and 0i j= . Then, the subtree update matrix jU  at 
column j for the sparse matrix A is defined to be   
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and the Frontal Matrix jF  is defined to be 
1
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Both jF  and jU  have order r+1 which is equal to the number of nonzeros in the jth 
column of the Cholesky factor which includes the diagonal element. From the definition of 
jF  it is clear that when jF  is computed, the first row/column of jF  has been completely 
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updated. Therefore, one step of elimination on jF  gives the nonzero entries of the factor 
column
* jL . So jF can be factorized as  
1
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This gives the Update matrix jU after one step elimination on jF . The Update Matrix is a full 
matrix and is derived from equation to be 
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It is clear from the definition of jU  and jU , that jU  is used to form the jth frontal matrix F; 
whereas jU  is generated from an elimination step with jF . jU  has one more row/column 
than jU .  
We saw above that the descendent of 1 is T[1] = {1}, descendents of 2 are T[2] = {1,2}, 
descendent of 3 is T[3] = {3}, descendents  of 4 are T[4] = {1,2,4} and of 6 are T[6] = 
{1,2,3,4,5,6}. So, from the definition of subtree update matrix, we have 1 0U =  and therefore 
1F  is  
1,1 1,2 1,7 1,8
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1 1
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 Therefore 
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            (80) 
Similarly, we can then calculate 2U , and hence 2F  and the update matrix. The process 
continues till the entire matrix is factorized. The advantage with multifrontal method is that it 
is not sequential; rather it has a parallel hierarchy as visible from the elimination tree of the 
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given example. Formation of the subtree update matrix begins on multiple fronts namely 1U , 
3U and 7U . We can verify that for the above example the subtree update matrices 1U to 4U  
are as given below.  
( )
( ) ( )
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Matrix extend add operator: Let R be an r by r matrix with r n≤ and S be an s by s matrix 
with s n≤ . Each row/column of R and S corresponds to a row/column of the given n by n 
matrix A. Let 1 2 ri i i≤ ≤ be the subscripts of R in A, and 1 2 sj j j≤ ≤ be those of S. 
Consider the union of the two subscript sets. Let 1 2, , tk k k be the resulting union. The matrix 
R can be extended to conform to the subscript set ( 1 2, , tk k k ), by introducing a number of 
zero rows and columns. In a similar way, the matrix S can be extended. Here, R S is 
defined to be the t by t matrix T formed by adding the two extended matrices of R and S. The 
matrix operator " " is known as the matrix extend-add operator. For example, let 
,    
p q w x
R S
u v y z
   
= =   
   
 then               (82) 
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         (83) 
Now, in terms of the extend-add operator defined above, we can see that the relationship 
between the frontal matrices { jF  } and the update matrices { jU } is 
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where 1 2, , sc c c are the children of the node j in the elimination tree. Thus jU  = 
1c
U …
sc
U , and T[j]-{j} is the disjoint union of the nodes in the subtree T[ 1c ],..., T[ sc ]. 
Duff and Reid [51] refer to the process of forming the jth frontal matrix jF  from * jA  and the 
update matrices of its tree children as the frontal matrix assembly operation, and the tree 
structure on which the assembly operations are based is called the assembly tree. 
We now summarize the essence of the multifrontal methods in the form of an algorithm 
for multifrontal Cholesky factorization in Fig. 15.  
 
 
Fig. 15: Algorithm for multifrontal Cholesky factorization 
In summary, the multifrontal method reorganizes the numerical computation, and the 
factorization is performed as a sequence of factorization on multiple fronts. In practice, 
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structural pre-processing [58] is done to reduce the working storage requirements by 
restructuring the tree, and finding the optimal post-ordering of the tree. After the pre-
processing, the computation of the Cholesky factor matrix by the multifrontal method is done 
as described in the above algorithm in Fig. 15.  
As discussed earlier, there exist many approaches to apply the multifrontal method for 
different classes of matrices. Broadly, they can be classified into: (1) symmetric positive 
definite matrices; (2) symmetric indefinite matrices; (3) unsymmetric matrices with actual or 
implied symmetric nonzero pattern; (4) unsymmetric matrices where the unsymmetric 
nonzero pattern is partially preserved; (5) unsymmetric matrices where the unsymmetric 
nonzero pattern is fully preserved; and (6) QR factorization of rectangular matrices. 
Below, we give the summary of the discussion on the differences in the multifrontal 
methods for the above classes of matrices presented in reference [33]. For approaches (1) to 
(4), the frontal matrices are related to one another by the elimination tree of A, or the 
elimination tree of A+AT if A is unsymmetric. The elimination tree has n nodes, each node 
corresponding to one pivot row and column. A frontal matrix assembles the contribution 
blocks of each of its children in the assembly tree. The assembly step thus adds the 
contribution blocks of each child into the current frontal matrix. For symmetric positive 
definite matrices, all of the pivots originally assigned to a frontal matrix by the symbolic 
analysis phase are numerically factorized within that frontal matrix. For other matrices, some 
pivots might not be eliminated, and the contribution block may be larger than predicted. The 
un-eliminated pivot is delayed, and its elimination is attempted in the parent instead. 
In the first three approaches, the frontal matrices are square. The frontal matrix may be 
rectangular, but the assembly tree is still used. The first four approaches precede the 
numerical factorization with a symmetric reordering of A or A+AT, typically with a minimum 
degree or nested-dissection ordering as part of a symbolic analysis phase.  
UMFPACK is based on the fifth approach. It does not use a pre-ordering or symbolic 
analysis phase. Rectangular frontal matrices are constructed during numerical factorization, 
using an approximate Markowitz ordering.. The frontal matrices are related to one another 
via a directed acyclic graph (DAG) rather than an elimination tree. The last approach, 
multifrontal QR factorization [70, 71], is based on the column elimination tree of A. 
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Now we illustrate with a simple example in Fig. 16, the working of the multifrontal 
method for the same unsymmetrical matrix in Fig. 12 for which the working of frontal 
method was illustrated earlier. The frontal matrices here are rectangular and not square. 
 
Fig. 16: Example for unsymmetric multifrontal method   
 
Consider the unsymmetrical matrix shown in Fig. 16(a). An initial pivot element is 
chosen, say element (1, 1). The corresponding first frontal matrix with this pivot row and 
column and all contributions to them is shown in Fig. 16(b). Subsequently, a pivot operation 
is performed to eliminate variable 1, which gives the resultant frontal matrix with u (upper 
triangular matrix), l (lower triangular matrix), and the non-zero entries in the non-pivot rows 
and columns corresponding to the contribution block (represented by dots). Further, after the 
elimination of variable 1, another pivot is selected, say (3, 2). A new frontal matrix is then 
constructed with row 3 and column 2, with all contributions to them from both the original 
matrix and the contribution block of the previous frontal matrix. The resulting frontal matrix 
is shown in Fig. 16(c). After performing a pivot operation to eliminate variable 2, we get the 
matrix as shown in Fig. 16(d), but here another pivot operation on element (4, 3) can be 
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performed to eliminate variable 3 as well, since all contributions to row 4 and column 3 can 
also be assembled into the same matrix. A pivot operation on element (4, 3) reduces the 
frontal matrix further as shown in Fig. 16(e). In this way, the frontal matrices are continued 
to be assembled, and pivot operations are performed on them until the matrix is completely 
factorized. Table 17 below lists the available direct solvers for serial machines [72]  
Table 17: Sparse Direct Solvers 
Code Technique Scope Contact Ref. 
CHOLMOD Left-looking SPD Davis [73]  
MA57 Multifrontal Sym HSL [51]  
MA41 Multifrontal Sym-pat HSL [61]  
MA42 Frontal Unsym HSL [49]  
MA67 Multifrontal Sym HSL [74]  
MA48 Right-looking Unsym HSL [54]  
Oblio Left/right/Multifr. sym, out-core Dobrian [75]  
SPARSE Right-looking Unsym Kundert [76]  
SPARSPAK Left-looking SPD, Unsym, QR George et al. [77]  
SPOOLES Left-looking Sym, Sym-pat, QR Ashcraft [78]  
SuperLLT Left-looking SPD Ng [79]  
SuperLU Left-looking Unsym Li [80]  
UMFPACK Multifrontal Unsym Davis [81]  
Abbreviations used in the table: 
SPD : symmetric and positive definite 
Sym : symmetric and may be indefinite 
Sym-pat: symmetric non zero pattern but unsymmetric values 
Unsym: unsymmetrical 
In the present study, UMFPACK 4.4 [34] is used as the engine for the solution of 
equations (80) and (81) by multifrontal direct method. UMFPACK consists of a set of 
ANSI/ISO C routines for solving unsymmetric sparse linear systems using unsymmetric 
multifrontal method. It requires the unsymmetric, sparse matrix to be input in a sparse triplet 
(compressed sparse column) format. UMFPACK 4.4 consists of four steps for solving the 
linear system. In the first step, it reorders the rows and columns such that the factors suffer 
little fill, or that the matrix has special structure, such as block-triangular form. In the second, 
it performs symbolic factorization, computing the upper bounds on the non zeros in L and U, 
the floating point operations required, and the memory usage of the factorization routine. It is 
an analysis step to determine the nonzero structures of the factors, and to create suitable data 
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structures for the factors. In the third step, numerical factorization is carried out to compute 
the LU factors. Finally, it solves the linear system using the computed LU factors by 
performing the forward and back substitutions.  
Different pre-ordering strategies are used to make the solver more memory efficient. It 
finds both a row and column pivot ordering as the matrix is factorized. No preordering or 
partial preordering is used. At the start of the factorization, no frontal matrix exists. It starts a 
new frontal matrix with a global Markowitz-style pivot search. It combines a column 
ordering strategy with a right-looking unsymmetric-pattern multifrontal numerical 
factorization. All pivots with zero Markowitz cost are eliminated first and placed in the LU 
factors. In the analysis phase it selects one of three ordering and pivoting strategies namely 
unsymmetric, 2-by-2, or symmetric. For symmetric matrices with non zero elements in the 
diagonal, the symmetric strategy is used to compute a column ordering using approximate 
minimum degree (AMD). No modification of the column ordering is made during the 
numerical factorization. A nonzero diagonal entry is selected as a suitable pivot if, in 
magnitude it is at least a times the largest entry in its column. Otherwise, an off-diagonal 
pivot is selected with magnitude at least b times the largest entry in its column. The 
parameters a and b are controllable with default values of 0.001 and 0.1, respectively. Thus, 
strong preference is given to pivoting on diagonal entries. For symmetric indefinite problems 
with zero entries in the diagonal, the 2 by 2 strategy is selected wherein a row permutation is 
done, that puts nonzero entries onto the diagonal. Then, the symmetric strategy is applied to 
the permuted matrix. 
It is possible that the built-in ordering schemes may not be the best for the target 
applications, and one may use an external ordering scheme for better performance. The 
multifrontal method for the solving sparse systems of linear equations offers a significant 
performance advantage over more conventional factorization schemes by permitting efficient 
utilization of parallelism and memory hierarchy. The main concern of the present study is the 
quantitative comparison of the performance of Newton’s method coupled with the 
multifrontal solver and one with the Gaussian elimination. 
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3.3.5 Time Step 
Reference [23] provides an excellent discussion on the variable time step strategy chosen 
for the Theta method. In this research also we use the variable time step scheme. However, 
the criteria used for time step adjustment are more stringent than in reference [23]. The 
maximum time step used in our simulator is 40 seconds unlike 20 seconds in reference [23]. 
The minimum time step is 0.0002. The increase in time step depends on both the local 
truncation error and the number of iterations it takes to converge to the solution for each time 
step. If the iteration error is less than the tolerance, and the number of iterations it takes to 
converge to solution is less than a predefined number for 5 consecutive time steps, then the 
time step is doubled. However, if the number of iterations is more than the maximum number 
of iterations, or the iteration error is greater than the maximum tolerance, then the integration 
is repeated with time step reduced to half. On the other hand, if the number of iterations is 
more than a predefined number of iterations which is 6 in this case, and the iteration error is 
within the tolerance, then the time step is reduced for the solution of the next time step. 
Reduction in time step is also by a factor of 2 but is fixed at minimum. Failure to reduce the 
time step for ascertained number of times will result in stopping the integration.  
3.3.6 Jacobian Building 
The task of Jacobian building for every iteration within an integration time step is a 
formidable task in terms of computational resources required. The demand on time increases 
with the increase in size of the power system. Thus, we use the same Jacobian matrix as long 
as the convergence is acceptable and fast. Since the terms of the Jacobian involve time step, 
there is a direct relation between the variation in time step, system condition, and frequency 
of Jacobian building. Interested readers can see reference [23] for more elaborate discussion 
on considerations on Jacobian matrix computation. Effective strategy to rebuild Jacobian has 
resulted in considerable time saving for each simulation. The results are presented in the next 
section.  
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3.4 Test System  
The proposed method is tested on two systems i) IEEE RTS-96 with 33 generators, and 
ii) Test system with 6 generators,  21 bus, 21 lines, 9 transformers and 3 tie lines as shown in 
the Appendix F and Appendix D respectively. 
3.5 Performance Comparison   
The system is simulated for 3600 seconds on a Pentium 4, 2.8 GHz, and 1 GB RAM. The 
system is simulated with an initial contingency which belongs to the set of contingencies 
containing functional group contingency, stuck breaker contingency or inadvertent trip 
contingency. A 20% load ramping from 900 seconds to 2700 seconds is also implemented. 
Performance comparison is performed against Gaussian Elimination methods and sparse 
solvers which include CHOLMOD [47], a set of ANSI C routines for sparse Cholesky 
factorization and update/downdate, GPLU [22] QR factorization [48] and a sparse LU 
factorization routine which utilizes routines from LAPACK. These sparse solvers are also 
present in the Matlab.  
3.5.1 Modified Newton Method  
In this formulation we propose to use the same LU factors repeatedly for subsequent 
iterations till the convergence degrades or in other words takes more than a specified number 
of iterations to achieve convergence. In the present formulation we used a simple criterion 
based on number of iterations the multifrontal solver takes for convergence for five 
consecutive time steps. If it is more than five iterations for each time step than the factors are 
rebuilt, other wise the same LU factors are reused for all subsequent iterations. The strategy 
to rebuild the factors can be further improved by more experimentation and combining it 
with the strategy to rebuild the Jacobian. This results in huge computational gain. This is due 
to the fact that primarily there are three fundamental steps in the multifrontal solver namely 
symbolic factorization, numerical factorization and the solution step. The most 
computationally intensive steps are the symbolic factorization and the numerical factorization 
which amounts to almost five to ten times the solution step. In the conventional solution 
method the coefficient matrix is factorized at every step in the solution of the linear equation. 
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However if we can use the same factors then the solution step is very cheap although it may 
take more number of iteration to achieve convergence. However the overall computational 
gain achieved is much more and increase in number of iterations has insignificant impact. 
We refer this implementation as the modified multifrontal based Newton method or modified 
Newton method. This is similar to very dishonest Newton method in the literature [82] 
however its implementation criterion differs from application to application and with 
different solvers robustness. In the results section we will refer it as modified multifrontal.  
3.5.2 Validation  
Fig. 17 below shows for the six generator test system the comparison of simulation plots 
by the full Gaussian Elimination solver and the Multifrontal methods. As seen in the figure, 
both the methods provided the same solution. This was also found to be true for all the other 
solvers for both the test systems.  
 
Fig. 17 Comparison of simulation plots for Gaussian elimination and for multifrontal method 
3.5.3 Results and Discussion  
Table 18 shows the performance comparison for the multifrontal method with the full 
Gaussian elimination algorithm and the sparse solvers on the 6 generator test system for 6 
different critical initiating contingencies on the system. For the sparse solvers only the best 
results of all the sparse solvers are reported. Column 1 shows the contingency number, 
columns 2,3 and 4 show the simulation time in seconds with the multifrontal algorithm, 
Gaussian Elimination and the sparse solvers respectively. Column 5 shows the speed-up 
using the multifrontal method compared to Gaussian, which varies between 3.75 times to 7 
times and Column 6 shows the speed-up with other sparse solvers, varying between 3 to 5.4 
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times. For this system there are a total of around 300 contingencies including all N-1, 
contingencies due to breaker failure, protection failure to trip, and due to inadvertent tripping. 
The time savings for 300 contingencies is provided in columns 7 and 8. The multifrontal 
method would save around 16 to 22 hours computing time compared to Gaussian Elimination 
and 11 to 17 hours compared to other sparse solvers.  
Table 18: 6-generator Test System 
The Fig. 18 below compares graphically the speed of the multifrontal method to that of 
the Gaussian algorithm for the 6 generator test system.  
Performance Comparison for a 6 bus Test System
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Fig. 18: Performance Comparison for a 6 generator system 
Table 19 similarly shows the performance comparison results for the 32 generator RTS 
system for 3 different critical initiating contingencies on the system. We observe that the 
speed-up against the Gaussian Elimination varies between 4 times to 6.4 times and against 
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Speed 
up (Col4/ 
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Hrs Hrs 
1 46.138 321.505 250.206 6.968 5.423 22.94725 17.005 
2 56.816 261.394 189.31 4.600 3.332 17.04817 11.041 
3 44.08 232.613 210.96 5.277 4.786 15.71108 13.907 
4 65.624 247.113 205.534 3.765 3.132 15.12408 11.659 
5 51.826 287.003 258.197 5.537 4.982 19.59808 17.197 
6 69.622 260.988 209.631 3.748 3.011 15.94717 11.667 
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the other sparse solvers it varies between 3.2 to 4.2 times. Again for this system if we are to 
analyze 300 contingencies as in the previous case, we can see from columns 7 and 8 that 
using the multifrontal method saves around 67 to 100 hours computing time compared to 
Gaussian  Elimination and between 49 to 67 hours compared to other commonly available 
sparse solvers. 
Table 19: 32-generator Test System 
 
The Fig. 19 below compares graphically the speed of the multifrontal method to that of the 
Gaussian algorithm for the 32 generator test system. 
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Fig. 19: Performance Comparison for a 32-generator test system 
From the numerical results above we observe that the time saving is almost linearly 
related to the increase in the number of generators in the system and also the speed up 
increases with the size of the system and hence the size of the Jacobian. In the test system we 
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methods 
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Sparse 
Solvers 
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Speed 
up (Col3/ 
Col2) 
 
 
Speed 
up (Col4/ 
Col2) 
Hrs Hrs 
1 222.807 1420.789 944.256 6.376 4.238 99.833 60.120 
2 356.227 1419.301 1165.931 3.984 3.273 88.585 67.475 
3 242.878 1047.513 828.699 4.312 3.412 67.052 48.818 
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had 6 generators and in the RTS system there were 32 generators. There was almost five 
times increase in the number of generators. From Table 18 and Table 19 we can see that there 
was a corresponding increase in time savings and speed up. This is because the size of the 
matrix linearly scales with the number of generators (assuming 10th order ODE per 
generator) and the algebraic equations corresponding to the network. The gain offered by the 
multifrontal methods becomes significantly more important with the real time systems. Thus 
the multifrontal methods may be viewed as a fundamentally important enabling technology. 
Table 20 and Table 21 shown below shows the performance comparison results of the 
modified multifrontal methods with the other sparse solvers. As can be seen from the results 
in Table 18 and Table 20 that the speed-up which was 3 to 5.4 times in the case of full 
multifrontal method has increased to 7.55 to 8.3 times in the case of modified multifrontal 
methods for the 6 generator test system.  
Table 20: 6-generator Test System ((Modified Newton) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly we can see from Table 19 and Table 21 that the speed-up which was 3.2 to 4.2 
times in the case of full multifrontal method has increased to 24.1 to 28.675 times in the case 
of modified multifrontal methods for the 32 generator test system. This is huge 
computational gain as compared to the six generator case. This was expected with the 
increase in size of the system since the computational cost for the symbolic and the 
numerical factorization increases nonlinearly with the increase in size of the matrix as 
compared to the solution step. Thus intelligent reuse of the LU factors can result in orders of 
magnitude saving in computational time.  
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Sparse solvers 
1 33.119 250.206 7.554 18.091 
2 24.897 189.31 7.603 13.701 
3 25.780 210.96 8.182 15.431 
4 24.978 205.534 8.228 15.046 
5 34.030 258.197 7.587 18.680 
6 27.210 209.631 7.704 15.202 
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Table 21: 32-generator Test System (Modified Newton) 
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Sparse solvers 
1 32.928 944.256 28.675 75.943 
2 44.781 1165.931 26.035 93.429 
3 29.252 828.699 28.328 66.620 
4 38.524 928.564 24.103 74.170 
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CHAPTER 4 NUMERICAL METHODS - ITERATIVE METHODS 
4.1 Introduction  
In the traditional classification, the solution methods to the linear system of equations are 
divided into two classes namely the direct methods and the iterative methods. However in the 
present context with the number of ideas and techniques from the sparse direct solvers being 
effectively applied in the iterative solution paradigm, there is no more a very clear boundary 
between the direct and the iterative methods. Additionally the field of iterative methods 
comprises a wide range of techniques, ranging from purely iterative methods, like the 
classical Jacobi, Gauss–Seidel, and SOR iterations, to Krylov subspace methods, which 
theoretically converge in a finite number of steps in exact arithmetic, to multilevel methods. 
The introduction of preconditioners has further made the distinction unclear. The use of the 
direct solution ideas and techniques has made the iterative methods increasingly more 
reliable and robust. 
For large systems the direct methods are less efficient than iterative methods because of 
round-off errors.  For sparse coefficient matrices the amount of storage space required for 
iterative solutions on a computer is far less than it is required for direct methods and thus 
making them more attractive than the direct methods. The scalability of the direct methods is 
very poor with problem size in terms of operation counts and memory requirements for 3 D 
problems as those arising in rotating channel in computational fluid dynamics in the solution 
of the Navier Stokes equations and from the discretizations of PDEs in 3 D space from other 
applications. Detailed, three-dimensional multi physics simulations carried out as part of the 
U.S. DOE ASCI program lead to linear systems of the order of billions. Iterative methods are 
the only viable option for large scale problems of this magnitude. Although iterative methods 
require less storage and often fewer operations than direct methods (especially in cases where 
an approximate solution of relatively low accuracy is sought), they often fail to compete with 
the reliability of direct methods. In many applications, iterative methods fail and 
preconditioning is necessary, though not always sufficient, to attain convergence in a 
reasonable amount of time.  
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A lot of research efforts in the developments for the iterative methods came from the 
impetus from the nuclear industry where they have been widely used for a long time 
[83,84,85].  
The power of most iterative methods lies in the cheapness with which each iteration step 
is performed. However this may entail a number of iterations for the solution to converge. 
This can be reduced by preconditioning the matrix but then the cost of each iteration 
increases. Most of the current iterative methods use Krylov sequences. In a Krylov-sequence 
based method, an approximate solution to the problem is computed from the subspaces of 
increasing dimension usually with some optimality condition over all vectors in the subspace 
so that the  solution will be obtained when the subspace is  of sufficient dimension. The two 
most widely used Krylov subspace methods for the solution of unsymmetric systems are 
GMRES and BiCGStab. The advantage of the latter is that of limited storage needs, but there 
are many problems for which this method does not work well. Thus for such problems, 
GMRES, being robust has become the method of choice, and this has led both to its ample 
study and to many extensions and variants. In general, there is no one method which is 
recommended for all problems [86]. 
Reference [87] presents the state-of-the-art research in applying iterative techniques to 
power system problems. It concludes that in terms of applicability, iterative methods cannot 
compete with direct methods because of convergence problems. Alleviating convergence 
problems requires good choice of preconditioners which do not add to computational 
complexity. Reliability of iterative solvers depends on the quality of preconditioners, than on 
the particular Krylov subspace accelerators used. In particular, the Jacobian for the time 
domain simulation is highly unsymmetric, with non-symmetric nonzero pattern. It was 
shown in the literature [88] that proper scaling of the Jacobian is important in case of non-
symmetric Jacobian matrix to achieve convergence and computational gain with incomplete 
factorization based preconditioners. This research proposes to develop multifrontal based 
robust and computationally cheap preconditioners for power systems as compared to 
incomplete LU factorization preconditioners used in the literature [87].  
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4.2 Basic Solution Methodology 
Let 0x be an initial approximation to the solution of  
Ax = b                       (85) 
0 0r b Ax= −                    (86) 
be the initial residual and let  
2 1
0 0 0 0 0( , ) { , , ,...., }mmK A r span r Ar A r A r−=  
be the Krylov subspace of dimension m defined by A  and 0r . The short-hand notation mK is 
used when the dependence on A and on the specific vector 0r  is clear from the context. Note 
that these subspaces are nested, i.e., 1m mK K +⊆ .  Krylov subspace methods are iterative 
methods in which at the mth step an approximation to the solution of (85), mx , is found in 
0x + mK , i.e., this approximation is of the form mx = 0x  + 1 0( )mq A r− , where 1mq −  is a 
polynomial of degree at most m − 1. If the system is real, 1mq − can be chosen to have real 
coefficients. This natural expression implies that the residual m mr b Ax= − is associated with 
the so-called residual polynomial mp of degree at most m with (0) 1mp =  since  
m mr b Ax= − = 0r  + 1 0( )mq A r− = 0( )mp A r .             (87) 
Analogously, the error satisfies 
* 0 *( )( )m mx x p A x x− = −  where *x  is the solution of 
equation (85). Let us denote by Pm the set of all polynomials p of degree at most m such that 
p(0) = 1. The approximation 0m mx x K∈ + (or equivalently, the corresponding polynomial) is 
often found by requiring mx to be the minimizer of some functional. Different methods 
depend on the choice of this functional, on the characteristics of the matrix, and on some 
implementation details, and thus, each method defines implicitly a different 
polynomial 1( )m m mp P or q −∈ . For example, in the popular GMRES [89], the approximation 
mx is the one minimizing the 2-norm of the residual. 
In the process of iteratively constructing a basis of mK , each method can be implemented 
so that at each iteration only one or two matrix-vector multiplications with A is required, in 
the form z Av=  (in some methods an additional operation of the form Ty A w= is needed). 
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This fact drives the practical applicability of these methods. In fact, the matrix itself is not 
needed, only its action as an operator on a vector is used, usually as a call to a subroutine. 
The method starts with an initial vector 0x , with initial residual 0 0r b Ax= − and at the m
th 
step obtain an element mx of 0 0( , )mx K A r+ satisfying a projection or minimizing condition of 
some kind. Let m mr b Ax= − be the residual at the m
th
 step. A general condition is the 
minimum residual condition: 
0
min
m
m
x x K
r b Ax
∈ +
= −                   (88) 
We note that the nested property of the Krylov subspaces, imply that any method for 
which the above condition holds will, in exact arithmetic, terminate in at most n steps. Of 
course, in practice one wants the methods to produce a good approximation to the solution of 
(85) in many fewer than n iterations. 
4.2.1 GMRES 
The Krylov subspace method GMRES (Generalized Minimal Residual), was first 
proposed by Saad and Schultz [89]. The projection condition is to minimize the residual over 
all possible vectors in the Krylov subspace 0( , )mK A r . That is, one obtains mx such that  
0
min
m
m m
x x K
r b Ax b Ax
∈ +
= − = −                 (89) 
.For GMRES, usually the 2-norm is used. The solution of the least squares problem (89) 
is unique as long as A has full rank [90]. The key to GMRES is the implementation of the 
solution of the least squares problem (89) using an orthonormal basis of the Krylov subspace 
produced by the Arnoldi procedure. We write the GMRES approximation at the mth step as  
m m mx V y=                       (90) 
 for some mmy R∈ . 
The sequence of residual norms mr  generated by GMRES, like for all methods 
satisfying the minimum residual condition (88) on nested subspaces, is non-increasing. The 
main disadvantage of GMRES is that as the iterations proceed, i.e., as m grows, the storage 
requirements grow accordingly. One needs mn storage locations to store the matrix mV . There 
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are several alternatives to alleviate this, using, e.g., restarted or truncated methods. In this 
research we use the restarted approach to control m.  
4.2.2 Other Methods 
Bi Conjugate Gradient (BiCG) is a different implementation of the Lanczos method, and 
in exact arithmetic, the approximation mx  is the same as that of the Lanczos method, The 
problems of the unsymmetric Lanczos method are present in BiCG, and in addition, the 
method may break down if the LU factorization without pivoting does not exist, whence this 
is called a pivot breakdown. In reference [91] a procedure, called QMR (Quasi-Minimum 
Residual) is proposed, that replaces the Lanczos solution iterates with a new sequence of 
approximate solutions such that the associated residuals satisfy a quasi-optimal minimization 
condition. In addition to overcoming the possible erratic behavior of the BiCG residual, the 
proposed approach also avoids pivot breakdown. QMR methods overcome this difficulty by 
solving the least squares problem instead of implicitly solving the m × m linear system. 
There are several reasons why Lanczos or BiCG are not much used nowadays. In addition to 
the possible breakdown of two-sided Lanczos and the need to have access to both operators 
A and TA , the Lanczos method is not very stable [92], and the residual norms may have 
large oscillations, sometimes referred to as irregular (or erratic) convergence. In fact, unlike 
the minimum residual methods, the residual norms for these methods are not necessarily non 
increasing. This should not be a problem as long as there is a downward trend, but it is 
preferred to have a smooth decreasing curve, and this fact has led to several suggestions on 
how to achieve some smoothing. However, smoothing the residual does not improve the 
numerical properties of the short-term Lanczos recurrence.  
BiCG stabilized (Bi-CGStab) is not very effective when the spectrum has large imaginary 
components, as is the case, e.g., for matrices stemming from advection dominated PDEs; 
[93,94] and often in power systems.  
We mention though the following well-known comparison between the norm of the QMR 
residual, and that of GMRES, denoted by Qmr and 
G
mr , respectively 
1(Q Gm m mr k W r+≤                  (91) 
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which was first obtained by Nachtigal [95]. Since G Qm mr r≤ , if 1 1 1Tm m mW W I+ + +=  then it must 
hold Q Gm mr r= . In general, the bound suggests that the QMR residual norm may be very far 
from the optimal GMRES norm when the chosen basis is ill conditioned. However, it was 
recently shown in [96] that this type of bound may considerably underestimate the actual 
behavior of quasi-optimal methods, in this case that of QMR. In particular, as long as the 
basis vectors remain linearly independent, convergence is not significantly different. We 
point out that in (91) the comparison of the two methods is done at the same iteration. An 
alternative measure of delay is obtained by monitoring the number of iterations required for 
the two methods to reach the same accuracy.  
4.2.3 Restarted method 
The iterative methods based on the full Arnoldi recurrence methodology for unsymmetric 
matrices are in general very expensive in terms of storage requirements. This is because a 
large number of iterations may be required to achieve a sufficiently accuracy, and meanwhile 
the Arnoldi matrix becomes unacceptably large to be stored and kept orthonormal. The 
general practice is to restart the method after a maximum subspace dimension is reached. In 
other words if iterations are restarted after m iteration then the current solution and the 
residual approximations become the initial quantities for the next recursion executed for at 
most m iterations and this process is repeated till the desired accuracy is reached. The 
advantage of a restarted procedure is that at most m iterations of the Arnoldi method are 
carried out, so that both computational costs and memory allocations per cycle are under 
control. But this comes at the cost of losing the optimality properties of the process after the 
first restart as in GMRES. As a result, the overall process may not converge. In the case of 
GMRES, for instance, the outer recurrence may stagnate  with 1i im mr r
+ ≤  for all i. Note that 
in GMRES the residual norm  cannot increase in the outer iteration, since the optimality of 
the inner GMRES step ensures that 0
i i
mr r≤  for all i. If stagnation occurs, a simple cure is 
to enlarge the maximum allowed subspace dimension, m, to enrich the subspace information. 
However enlarging the subspace dimension does not always ensure faster convergence 
[97,98]. Sometimes however it may not be possible to choose a larger m for large problems 
due to storage and other constraints. Good choice of m can be advantageous [99]. Other 
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schemes can be coupled with GMRES at restart time, resulting in better restarting strategies 
than restarted GMRES [100].  
4.2.4 Preconditioning  
Preconditioning is the most important and critical factor in the development of efficient 
iterative solvers that can compete with direct solvers in terms of reliability and robustness. 
Thus there have been more research efforts on preconditioners than on the direct and Krylov 
subspace methods put together. Trefethen and Bau in [101, p. 319] states emphatically: 
“In ending this book with the subject of preconditioners, we find ourselves at the 
philosophical center of the scientific computing of the future.... Nothing will be more central 
to computational science in the next century than the art of transforming a problem that 
appears intractable into another whose solution can be approximated rapidly. For Krylov 
subspace matrix iterations, this is preconditioning.”  
Preconditioning refers to transforming the linear system (85) into another system to 
improve the spectral properties of the coefficient matrix for iterative solution.  
If M is a nonsingular matrix that approximates A (in some sense), then the linear system 
1 1M Ax M b− −=                    (92) 
has the same solution as (85) but may be easier to solve. Here M is the preconditioner. In 
cases where M−1 is explicitly known (as with polynomial preconditioners or sparse 
approximate inverses), the preconditioner is M−1 rather than M. 
System (2) is preconditioned from the left, but one can also precondition from the right: 
1 1
,AM y b x M y− −= =                   (93) 
When Krylov subspace methods are used, it is not necessary to form the preconditioned 
matrices M−1A or AM−1 explicitly (this would be too expensive, and we would lose sparsity). 
Instead, matrix–vector products with A and solutions of linear systems of the form Mz =r are 
performed (or matrix–vector products with M−1 if this is explicitly known). 
In addition, split preconditioning is also possible, i.e., 
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2,M AM y M b x M y
− − − −
= =                (94) 
where the preconditioner is now M = M1M2. The type of preconditioning used depends on the 
choice of the iterative method, problem characteristics, and so forth. 
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 For symmetric positive definite (SPD) problems, distribution of the eigenvalues of the 
coefficient matrix governs the rate of convergence of the iterative methods like the conjugate 
gradient method. The preconditioned system aims to have a smaller spectral condition 
number, and/or eigenvalues clustered around 1. For unsymmetric (non normal) problems 
the situation is more complicated, and the eigenvalues may not describe the convergence of 
unsymmetric matrix iterations like GMRES [102]. Nevertheless, a clustered spectrum (away 
from 0) often results in rapid convergence, particularly when the preconditioned matrix is 
close to normal For example, with residual minimizing methods, like GMRES, right 
preconditioning is often used. In the non normal case, solvers like GMRES can behave very 
differently depending on whether a given preconditioner is applied on the left or on the right 
[103, p. 255,104, p. 66].  In general, a good preconditioner M should meet the following 
requirements: 1) the preconditioned system should be easy to solve, 2) The preconditioner 
should be cheap to construct and apply, 3) their inverse should be cheaply applicable, 4) their 
use should entail low  memory requirements, 5) the transformed problem should converge 
faster (less computational time) than the original problem.  
The first, third and the fifth properties require fast convergence properties of the 
preconditioned iteration, while the rest ensures that each iteration step is not too expensive. It 
is important to strike a balance between the two requirements as they are competing with 
each other. With a good preconditioner, the computing time for the preconditioned iteration 
is usually significantly reduced compared to the unpreconditioned one. One of the important 
goals is to construct good quality preconditioners which can be reused in the solution of 
linear systems with same or slowly changing or similar coefficient matrices and different 
right hand side. This justifies spending computational cost on the construction of such 
preconditioners. This is often the case when solving the system of linear equations arising out 
of the solution of the non linear equations by Newton’s method. The Jacobian matrix evolves 
slowly and thus the factors of the preconditioners can be reused till the convergence degrades 
with disturbances in terms of the contingencies or the changing load and other changes in the 
system when the preconditioners need to be rebuilt.  
In general there are two approaches to construct preconditioners, namely problem 
specific or for a narrow class of problems and the other a generalized preconditioner. 
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Problem specific or specialized algorithms can be very optimal, effective and successful for a 
narrow class of problems. This however requires complete knowledge of the problem at 
hand, including the model and the equations governing the system, the domain of integration, 
the boundary conditions, details of the discretizations, and so forth. For example in [105], the 
method of diffusion synthetic acceleration (DSA) [106,107,108], which is widely used in the 
transport community, can be regarded as a physics-based preconditioner for the transport 
equation.  
The problem-specific approach may not always be feasible or even desirable. The 
complete knowledge of the problem to be solved, or the information may not be available, 
too difficult to comprehend for the software developer to use or too difficult to obtain. 
Furthermore these approaches are in general very sensitive to the details of the problem, and 
even slight changes in the problem can compromise the effectiveness of the solver. For 
example in the power system application for the time domain solution, changes in the system 
topology due to breaker status changes or contingencies, load changes from very light load to 
heavy load, and other system condition changes might degrade the quality of the 
preconditioner to the extent of worse performance than the unpreconditioned system. Also 
different power systems would require different preconditioners to be developed. For these 
reasons, there is a need for general purpose preconditioning techniques that are applicable 
over a wide range of problems and are robust. The current research is motivated by this fact 
and we attempt to develop such preconditioners which would be applicable for a wide range 
of problems including power systems. These are multifrontal based preconditioners which 
are very robust and cheap and can be applicable to problems from different fields of 
applications.  
 These general purpose preconditioner techniques are efficient over a wide spectrum of 
problems and achieve good efficiency and can be further optimized for specific problems 
Algebraic methods are often easier to develop and to use and are particularly well suited for 
irregular problems such as may arise in power system dynamic simulation and from 
discretizations of PDEs in the solution of Navier Stokes equations The resulting general 
purpose preconditioners can be competitive with optimal, less versatile problem-specific 
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techniques. Finally, algebraic methods are often used as basic components in more 
sophisticated, problem-specific solvers [109]. 
4.2.5 Preconditioning for the unsymmetric matrices.  
In the unsymmetric case, incomplete factorizations are widely used. But even in the 
simplest cases, the amount of success often depends on the ability to tune the fill-in and 
threshold parameters [88]. Unfortunately, these algebraic approaches do not work well in all 
cases. As discussed earlier part of the difficulty in the unsymmetric case is due to the fact 
that the convergence of the Krylov subspace methods does not depend only on the 
eigenvalues and their relative position on the complex plane i.e clustering,, especially in 
the non-normal case, but also there is often a lack of diagonal dominance which strongly 
influences the stability of the incomplete factorization based preconditioners.   
In fact in the unsymmetric cases even the existence of a stable complete factorization 
without pivoting is not guaranteed. Even if the incomplete factorization process can be 
completed without breakdowns, there is no guarantee in general that it will result in a useful 
preconditioner. Especially for unsymmetric problems, the incomplete factors L and U may 
happen to be very ill conditioned, even for a well-conditioned A. Application of the 
preconditioner, which involves a forward substitution for L and a back substitution for U, 
may introduce large errors that can destroy the effectiveness of the preconditioner. In a 
nutshell, instability in the ILU factors is related to lack of diagonal dominance. The two 
types of instability (zero or small pivots and unstable triangular solves) can occur 
independently of one another, although they are frequently observed together in matrices that 
are strongly unsymmetric and far from diagonally dominant as is the case arising in power 
system dynamic analysis and those arising in the solution of the Navier–Stokes equations. 
The quality of an incomplete factorization A LU≈  can be gauged, at least in principle, by its 
accuracy and stability. Accuracy refers to how close the incomplete factors of A are to the 
exact ones and can be measured by 1 FN A LU= − . For some classes of problems, including 
symmetric M-matrices, it can be shown [110,111] that the number of preconditioned CG 
iterations is almost directly related to N1, so that improving the accuracy of the incomplete 
factorization by allowing additional fill will result in a decrease of the number of iterations to 
converge. However, for more general problems (and especially for highly unsymmetric and 
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indefinite matrices) this is not necessarily the case, and N1 alone may be a poor indicator of 
the quality of the preconditioner. Stability refers to how close the preconditioned matrix 
1( )LU A− is to the identity matrix I and is measured by 12 ( ) FN I LU A
−
= − or by 
1
2 ( ) FN I A LU
−
= − for right preconditioning system. Let R LU A= − , the residual matrix, 
we get 1( )I LU A−−  = 1( )LU A−  and it becomes clear that an incomplete factorization can be 
accurate (small N1) but unstable (large N2). Indeed, if either L−1 or U−1 has very large entries 
(unstable, or ill-conditioned triangular solves), then N2 can be many orders of magnitude 
larger than N1. In this case, failure of the preconditioned iteration is to be expected [112,113]. 
Thus, for general matrices N2 is a more telling measure of preconditioning quality than N1. 
Although it is not practical to compute N2, even a rough estimate can be quite useful. As 
recommended in [94], an inexpensive way of detecting ill conditioning in the ILU factors is 
to compute 1( )LU e−
∞
, where e denotes the n-vector with all entries equal to 1. Note that this 
amounts to solving a linear system with the factored coefficient matrix LU and e as the right-
hand side. This is, of course, only a lower bound for 1( )LU −
∞
, but it has been found to be 
quite useful in practice. A very large value of this quantity will reveal an ill conditioning and 
therefore a not so useful preconditioner and will indicate the need to compute a better one. 
Instabilities in the preconditioner construction and application can often be avoided by 
suitably preprocessing the coefficient matrix A. These preprocessings consist of a 
combination of symmetric permutations, nonsymmetric ones, and scalings aimed at 
improving the conditioning, diagonal dominance, and structure of the coefficient matrix. 
Finally, a priori information on the nature of the problem need to be incorporated into a 
general-purpose preconditioner like ILU to obtain a stable and effective preconditioner.  
For example in [114], good results were obtained in the solution of complex symmetric 
indefinite systems arising from the Helmholtz equation using variants of incomplete 
factorization methods that make clever use of available knowledge of the spectrum of the 
discrete Helmholtz operator. This shows that purely algebraic methods, such as ILU 
preconditioners, can be made more competitive by exploiting available information about a 
particular class of problems. Still their successful and effective application for unsymmetric 
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matrices as those arising in power system remains a challenge. This motivates the 
development of very robust and efficient multifrontal based preconditioners for the power 
system.  
4.2.6 The Effect of Ordering 
Incomplete factorization preconditioners are sensitive to the ordering of unknowns and 
equations. Reorderings have been used to reduce fill-in (as with sparse direct solvers), to 
introduce parallelism in the construction and application of ILU preconditioners, and to 
improve the stability of the incomplete factorization. In most cases, reorderings tend to affect 
the rate of convergence of preconditioned Krylov subspace methods. 
The effects of reorderings on the convergence of preconditioned Krylov subspace 
methods have been studied by a number of authors, mostly experimentally, and are still the 
subject of some debate  [115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127] . In 
general, the ordering used and the corresponding preconditioned iteration interact in rather 
complex and not-well understood ways.  
Sparse matrix reorderings have been in use for a long time in connection with direct 
solution methods [128]. Classical ordering strategies include bandwidth- and profile reducing 
orderings, such as reverse Cuthill–McKee (RCM) [129], Sloan’s ordering [130], and the 
Gibbs–Poole–Stockmeyer ordering [131]; variants of the minimum degree ordering [132, 
133]; and (generalized) nested dissection [134,135]. These orderings are based solely on the 
structure (graph) of the matrix and not on the numerical values of the matrix entries. For 
direct solvers based on complete matrix factorizations this is justified, particularly in the SPD 
case, where pivoting for numerical stability is unnecessary. However, for incomplete 
factorizations, the effectiveness of which is strongly affected by the size of the dropped 
entries, orderings based on graph information only may result in poor preconditioners. Thus, 
it is not surprising that some of the best orderings for direct solvers, such as minimum degree 
or nested dissection, often perform poorly when used with incomplete factorizations.  
This phenomenon has been pointed out, for SPD matrices arising from diffusion-type 
problems in 2D [136]. It is shown that when a minimum degree ordering of the grid points 
was used, the rate of convergence of conjugate gradients preconditioned with a no-fill 
incomplete Cholesky factorization was significantly worse than when a natural 
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(lexicographical) ordering was used. The reason for this is that even though fewer nonzeros 
are likely to be dropped with a minimum-degree ordering (which is known to result in very 
sparse complete factors), the average size of the fill-ins is much larger, so that the norm of 
the remainder matrix R = A − LLT ends up being larger with minimum-degree than with the 
natural ordering [137, pp. 465–466]. However, fill-reducing orderings fare much better if 
some amount of fill-in is allowed in the incomplete factors. As shown in [136], minimum 
degree performs no worse than the natural ordering with a drop tolerance based Incomplete 
Cholesky (IC). Similar remarks apply to other orderings, such as nested dissection and red–
black; RCM was found to be equivalent or slightly better than the natural ordering, 
depending on whether a level-of-fill or a drop tolerance approach was used. Hence, at least 
for this class of problems, there is little to be gained with the use of sparse matrix orderings. 
For finite element matrices, where a “natural” ordering of the unknowns may not exist, the 
authors of [136] recommend the use of RCM. In [138,139] variants of RCM were shown to 
be beneficial in IC preconditioning of strongly anisotropic problems arising in oil reservoir 
simulations. An intuitive explanation of the good performance of RCM with IC 
preconditioning has been recently proposed [140]. It should be mentioned that minimum 
degree may be beneficial for difficult problems requiring a fairly accurate incomplete 
factorization and thus large amounts of fill [141]. 
However we found that for the unsymmetric case of the power system dynamic 
simulation the effect of the ordering was to worsen the performance of the incomplete 
factorization based preconditioners. In most cases the solution did not converge for cases 
where the L and U factors were computed after the ordering of the coefficient matrix. In 
other cases there was stagnation of the solution vector.   
4.3 Performance Comparison 
4.3.1 Validation  
The Fig. 20 below shows for the six generator test system the comparison of simulation 
plots by the multifrontal preconditioner based GMRESR iterative solver and the direct 
methods based multifrontal LU solver. As seen in the figure, both the methods provided the 
same solution.  
  
81 
Circuit Loading of Line L5
27
27.5
28
28.5
29
29.5
30
30.5
31
31.5
32
29
0
34
5.0
15
46
2.7
75
58
3.7
35
70
3.7
35
84
3.7
35
94
3.7
35
10
63
.
74
11
83
.
74
13
03
.
74
14
23
.
74
15
43
.
74
16
63
.
74
17
83
.
74
19
03
.
74
20
23
.
74
21
43
.
74
22
68
.
74
23
83
.
74
25
03
.
74
26
23
.
74
27
43
.
74
28
63
.
74
29
83
.
74
31
03
.
74
32
23
.
74
33
43
.
74
Time in seconds
Li
n
e 
Lo
ad
in
g 
in
 
M
W
Iterative solver
Multifrontal solver
 
Fig. 20 Comparison of simulation plots for the multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver and for the 
multifrontal solver  
4.3.2 Results and Discussion  
In this study, an efficient and robust variant of GMRES known as restarted GMRES 
(GMRESR) [142] was used.  The GMRESR algorithm with preconditioning for solving the 
linear system of equations (85) is given in the Appendix G. In this algorithm, two iterative 
loops are performed – the inner loop and an outer loop, both based on GMRES algorithm. An 
internal preconditioning operation is applied using GMRES in the inner loop using few steps  
A good preconditioner is essential to accelerate the convergence of iterative methods.  In 
the GMRESR algorithm given in Appendix G an external multifrontal based preconditioner 
is applied in addition to the internal GMRES preconditioning operation.  This is crucial for 
accelerating its convergence. The other incomplete factorization based preconditioners like 
ILU were used with iterative methods like GMRES, BiCGStab, QMR for the purpose of 
performance comparison and showing the effectiveness and robustness of the multifrontal 
preconditioned GMRESR method and ineffectiveness of other preconditioners for the power 
system dynamic simulation problem. The ILU preconditioned GMRES and its variants were 
used in the literature but it was concluded that the fill in factor and the threshold to restart are 
highly problem specific and in general a large fill was required and the Jacobian had to the 
preprocessed with scaling to achieve good convergence. With the power system in a flux and 
the corresponding Jacobian matrix changing, it would require repeated preprocessing of the 
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Jacobian and evaluation of the proper scaling factor, fill-in factor and threshold value to 
achieve computational gain over direct methods. This would become a very challenging task 
especially for large power system and changing topology where the even order of the 
Jacobian varies. Thus ILU preconditioners are not so effective for the linear system of 
equations arising in power system. This motivates the development of highly robust and 
general purpose multifrontal preconditioners which are cheap to obtain and facilitates fast 
convergence.  
The LU factors obtained from the multifrontal solver are used to obtain the 
preconditioner.  In the Newton’s iterations, the left hand side matrix is the Jacobian ( )J

, 
which is intelligently updated as discussed in the last chapter.  The first iteration is solved 
using the multifrontal solver and the LU factors are stored in the memory.  During 
subsequent iterations, equation (85) is solved using the GMRES iteration. The LU factors 
stored for the initial Jacobian ( )0J

 are used as preconditioner in the subsequent iterations and 
time steps till the convergence degrades. Then the factors are recalculated.  Since the LU 
factors are already stored, the preconditioning step is relatively inexpensive. 
There is a significant reduction in the time taken by subsequent iterations of the GMRES 
solver as compared to the iteration where the LU factors are computed. This is due to the fact 
that the GMRES solver uses the previous LU factors. This accumulates to give the overall 
computational efficiency.  
Another important advantage of using the multifrontal preconditioner with GMRESR is 
that the Newton’s quadratic convergence is obtained in less computational time. However 
with the ILU preconditioners this is not true because the approximate LU factors used in the 
iterative steps increase the number of iterations for convergence and often it is much slower. 
In unsymmetric cases they may not converge at all without high degree of fill in which is 
computationally very costly. This is true in the case of power system dynamic simulations 
where the Jacobian matrices obtained are highly unsymmetric and with zero entries in the 
diagonal. This causes very poor performance of the ILU preconditioners. In other words the 
preconditioners actually worsen the convergence rate. To overcome this limitation, the ILU 
preconditioners can be applied with segregated algorithms in combination with other 
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techniques to handle the diagonal zero introducing component.  This however would lose the 
quadratic convergence property of Newton’s method.  Thus, GMRES with multifrontal based 
preconditioner provides a good alternative to highly unsymmetric problems and can be a 
viable option for 3D Navier Stokes equations.   
As discussed earlier, reordering with the ILU preconditioners in the present problem 
degraded the convergence characteristic drastically and in most cases the solution did not 
converge or took lot of iterations to converge. We implemented RCM, symamd, colamd, 
symmmd orderings available in Matlab, with the GMRESR, BiCGstab, and QMR. The 
results are not reported because of no convergence in most cases. This was due to the fact 
that although the LU factors were computed faster due to reordering schemes in some cases 
but the LU factors in themselves were not so accurate and stable. This led to the failure in the 
iteration step.  
The figure below Fig. 21 shows the non zero element distribution of the Jacobian matrix 
obtained from the dynamic simulation of the 6 generator test system.  
 
Fig. 21 The non zero pattern of a typical Jacobian matrix in dynamic simulation 
The Figure below show the RCM reordered non zero element distribution for the matrix 
in Fig. 21 
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Fig. 22 RCM Reordered non zero element distribution for the matrix in Fig. 21 
 
The Figure below show the symamd reordered non zero element distribution for the matrix in 
Fig. 21 
 
Fig. 23 Symamd Reordered non zero element distribution for the matrix in Fig. 21 
 
 
Table 22 shows the performance comparison of the computational time in seconds for the 
three different iterative solvers namely GMRESR, BiCGStab, QMR for the six generator test 
system. All the three methods are preconditioned versions , with ILU as the preconditioners. 
In all the three cases the solvers failed for drop tolerance greater than 0.05. The drop 
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tolerance of 0 indicates complete LU factorization. This suggests strongly how the ILU 
preconditioners are very ineffective for unsymmetrical matrices as in power system time 
domain solution. From Table 22 it is clear that the GMRESR with drop tolerance 0.05 gives 
the best performance among the iterative solvers compared here. Another important 
observation is that the computational time actually increases for QMR and BiCGStab for 
drop tolerance 0.05 as compared to drop tolerance 0. This suggests how the LU factors 
obtained from ILU actually worsen the convergence and it takes more iteration and hence 
more time for convergence. Another important observation is that the reuse of the LU factors 
which are already approximate worsened the convergence. For the rest part only comparison 
with the ILU preconditioned GMRESR with drop tolerance 0.05 is given.  
Table 22 Comparison of ILU preconditioned different iterative solvers 
 
Table 23 shows the comparison of the computational time of the multifrontal preconditioned 
GMRESR solver with the modified multifrontal solver, other direct sparse solvers, and ILU 
preconditioned GMRESR solver for the six generator test system. Column 5 ,6 and 7 refer to 
the time taken by the multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver when the LU factors were 
rebuilt depending on the number of iterations it took for the solution to converge in the 
previous and the current iteration . The number of iteration in column 5, 6, and 7 are 1, 3 and 
5 respectively.  
 
 
 
Contingency 
 no. 
 
 
Gmresr_dr
optol_0 
(Secs) 
 
 
Gmresr_dr
optol_0.05 
(Secs) 
 
 
qmr_droptol
_0 
(Secs) 
 
 
qmr_dropt
ol_0.05 
(Secs) 
 
 
Bicgstab_dro
ptol_0  
(Secs) 
Bicgstab_d
roptol_0.05 
(Secs) 
1 276.85 250.20 256.15 264.69 268.31 262.10 
2 195.59 187.29 192.45 190.65 203.44 245.38 
3 227.78 206.40 212.37 243.50 220.07 366.11 
4 200.61 187.04 193.53 206.91 195.89 213.79 
5 283.85 261.7 282.23 383.51 276.83 703.82 
6 212.89 207.01 218.77 232.92 225.73 285.38 
7 306.25 248.33 265.24 325.21 253.46 471.04 
8 257.31 238.47 256.51 310.61 257.05 326.22 
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Table 23 Comparison of multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver with other solvers: 6 
generator system 
 
 
Table 24 shows the speed up comparison of the multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver 
with the modified multifrontal solver, other direct sparse solvers, and ILU preconditioned 
GMRESR solver for the six generator test system. We can see that the developed iterative 
solver is five to seven times faster than all other ILU preconditioned iterative solvers and 
other direct sparse solvers. Also the modified multifrontal methods are 1.2 to 1.4 times faster 
than the multifrontal GMRESR iterative solver.  
 
 
Table 24 Speed up comparison of multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver with other solvers: 6 
generator system 
 
Table 25 shows the comparison of the computational time of the multifrontal preconditioned 
GMRESR solver with the modified multifrontal solver, other direct sparse solvers, and ILU 
preconditioned GMRESR solver for the thirty two generator test system.  
 
 
Contingency 
 no. 
 
 
Gmresr_droptol_0.05 
(Secs) 
 
 
Sparse 
solvers 
(Secs) 
 
 
Modified 
Multifrontal 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 1 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 3 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 5 
(Secs) 
1 250.20 250.2 33.119 41.14 40.88 44.76 
2 187.29 189.3 24.897 33.19 32.29 34.99 
3 206.40 210.96 25.780 27.66 29.71 32.69 
4 187.04 205.53 24.978 29.89 33.23 34.22 
5 261.70 258.19 34.030 43.75 43.75 49.96 
6 207.02 209.63 27.210 34.17 35.26 42.66 
7 248.33 249.36 32.314 39.46 40.49 43.82 
8 238.48 257.85 32.573 43.33 47.10 56.25 
Contingency 
 no. 
Gmresr_droptol_0.05 
/  Multi-GMRESR 
ITR - 3 
Sparse solvers/ Multi-
GMRESR ITR - 3 
Multi-GMRESR 
ITR – 3/ Modified Multifrontal 
1 6.120 6.120 1.234 
2 5.798 5.861 1.297 
3 6.947 7.101 1.152 
4 5.627 6.183 1.330 
5 5.981 5.901 1.285 
6 5.870 5.944 1.296 
7 6.133 6.158 1.253 
8 5.063 5.474 1.446 
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Table 25 Comparison of multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver with other solvers: 32 
generator test System 
 
 
Table 26 shows the speed up comparison of the multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR 
solver with the modified multifrontal solver, other direct sparse solvers, and ILU 
preconditioned GMRESR solver for the thirty two generator test system. We can see that the 
developed iterative solver is 13.5 to 20 times faster than all other ILU preconditioned 
iterative solvers and other direct sparse solvers. Also the modified multifrontal methods are 
1.6 to 1.8 times faster than the multifrontal GMRESR iterative solver. 
 
Table 26 Speed up comparison of multifrontal preconditioned GMRESR solver with other solvers: 
32 generator test  system 
 
From the above results and analysis it is clear that with proper design of the 
preconditioner and proper intelligence for its reuse great computational efficiency can be 
achieved compared to the existing direct and the iterative solvers. We also see that the 
developed iterative solvers can be highly competitive with the direct solvers in terms of 
robustness and speed. Also the speed up increases non linearly with the increase in size of the 
system. We expect that with further improvement in the preconditioner and increase in size 
of the system iterative solvers would outperform the modified multifrontal solvers also.  
 
 
 
Contingency
 no. 
 
 
Gmresr_droptol_0.05 
(Secs) 
 
 
Sparse 
solvers 
(Secs) 
 
 
Modified 
Multifrontal 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 1 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 3 
(Secs) 
 
 
Multi-
GMRESR 
ITR - 5 
(Secs) 
1 1078.55 944.25 32.928 60.18 64.37 63.03 
2 1412.42 1165.93 44.781 73.97 92.26 87.57 
3 986.96 828.69 29.252 56.20 56.27 49.33 
4 1287.51 928.56 38.524 79.95 76.28 68.51 
Contingency 
 no. 
Gmresr_droptol_0.05 
/  Multi-GMRESR 
ITR - 3 
Sparse solvers/ Multi-
GMRESR ITR - 3 
Multi-GMRESR 
ITR – 3/ Modified Multifrontal 
1 17.921 15.690 1.827 
2 19.094 15.761 1.651 
3 20.005 16.797 1.686 
4 18.793 13.553 1.778 
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CHAPTER 5 MODELING AND PROTECTION 
This chapter describes the modeling of the power system components and generator 
protection adopted for this research. At the outset the chapter describes the component 
modeling and the formulation of the differential algebraic equations governing the system. 
Following this the results of an in depth study of cascading events over the past 40 years 
focusing on generator protection under abnormal conditions are synoptically presented, 
highlighting the importance of generation protection during the unfolding of such 
uncontrolled high consequence scenarios. After the historical perspective a detailed 
description of generator protection modeling used in this research is given. The next section 
presents the fundamental concepts for island detection and subsequent simulation on each 
islands formed as a result of the cascading phenomena. The chapter is followed by the results 
and discussion of the implementation of the above described component modeling, generator 
protection and island detection and simulation on a test system.  
5.1 Component Modeling and Formulation of Dynamic Algebraic 
Equations 
5.1.1 Exciter Model  
In this research a simple PI controller is used for generator terminal-voltage control.  The 
block diagram of the exciter is shown below in Fig. 24. 
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Fig. 24: Block diagram of exciter 
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5.1.2 Governor Model 
The governors are all modeled as a speed integrator with droop ratio R as in Fig. 25. TCH 
is the time constant for hydro-mechanically server, which is modeled as an inertia link. The 
output of the governor is Y, which is the mechanical power input to electric machine. grefL  is 
the output of Automatic Generation Control (AGC), which is illustrated in Fig. 26. It is 
actually the summation of the gate reference 0
g
refL  and the AGC adjustment signal. Here it is 
assumed that every generator participates in the global frequency adjustment. 
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Fig. 25: Governor 
 
5.1.3 AGC Model 
Fig. 26 illustrates the AGC model used in this research. The aim of the AGC is to 
regulate the system frequency to the reference frequency
ref
gω . Any deviation from this value 
will be sensed by the AGC. The inverse of the time constant in each of the integrators in Fig. 
26 is proportional to the size of the unit, for which the output signal is intended. This 
underlying philosophy is that a larger generator contributes more to regulate the frequency 
than a smaller generator. 
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Fig. 26: Block diagram of Automatic Generation Controller (AGC) 
 
5.1.4 Over-excitation Limiter Model 
A summed-type over-excitation limiter (OEL) model shown in Fig. 27 is used in this 
research. The regulating part of the OEL is a pure integrator. It simulates the heat build-up in 
the exciter. A wind-up limiter is added to the integrator to limit the output of OEL to exciter. 
The direct output of OEL is not limited because it is a reflection of winding temperature 
rather than a concrete element that has a physical limit. 
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Fig. 27: Over-exciter limiter 
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5.1.5 Load Model  
The loads are modeled as constant active and reactive power injection. 
5.1.6 Formulation of Dynamic Algebraic Equations 
The equations developed are for all the generations including the exciter, the governor 
and the AGC models. The two axis model for the generator is used in the present study. For 
generators, the meanings of the notation are the same as in [25]. The notation for exciter, 
governor, and the AGC are same as shown in Fig. 24-Fig. 27. The limiter for each variable is 
implemented as logic in program and is not shown in the above equations.  
The set of differential equations are as the same as discussed in equations (47)-(58). 
The loads in our test system are modeled as constant active and reactive power injection. 
A general power system dynamic algebraic equation (DAE) groups for equations in (47) 
through (58) are summarized in (59) and (60). 
5.2 Generator Protection  
5.2.1 Importance of Generator Protection  
Power systems are constantly subjected to the transient disturbances due to system 
component faults, switching of major loads, occasional lightening flashover, intentional 
sabotage, human errors and unintentional protective relay operation and so on. During this 
transient period from one steady state to the next the performance of the generator excitation 
system and the turbine control system play an important role in ensuring system stability. 
However, the coordination between these and the other control mechanisms with system 
protection is of prime importance to avert a cascading event [143]. Of particular importance 
in this long term simulation study is the role of generator protection especially under 
abnormal conditions. Along with coordinating with the system to avoid misoperation, the 
protective relays must protect the generating plant damage which would otherwise seriously 
hamper restoration and cause huge economic loss.  
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In many of the past blackouts the operation of the generator protective relays stands out 
as one of the very critical events in the sequence of events leading to those catastrophic 
scenarios. Many times the unexpected relay operation has been due to the lack of 
coordination between the control and protection function of the generator with that of the 
system [ 144 ].  This research effort reports conclusively the importance of generator 
protection modeling in dynamic simulation studies to trace the system trajectory following a 
transient disturbance to the system. This study is also important in planning out control 
strategies to interrupt the unfolding of a cascading event.  
5.3 Historical Evidence/Perspective 
This section presents a historical perspective, over the past 40 years, of the role of 
generator protection under abnormal conditions in the unfolding of the cascading events. The 
purpose of this section is not to describe any of these catastrophic events in detail which 
would be voluminous, rather in this section an attempt is made to report the critical protective 
relay operations for generator protection leading to these blackouts. The purpose of this study 
is to substantiate the importance of generator protection modeling in the dynamic simulation 
study of the power system.  
5.3.1 Northeast Blackout November 9-10, 1965  
This information was obtained from [144, 145 , 146 , 147 , 148 , 149 ]. An out of step 
condition developed due to continued acceleration of The PASNY and Ontario Hydro 
generators at Niagara Falls, and caused two 345 kV lines between Rochester and Syracuse to 
be opened by distance relay action; all parallel underlying lower voltage lines were also 
tripped. Four seconds after the initial line trip, five out of the sixteen PASNY-Massena 
generators tripped and the system islanded into 5 areas as shown in Fig. 28. 
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Fig. 28: System islanding into 5 areas [144] 
 
In area 3 an overfrequency condition developed due to large generation excess and thus 
all steam power plants were tripped by overspeed protection. This was followed in quick 
succession by simultaneous tripping of 10 generators at Beck due to excessive governor 
operation and tripping five PASNY-Niagara pumping-generating units by overspeed 
protection. Thus an underfrequency condition ensued and the whole area blacked out. 
Similarly in area 4 there was complete blackout since all the generators tripped within 11 
minutes due to undervoltage and underfrequency protection. 
5.3.2 June 5, 1967, PJM Disturbance  
About 26 generators were automatically tripped during this disturbance—12 by loss-of-
field relaying, six due to abnormal current or voltage, four by turbine protection, and four by 
other protective devices [143].  
5.3.3 North American Northeast Blackouts of 1977  
This information was obtained from [144, 150, 151, 152]. After a sequence of line trips 
and a generator trip, the loss of a generator, Ravenswood #3 unit, due to the loss of field relay 
operation was very critical because it was responding to sharp voltage fluctuations 
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accompanying load shedding. This caused sharp frequency drop up to 54 Hz and Arthur Kills 
#3 unit tripped due to underfrequency protection. This was followed by immediate tripping 
of remaining generators in the islanded Con Edison system.  
5.3.4 French Blackout December 19, 1978  
The sequential tripping of a 400 kV line and three 225 kV lines due to overcurrent 
protection followed by the tripping of a hydro unit of Revin power plant due to generator 
overcurrent protection led to this blackout [143].  
5.3.5 Tennessee Disturbance August 22, 1987  
Voltage controlled/restrained overcurrent and distance relays on generators tripped [143]. 
This started a cascading effect that eventually tripped all source lines into TVA’s South 
Jackson, Milan, and Covington substations [153]. 
5.3.6 The Tokyo Blackout 1987  
After the initial tripping of lines and transformers due to improper operation of zone 4 
impedance relay, the loss of the load caused a frequency spike and due to overfrequency 
generator protection the units Kashima #6 and Kawasaki #6 tripped and Kashima #4 was 
manually stopped [143, 153]. 
5.3.7 PECO Disturbance February 21, 1995  
During the second fault, the Limerick 1 and 2 generators were tripped by ground 
overcurrent relays connected to their step-up transformers [143]. 
5.3.8 Western System July 2, 1996  
This information was obtained from [4, 144, 154, 155]. At 1:25 P.M. on July 2, 1996, a 
huge disturbance occurred in WSCC system. A short circuit occurred on a 345 kV line 
between the Jim Bridger plant near Rock Springs and it was tripped successfully. This 
disturbance caused a parallel line to be tripped also. An SPS scheme was initiated after the 
tripping of the two lines, which shut down two generating units at the Jim Bridger plant. 
About 24 seconds after the fault, the outage cascaded through tripping of small generators 
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near Boise plus tripping of the 230 kV line from Western Montana to SE Idaho. . The 
undervoltage and inter-area oscillation problem developed quickly throughout the system. 
This was further aggravated by false tripping of 3 units at McNary. Within a few seconds, 
five islands were formed and as a result. 2,500MW power was lost and 1,500,000 customers 
were affected.  
5.3.9 Western System  August 10, 1996  
This information was obtained from [4, 156, 157]. Due to poor design of overexcitation 
limiters many generators tripped at inappropriate time. The most critical event was sequential 
tripping of 13 McNary generators due to the generator field current protection scheme which 
operated to trip the generators instead of limiting the field current. In the southern islands, 
many generators tripped undesirably following underfrequency load shedding. A total of 175 
generating units were tripped and 5,700,000 customers were interrupted. 
5.3.10 Chilean Blackout May 1997  
The main cause identified for the voltage collapse in the Chilean Interconnection System 
was the overexcitation limits in the generating units at Colbun-Pehuenche [143]. 
5.3.11 North American Northeast Blackouts of August 14, 2003  
Eastlake 5 unit tripped due to overexcitation protection. Machines in Detroit pulled out of 
step and lost synchronism. Among other factors overreaching impedance relays (zone 2 and 
zone 3) and a lack of coordination between generation protection and transmission protection 
systems led to this widespread blackout [158].  
5.3.12 Blackout in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark – September 23, 2003  
This information was obtained from [159, 160, 161]. A nuclear plant at Oskarshamn 
tripped at 12:30 due to technical problems and the north south flow on the west side 
increased. Coincidently the switching device at Horred substation broke apart with another 
nuclear plant and two important north-south connections lost. Due to loss of transmission 
path to the west coast the east side became overloaded. Thus within seconds, the 
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underfrequency and undervoltage generator and other grid protections reacted and resulted in 
a complete voltage collapse. 
5.3.13 Italian Blackout September 28, 2003  
One of the main lessons learnt after this severe disturbance was that a thorough and 
accurate testing of protecting devices and governors should be performed during the 
commissioning of the power system [162, 163, 164, 165].  
5.3.14 Greece July 12, 2004  
The critical event occurred at 12:37 when Unit 3 of Aliveri power station serving the 
weak area of Central Greece tripped automatically [166]. At 12:38 the remaining unit in 
Aliveri was manually tripped. At 12:39 voltage instability leading to collapse happened and 
the system was split in two by line protection devices and disconnected the generation from 
the separated Southern part.  Thus the blackout spread into the area of Athens and 
Peloponnesus. 
5.3.15 Australian Blackout Friday August 13, 2004  
The initiating event was an internal fault in a transformer which triggered the tripping of 
three generators due to generator differential protection [144,167]. Another independent 
generator tripped due to premature negative phase sequence protection as a result of a faulty 
timer circuit. Due to sudden generation loss the frequency dropped and Underfrequency load 
shedding along with generator trippings due to underfrequency protection and automatic 
voltage regulator protection followed.  
5.3.16 Central-South System Collapse of the Peninsular Malaysia Grid System January 
13, 2005  
After the initial circuit trippings, the North East and the Central South sub system were 
left interconnected only through the four transformers at Port Klang [144]. The sub systems 
began to pull apart as the generators in the North East went out of step with those in the 
Central South sub system. Soon they separated with each sub system having load and 
generation imbalances. In the Central sub system the frequency spiraled down due to 
  
97 
generation deficiency and all the generators tripped. However it was not due to 
underfrequency protection. The system frequency fluctuations disrupted the fuel to air ratio 
of premix burners, resulting in a very lean mix of fuel and air that caused flame instability. 
Along with this there were other factors involved and finally the turbine protections acted to 
trip the turbines due to high vibration in the combustion chamber. The major disturbances in 
1996, 1998, 2001 and 2005 on the TNB grid were due to either inadvertent tripping of the 
gas turbine based plants or undesirable performance of the gas turbine based units. 
5.3.17 Blackout in the Swiss Railway Electricity Supply System June 22, 2005  
After the initial event the SBB system was split into two parts, the Southern and the 
Northern [144]. The southern part had an excess of 200MW which led to frequency increase 
and thus the overfrequency protection tripped most of the generators were tripped within 
eight seconds and the whole area was blacked out. On the contrary the northern part was 
generation deficient and to maintain the stability the generation from Châtelard, Vernayaz 
and Etzel power plants and the import from Germany increased. However shortly after this 
the generators were tripped due to overload and the tie line from Germany was opened 
causing complete system shutdown.  
5.3.18 UCTE Major Disturbance of 4 November, 2006  
In the Western Subsystem load generation imbalance led to frequency decline to 49 Hz 
and underfrequency tripping of pump storage hydro units and large portion of wind and 
cogeneration units [144]. The North East Subsystem had huge excess of generation up to 10 
GW and the frequency initially increased to 51.4 Hz. To the advantage, wind generations 
tripped due to overfrequency protection and the frequency recovered. But unfortunately soon 
some of the wind generators automatically reconnected as the frequency recovered, and the 
frequency once again began to increase.  
5.4 Generator Protection Types and Strategies  
In this research the main concern is the generator protective relay operation under severe 
disturbance conditions. In the previous section on the synoptic study of the past blackouts, 
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the specific generator protections that operated and which were critical events in the 
unfolding of the cascading were identified in italics. Of all them we would focus on a subset 
which is most important and frequent in such critical scenarios. They are enumerated below 
and are followed by a detailed discussion of each of them. In this study the generator 
protection studied are as follows: 
• Overexcitation  
• Overcurrent  
• Overvoltage 
• Undervoltage 
• Overfrequency  
• Underfrequency  
• Out of Step 
 
In summary the generator protection must be coordinated with the allowed voltage and 
frequency regulating ranges. Thus the generator voltage protection is set outside a threshold 
of about ±10% of nominal voltage and the frequency related protection generally operates 
within ±5% of the nominal speed. The overcurrent protection is delayed with respect to the 
automatic voltage regulator and governor dynamics. Most of materials discussed below on 
the different generator protection under abnormal conditions come from references [143, 
168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179]. 
5.4.1 Overexcitation (Volt per Hertz protection) Device 24 
Generators and transformers require an internal magnetic field to operate. The core of a 
transformer and the stator of a generator are designed to provide the magnetic flux necessary 
for rated load. Deviations in frequency, power factor and voltages outside the intended limits 
of generator and transformer operation cause thermal stress and insulation degradation. An 
overexcitation condition occurs when the generator or the transformer equipment is operated 
such that flux levels exceed the design values. These design limits are specified in terms of 
the ratio of the voltage to frequency (V/Hz) applied at the terminals of the equipment.  
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The core area and the magnetic properties of the core material define the excitation 
capability of a generator or transformer. The core is designed to support a flux density 
necessary for full load operation and to dissipate the heat associated with that excitation 
level.  
Standards ANSI/IEEE C50.13 (generators); C57.12 (transformers); IEEE Std C50.12, 
4.1.5; IEEE C50.13, 4.17; IEEE Std 67 do not specify V/Hz limits for transformer or 
generators directly, but the voltage limits specified for this equipment at rated frequency 
imply continuous V/Hz limits. For instance the standards require a generator to be capable of 
operation at rated kVA, frequency and power factor with terminal voltage variations of ± 5%. 
Continuous operating capabilities are indicated below: 
• Generators: 1.05 p.u. (generator base); 
• Transformers: 1.05 p.u. on transformer base at full load, 0.8 pf or 1.1 p.u. at no load 
at the secondary terminals of the transformer. 
Transformers and generators can withstand overexcitation for a short time. Maximum 
allowable component temperature and the rate of temperature rise in these components 
determine the limits. However the limiting component vary with design, and this has 
prevented the standardization of on overexcitation withstand characteristic and it must be 
obtained from individual manufacturers. 
1) Overexcitation and Overvoltage  
A generator operating at no load with rated voltage and frequency would have one per 
unit flux and is said to be operating at one per unit excitation. Overexcitation would result 
from high voltage at rated frequency and from rated voltage with low frequency. 
Overexcitation condition is not the same as overvoltage condition where the dielectric 
breakdown is the concern. Overexcitation can occur without notice being a function of 
voltage and frequency. Generators can be subjected to repeated overexcitation by 
inappropriate operating practices or operator error without a disruption to operations. The 
resulting thermal degradation of insulating material is cumulative. The transformer or 
generator that survives a serious overexcitation event or many small events may fail as a 
result of a moderate event or during normal service.  
2) Causes of overexcitation  
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It usually occurs during periods of reduced frequency operation such as start up or 
shutdown under automatic voltage regulator control. CTGs with converter starting may be 
subjected to very low frequencies (such as 2 Hz) during starting. Another classic V/Hz 
damage scenario is the failure of the field breaker to open for shutdown. Failure within 
voltage regulator and associated circuits can cause damaging overexcitation to the 
synchronized generator and connected transformer. The loss of generator voltage signal to 
the regulator is an example.  
Load rejection with the automatic voltage regulator in service and a capacitive load can 
cause overexcitation. The capacitive load could be shunt capacitor used for voltage control or 
VAR support or it could be the charging current for a high voltage transmission line. The 
V/Hz may exceed 125%.  
Overexcitation Due to Overvoltage: When a power system island is formed during a major 
system disturbance, it may have excessive VARS in relationship to VAR load. These VAR 
sources are shunt capacitors, as well as VARS produced by generators within the island. 
Sudden power system disturbances can also unload transmission lines whose shunt 
capacitance can contribute to high VAR levels within the island. Ideally, control actions, 
such as tripping of shunt capacitor banks within the island, will reduce system voltage to 
within generator and transformer continuous capabilities. At power plants, automatic 
generator excitation control will reduce VAR output to control voltage within the island. If 
required, generators can operate underexcited and absorb VARS. The amount of VARS that 
the generator can absorb is limited by the generator underexcited capability, which is limited 
by stator end iron heating. Other considerations, such as steady-state stability limits and loss 
of excitation protection can also limit under excited generator operation. The minimum 
excitation limiter in the voltage regulator limits the VAR intake level. This is a settable 
control within the generator voltage regulator that needs to be properly adjusted, to 
coordinate with generator capability and steady state stability limitations. If during a major 
system disturbance, the generator excitation control is in manual, none of the generator 
control actions described above will take place and the generator VAR output will not be 
reduced to lower system voltage. If a significant number of generators within an island 
formed during a major disturbance are operating with their voltage regulator control in 
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manual, it will greatly exacerbate high voltage problems with the island. If high voltage 
during a major system disturbance is not reduced to within generator and transformer 
capabilities, protection is provided to trip generators and their associated transformers. 
Overexcitation Due to Underfrequency: A volts per hertz overexcitation condition can also 
occur due to low system frequency resulting from a major system disturbance. This, 
however, is a less likely cause than high voltage. Its trip time is usually much slower than 
under frequency relaying. 
3) Damage 
When a transformer or a generator is operating within rated parameters, the flux in the 
core will be below the saturation flux density and it will confine itself to the core since the 
core permeability will be much higher than that of adjacent structures. Core heating will also 
be within design limits. Flux produced in excess of design limits will saturate the core and 
will spill into the surrounding air space and stray flux would be induced into non-laminated 
metallic structures around the core which are not designed to carry flux. Damage to a 
laminated core due to increased losses requires extreme overexcitation for a significant time. 
However eddy currents induced in non-laminated structures can cause severe component 
damage and quick thermal runaway.  
In a generator the most damaging spill flux will appear at the ends of the stator core. 
Also, the excessive induced currents within the stator laminations can create voltage 
gradients between core laminations sufficient to break down the inter-laminar insulation. If it 
occurs the core will be permanently damaged, rendering it incapable of carrying even normal 
flux without arcing, increased heating and further deterioration. Stator core restacking is a 
very expensive procedure.  Field current in the generator can also become excessive.  
4) Protection  
Protection for a generator or generator and connected transformer against overexcitation 
can be provided in several forms such as V/Hz relaying at the generator terminals, by V/Hz 
limiting circuitry within the automatic voltage regulator, or by relay sensing machine field 
current or voltage.   
Field Monitoring Relays: Relays within the excitation system can provide limited 
overexcitation protection by monitoring field current or voltage. This relaying would be set 
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slightly above the field current or field voltage necessary to produce rated generator output 
voltage at no load. Tripping would be through a timer with a few second delay. This relaying 
would be in service only when the generator is offline to provide overexcitation protection 
during startup and shutdown.  
V/Hz Limiter: V/Hz limiter circuitry is within the automatic voltage regulator. It senses 
voltage and frequency at generator terminals and adjusts the generator field as required to 
prevent operation above a preset V/Hz value. Many limiter designs exist and it may be in 
service at all times or it may be in service only when the generator is offline. It functions 
only in the automatic control mode. Care should be taken while setting the limiter so that the 
short time overexcitation capability of the generator can be utilized during system 
disturbances. When the excitation control is out of service then V/Hz relaying is used to 
protect the station transformers and the generator. 
V/Hz Relay Application (Device 24): If the prime mover and associated mechanical systems 
are capable of withstanding a load rejection, the V/Hz relaying should trip the field and 
generator breakers. The prime mover need not be tripped. This will facilitate a rapid restart of 
the unit after the cause of the overexcitation is cleared. If the mechanical system cannot 
withstand the load rejection associated with the generator trip, a prime mover trip must be 
initiated. V/Hz relaying for the protection of the generator is applied at the generator 
terminals. They have either the definite time or inverse time characteristic. Either 
characteristic must be set to initiate tripping before damage occurs at the maximum level of 
overexcitation anticipated. The inverse time characteristic is preferred to allow maximum 
utilization of the short time capability of the generator. The definite time characteristic 
overprotects at low levels of overexcitation, thus jeopardizing unit availability during system 
disturbances. 
Practical Consideration: The reset is intended to mimic the thermal characteristic of the 
protected generator or transformer. Assume that a given overexcitation condition will 
damage equipment in 60 seconds and therefore V/Hz relay is set to operate in 50 seconds. 
But the V/Hz limit violation is removed after 40 seconds and reappears after 10 seconds. If 
the relay is reset after the initial violation recedes, then upon recurrence of the event the 
equipment will be subjected to the overexcitation condition for full 50 seconds before 
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tripping. This means the equipment is exposed for 90 seconds. This would cause damage to 
the equipment. Also the heat generated in the protected equipment will not dissipate in short 
time between events. Therefore the memory feature is required for the relay to reset at a rate 
comparable to the cooling rate of the protected equipment.   
5) Settings  
The system operating voltage range extends to the continuous V/Hz capability of 
generators and transformers. Thus the setting must be done in a way to guarantee that 
overexcitation protection will not actuate when the system is operating at the maximum 
continuous V/Hz capability of the equipment. To accomplish this, the settings must be above 
the applicable limit with sufficient margin to allow for relay and potential transformer errors. 
The setting should also include an appropriate safety margin. The resulting V/Hz settings can 
be substantially above the continuous V/Hz capability.  
 The delay for the overexcitation protection should allow for the maximum utilization of 
the short time capability of the protected equipment. Overexcitation can occur during a 
system disturbance because of field forcing, reduced system frequency or both. In this 
situation the output of every generator is very critical to system recovery. Protective relays 
that do not optimize the equipment capability reduce the reliability of the entire power 
system. The setting for the generator is straightforward. The V/Hz limit at the generator 
terminal is 105% regardless of the load condition. The initiation setting for the pickup of the 
relay should be set above 105%+margin (device error + PT error + safety margin). Short-
time overexcitation withstand curves provided by manufacturers are often based on actual 
core limits. When such curves are applied at the equipment terminals, they represent a no 
load condition. The application of such curves under load may be optimistic. When using 
short time curves, the applicable conditions for the curves must be known. 
 Time delay settings: The V/Hz relay must be set with sufficient time delay to override 
system fault voltage transients and to allow the voltage regulator to restore normal voltage 
following load rejection. These minimum delay conditions are normally met when the delay 
is set to maximize utilization of the short time overexcitation capability of the equipment. 
However the determination of anticipated maximum excitation level would require a 
dynamic study involving the generator, voltage regulator and governor, saturation 
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characteristics of the generator and transmission parameters. In practice the maximum V/Hz 
condition at the generator terminals can be estimated from the generator’s open circuit 
saturation curve. Generally the shape of the curve is such that the saturation of the stator will 
limit the terminal voltage to less than about 1.25 pu. Therefore at 1.25 pu the limiter if 
installed should act to reduce the excitation before relaying initiates a generator trip, 
otherwise the relay must initiate a trip before the short time withstand of the generator or 
connected transformer.  
5.4.2 Overcurrent 
The continuous output capability of a generator is expressed in kilovolt-amperes (kVA) 
available at the terminals at a specified frequency, voltage, and power factor. For hydrogen-
cooled generators, the output rating is usually given at the maximum and several lesser 
hydrogen pressures. For CTGs, this capability is given at an inlet air temperature in the range 
of –20° C to 50° C. In general, generators may operate successfully at rated kVA, frequency, 
and power factor for a voltage variation of 5% above or below rated voltage. 
Under emergency conditions, it is permissible to exceed the continuous output capability 
for a short time. In accordance with IEEE Std. C50.13, the armature winding short time 
thermal capability is given in Table 27. 
Table 27: Overcurrent relay settings 
Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120 
Armature current (percent) 218 150 127 115 
 
where 100% current is the rated current of the machine at maximum hydrogen pressure. In 
some instances, generator overload protection may be provided through the use of a torque 
controlled overcurrent relay that is coordinated with the IEEE C50.13 short time capability 
curve. This relay consists of an instantaneous overcurrent (IOC) unit and a time-overcurrent 
unit having an extremely inverse characteristic. The instantaneous unit is set to pick up at 
115% of full-load current and is used to torque control the time-overcurrent unit. The 
instantaneous unit dropout should be 95% or higher of pickup setting. 
The time-overcurrent unit is set to pick up at 75% to 100% of full-load current, and a 
time setting is chosen so that the relay operating time is 7.0 s at 218% of full-load current. 
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With this approach, the relay is prevented from tripping for overloads below 115% of full-
load current and yet provides tripping in a prescribed time for overloads above 115% of full-
load current. The overcurrent relay settings should be provided to transmission system 
protection personnel for coordination purposes. An overload alarm may be desirable to give 
the operator an opportunity to reduce load in an orderly manner. This alarm should not give 
nuisance alarms for external faults and should coordinate with the generator overload 
protection if this protection is provided. 
For air-cooled generators that may operate in a wide range of ambient temperatures, it is 
necessary to coordinate the IEEE C50.13 thermal capability and the relay setting with the 
increased capability of the turbine and the generator at reduced ambient temperature. 
Conversely, it may be difficult to protect the generator for its reduced capability when the 
ambient temperature is high. 
5.4.3 Overvoltage 
Voltage regulators control the generator excitation levels to ensure the terminal voltage is 
maintained at a level that is within the rated operating range of the generator. Voltages 
outside that range could result in damage to the generator or unacceptable power system 
conditions. Voltages may exceed rated levels during system disturbances, while the generator 
excitation system is limited by its internal controllers, or is operating in a manual control 
mode. Abnormal voltage protection for generators must coordinate with any external control 
systems regulating the system voltage that would help to restore normal voltage levels at the 
generator terminals.  
Abnormally high voltages could cause excessive dielectric stress on the generator or unit 
transformer insulating materials and result in insulation failure. As discussed earlier 
overexcitation and overvoltage are related but not the same. Overvoltage condition may 
occur without necessarily exceeding the flux limits.  For example in hydrogenerators an 
overspeed of 200% or more can occur upon load rejection leading to serious overvoltage 
condition especially if they are operating in manual excitation control mode. 
Overvoltage protection is sometimes provided to protect the generator from excessive 
dielectric stress. In addition to coordinating with external system voltage control devices, 
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generator overvoltage protection must also coordinate with internal excitation system voltage 
controllers. Such coordination is not difficult as long as the protection is set to pick up at a 
higher level than the maximum setting on the generator voltage reference control and the 
setting of the excitation system volts per hertz controller at a fundamental frequency (if this 
auxiliary control device is provided). Coordination with exciter controls for temporary 
excursions above the maximum controlled voltage level is easily achieved with even small 
time delays on the protection, because the control devices are normally quite fast (exerting 
control within less than 1 s).  
A major cause of overvoltage is sudden loss of load. Power equipment involving iron 
(rotating generators, transformers) operate close to the knee of their saturation curves. Thus 
small overvoltages result in large increases in exciting current and cause major damage. 
Typical permissible overvoltage at no load is given in Table 28 
 
Table 28: Typical Overvoltage limits 
Generator 
105% Continuous 
110% 30 minutes 
115% 5 minutes 
125% 2 minutes 
Instantaneous overvoltage setting should be about 106%-110% of rated voltage to ensure 
prompt removal. 
5.4.4 Undervoltage 
Undervoltage conditions are not usually harmful to generators themselves, so direct 
undervoltage protection is not normally provided for them. However sustained operation of a 
generator with terminal voltage lower than 95% of its rated voltage may cause reduction in 
stability limits, import of excessive reactive power from the grid to which it is connected and 
can lead to malfunctioning of voltage sensitive devices and equipments. Also, overheating 
due to extended operation at low voltages may damage the auxiliary motors for turbine 
generator sets. Auxiliary supplies are therefore sometimes monitored by undervoltage relays 
that may trip the generator off line to protect the motors.  
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Auxiliary undervoltage tripping is usually applied at nuclear generating stations, where the 
protection of safety related auxiliary equipment is of paramount importance. The 
undervoltage relays are typically set close to 0.9 p.u. of normal operating voltage, with time 
delay to prevent tripping during successful clearing of external faults. However, this setting 
can cause tripping during system disturbances involving sustained undervoltage conditions.  
5.4.5 Overfrequency 
Off nominal frequency operation is a result of load generation mismatch. Turbine 
operation capabilities at abnormal frequency are usually more restrictive than generators and 
transformers. Operation of a turbine between 59.5 and 60.5 Hz (in a 60-Hz system) is 
considered within the unrestricted time operating frequency limits, whereas the operation 
above 60.5 Hz and below 59.5 Hz is regions of restricted time operating frequency limits. 
Continuous operation in this region under generator-loaded condition is not recommended. 
Overfrequency is usually the result of a sudden reduction in load or unit full load 
rejection and, therefore, corresponds to light-load or no-load operation of a generator. 
Overfrequency operation is less of a concern than underfrequency operation. This is because 
normal frequency can be quickly restored by reduction in generation by operator or governor 
control action. Overfrequency increases ventilation and therefore the load carrying capability 
is increased without the danger of overheating. Also the flux density required for a given 
terminal voltage is reduced. 
As an example overfrequency operation or overspeed operation is a concern for a hydro 
turbine. A hydro turbine typically has a huge mass and high kinetic energy of water in the 
penstock.  A sudden loss of load on it accelerates the turbine- generator mass and results in 
an overspeed of up to 150%. On a hydro turbine, the input energy is a large mass of water 
traveling at significant speed. A rapid closure of the gate would result in water hammer with 
a pressure spike that would damage the penstock. Consequently, the minimum and maximum 
design pressures for the penstock limit the rate of gate movement. However, if a failure 
occurs within the gate or governor system, the hydro unit could attain a speed of 200% rated, 
incurring major damage. 
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5.4.6 Underfrequency  
Frequency decay is a generally a result of a system disturbance caused by the loss of a 
large generation resulting in system separation and overloading. The generators may be 
subjected to prolonged periods of underfrequency operation which pose a serious threat to 
the turbines and other auxiliaries along with the generator. Underfrequency operation reduces 
ventilation, increases overheating and reduces the load carrying capability of the generators.  
The generators can operate up to 0.95 pu rated speed for prolonged periods without 
overexcitation if the output is reduced proportional to speed at rated terminal voltage. From 
0.95 pu to 0.90 rated speed, both output voltage and current should be reduced in proportion 
to speed, thus reducing output capability by the square of the speed reduction [177]. 
The standards do not specify generator capability at reduced frequencies, but this 
information can be made available from the generator manufacturer. The reduction in output 
capability coupled with possible overloading of the generator during a system disturbance 
may result in thermal damage to the generator if its short time thermal capability is exceeded.  
1) Underfrequency Turbine Capability 
Generally the turbines are considered to be more restrictive than the generators they drive 
at reduced frequencies because of possible mechanical resonances in the many stages of 
turbine blades. These limitations usually apply to steam turbine generators. Combustion 
turbine generators (CTGs) in general have greater tolerance than steam units for 
underfrequency operation.  
 
Combustion turbine generators: They can usually operate down to 57 or 58 Hz for extended 
periods of time. The specific underfrequency limit should however be consulted from the 
manufacturer for each CTG. However, CTGs are frequently limited by combustion instability 
and/or sharply reduced turbine output as frequency drops due to reduced airflow through the 
turbine. Loss of air flow will result in immediate unit trip following the detection of a change 
in axial rotor position, shaft and/or bearing vibration, loss of flame in the combustor(s), or 
excess temperature of the turbine. One manufacturer estimated a 17% loss in output at 55 Hz. 
In general, there are no restrictions on hydrogenerators. Combustion turbines (particularly 
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under 200MW) have limited number of blade sizes and, therefore, have fewer resonant 
frequencies. 
Steam turbine generators: Of all turbines steam turbines are most adversely affected by 
underfrequency operation. Damage due to blade resonance is of primary concern in the 
turbine blade design. Resonance occurs when the frequency of the vibratory stimuli and the 
natural frequency of a blade coincides or are close to each other. The steam flow path is not 
homogeneous due to physical irregularities in the flow path and this produces cyclical force 
to the blades. At resonance the cyclical forces increases the stress and the damage to the 
blades is accumulated and may appear as a crack of some parts in the assembly. Although 
these cracks especially in tie wire and blade cover may not be catastrophic in these areas but 
they can alter the blade tuning such that resonance could occur near rated speed.  
Every turbine blade has numerous natural resonance modes, namely tangential, axial, and 
torsional. Each mode has a natural frequency that varies with the physical dimensions of the 
blade. Short blades in the high-pressure and intermediate pressure stages of the turbine can 
be designed to withstand a resonant condition. However the longer turbine blades associated 
with the low pressure turbine are prone to damage by prolonged abnormal frequency 
operation. These blades are protected by tuning their natural resonant frequencies away from 
rated speed. These blades generally determine the turbine’s vulnerability to under frequency 
operation.  
Standards do not specify short time limits for over-or underfrequency operation. The 
manufacturer of the specific turbine must provide this data. Reference [178] lists the 
following limitations for one manufacture’s turbines as: 
• 1% change (59.4–60.6 Hz), no adverse effect on blade life 
• 2% change (58.8–61.2 Hz), potential damage in about 90 minutes 
• 3% change (58.2–61.8 Hz), potential damage in about 10–15 minutes 
• 4% change (57.6–62.4 Hz), potential damage in about 1 minute 
Reference [179] states that with a 5% frequency deviation, damage could occur within a 
few seconds. These withstand times are not typical. Limits vary dramatically among 
manufacturers, as can be seen in Fig. 29, which includes limitation curves from four 
manufacturers. 
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Fig. 29: Steam Turbine Partial or Full-Load Operating Limitations During Abnormal Frequency [176] 
 
Time spent in a given frequency band and hence the fatigue damage is cumulative and is 
independent of the time accumulated in any other band. For each incident, the first ten cycles 
in a given frequency band are not accumulated since some time is required for mechanical 
resonance to be established in the turbine blades. The fatigue life is used up during abnormal 
underfrequency operation and a series of such events influence the total fatigue life, as the 
first underfrequency event will weaken the turbine blades and reduce the number of cycles to 
failure for subsequent events. 
2) Settings 
The settings should be such as to coordinate with the automatic load shedding on the 
system and at the same time provides protection for each band of the manufacturer’s 
withstand characteristics. It is also important to take into account the past history of the 
turbine with respect to the accumulated vibratory stresses in each band of underfrequency 
operation.  
The first line of action against the underfrequency protection is automatic load shedding. 
This is continued until there is no mismatch between the load and the generation. It is 
designed based on the frequency decay and the rate of frequency decay. It is generally 
employed in steps. However due to the extreme complexity of the power system it is 
extremely difficult to reach an exact match between load and generation especially during 
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cascading events when several islands are formed with different load and generation 
mismatch. Moreover this island formation may be different can conceived in the planning 
stage for the automatic load shedding. Finally the frequency decay is also oscillatory and non 
homogeneous. Thus second line of defense in the form of backup protection is essential and 
is discussed in the following paragraph.  
The backup protection employs a multilevel underfrequency tripping scheme. A separate 
time delayed underfrequency function is required for each band on the manufacturer’s limit 
curve. The scheme for timers used in this research is one of cumulative timers to store a 
history of the operating time in each protective band in a nonvolatile memory. This scheme 
takes full advantage of the underfrequency capability of the prime mover and is only 
available in microprocessor relays. The timers set near the maximum allowable time for the 
band they protect. This strategy aims at maximizing the availability of large units during 
system disturbances, thus enhancing the power system’s ability to ride through such 
disturbances. Fig. 30 shows a six-level accumulated time scheme. Underfrequency trip 
settings are slightly above the start of each band, and timers are set slightly below the total 
allowable time for each band. When the cumulative operating time in a band for all previous 
underfrequency events plus the current event equals that band timer setting, the scheme will 
operate to trip the generator. The operation of this scheme indicates that the blades associated 
with the actuated band are at the end of their useful life. At a minimum, a complete 
inspection of the blades is indicated.  
The first line of defense is preferred as long as the disturbance can be successfully 
handled by it.  
The commonly used timer schemes do not have memory. They measure the duration of 
current frequency operation and then resets to zero. Also they keep on accumulating the time 
as long as the frequency remains below their actuation limit. This does not correspond to the 
actual behavior of the turbine. Hence it is a compromise protection scheme. 
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Fig. 30: Time accumulation based Timers [170]  
5.4.7 Out of Step 
The discussion on out of step is taken mainly from references [143] and [170]. Prior to 
the 1960s, electrical centers were normally found on the transmission system and out-of step 
protection was provided by line relaying without the need for trip generation. Over the years, 
the transmission system became stronger. Generator and GSU transformer impedances have 
increased because the improved cooling technology provided greater MVA capacity from 
physically smaller units. As a result, the electrical centers on many systems have moved into 
the GSU transformer and the generator itself, significantly increasing the stresses on both the 
components. These swings would not be detected by network protection, thus the need for 
out-of-step protection at the generator.  
Out-of-step protection may also be required at the generator if the electrical center is 
located beyond the GSU on the transmission system, but the transmission relaying is slow or 
incapable of detecting the out-of-step condition. Also, the overcurrent relays used for 
generator protection do not provide reliable loss of synchronism detection. Although currents 
may be high enough to actuate an overcurrent relay, tripping will depend on the duration of 
the excess current, which is determined by the slip frequency. The operating time of an 
overcurrent relay will normally exceed the duration of the current pulse each slip cycle. If the 
condition persisted for many slip cycles, an electromechanical overcurrent relay might 
“ratchet” closed and trip the generator. Solid-state and microprocessor relays with fast reset 
characteristics will not ratchet.  
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Differential relays will not detect an out-of-step condition because the infeed and outfeed 
currents within the differential zone are equal. Following a system disturbance, the generator 
rotor angle will oscillate as the generator attempts to find a new steady-state operating point. 
These rotor oscillations produce variations of stator voltage and current. The quotient of 
these varying quantities represents the dynamic system impedance during the transient as 
viewed from the generator terminal. The dynamic impedance is also referred to as the “swing 
impedance” or just “swing.” Distance relays applied at the generator as system backup 
protection will detect a swing if the swing impedance passes through the trip characteristic. 
The relay time delay and the speed at which the apparent system impedance crosses the relay 
characteristic will determine if tripping is initiated. Normally, the delay required for 
coordination with network relaying will prevent these schemes from operating during out-of-
step events. Loss-of-field protection is an impedance-based relay scheme applied at the 
generator terminals to detect the failure of the generator field. Fig. 31 shows the trip 
characteristic for one popular LOF configuration. The trip characteristic is set with a time 
delay. Because this scheme measures the impedance looking into the generator, it cannot 
detect swings that pass through the GSU transformer.  
 
Fig. 31: Loss of field relay Characteristics 
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The offset of the characteristic also precludes detection of swings within the generator 
near the terminals. The trip characteristic will operate for slow-moving swings that linger 
within its characteristic in excess of the trip delay setting, typically 0.5 sec to 1.0 sec. The 
bottom line is that the loss-of-field protection may operate for specific out-of-step conditions, 
but cannot provide standalone out-of-step protection.  
Over the years, specialized detection schemes have been developed. Early out-of-step 
protection schemes counted the current pulsation each time a generator pole slipped (passed 
through 180 degree separation with system voltage). Tripping was initiated after a preset 
number of counts. Now it is recognized that the system impedance viewed from the generator 
terminals provides a method for the rapid detection of a loss of synchronism. Consequently, 
out-of-step detection schemes employ impedance-sensing elements and specialized logic to 
distinguish between a fault condition and a loss of synchronism. In order to apply this type of 
protection, it is necessary to understand how system impedance varies during a loss of 
synchronism.  
 When a generator loses synchronism, the resulting high peak currents and off-frequency 
operation can cause winding stresses, high rotor iron currents, pulsating torques, and 
mechanical resonances that are potentially damaging to the machine. To minimize damage, 
the generator should be tripped without delay, preferably on the first slip cycle. During an 
out-of-step condition, the apparent impedance, as viewed from the generator terminals, will 
vary as a function of system and generator voltages and the angular separation between them. 
The impedance locus will depend on the excitation system, machine loading, and initiating 
disturbance.  
Normally, system transient studies should be performed to determine the system 
impedance swing against time for different scenarios. The relays are set so that they will not 
trip for any stable swing but will trip if the swing is unstable. The swing is more likely to be 
unstable when the generator is operating at unity or leading power factor with the automatic 
voltage regulator out of service. For unstable swings, the impedance loci for each generator 
should be determined with system configurations that give maximum and minimum system 
impedances and with voltage regulators in and out of service. With different generator 
loading conditions and system configurations, the transient response of the machines is 
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determined for different fault conditions. Generally, systems are required to withstand close 
in three-phase fault on the high side of the step-up transformer and breaker failure conditions. 
Even with fast relaying and breaker operating times, this condition may sometimes result in 
generator loss of synchronism. Out-of-step protection on a generator is required when 
relatively a large generator can go unstable for reasonable system contingencies and the 
swing goes through the generator/transformer zone. Many new generating plants are 
combined cycle, with a combination of gas turbines and a steam turbine at the same location. 
The latter will normally be lower inertia and will tend to go out of step before the higher 
inertia units. Out-of-step protection applied on the steam unit can lead to faster recognition of 
out-of-step conditions and it is possible that, in some cases, tripping of the steam unit quickly 
will result in the gas turbines staying in synchronization with the system. It has also been 
suggested that a back-up distance relay, set to trip if the primary breaker does not clear the 
critical fault, can be used in some conditions to trip the steam turbine and keep the gas 
turbines on line.  
While planning studies can identify what setting to apply to out-of-step relays, it should 
be recognized that these studies are usually based on limited anticipated scenarios (e.g., three 
phase faults, breaker failure, specific system configurations, and loading, etc.). Severe system 
disturbances often involve multiple events with depressed system voltages, switching events, 
and system oscillations. In addition, under abnormal system conditions, such as 
underfrequency, the relay characteristics may vary from ideal. Under these circumstances, 
application of an out-of-step relay may cause the impedance to enter the relay tripping 
characteristic for some situations where the machine is not necessarily out of step, thus 
causing nuisance tripping and possibly worsening overall system conditions. Detailed studies 
of performance under severe multiple contingencies must balance the risk of undesirable 
tripping against the risk of damage to the machine. The tripping mode recommended (breaker 
trip, assuming the unit can respond to full load rejection) does allow the machine to be 
quickly reconnected. Reference [170] provides a detailed discussion on the swing 
characteristics and the settings consideration for the relay. 
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5.5 Automatic Island Detection and Simulation 
A depth first search (DFS) based algorithm is developed to simulate the cascading 
scenarios in power system including generator protection. DFS is a graph, tree or tree 
structure search algorithm which starts at one root and explores as far as possible along each 
branch before backtracking as in breadth first search algorithm. Then the search backtracks, 
returning to the most recent node it hadn't finished exploring. Extremes are searched first. 
DFS tends to require less memory, as only nodes on the “current” path need to be stored. 
Time complexity of both algorithms are proportional to the number of vertices plus the 
number of edges in the graphs they traverse (O(|V| + |E|)).  DFS can be asily implemented 
using the recursion methodology. 
The figure shown below Fig. 32 is a representative structure of the cascading phenomena 
starting at root node A and progressing on any of the three branches initially, which can 
further branch depending on the trajectory of the system. DFS is ideally suited for simulating 
the cascading phenomena in power system.  
 
Fig. 32 Representation of the DFS algorithm 
 
A depth-first search starting at A, assuming that the left edges in the shown graph are 
chosen before right edges, and assuming the search remembers previously-visited nodes and 
will not repeat them (since this is a small graph), will visit the nodes in the following order: 
A, B, D, F, E, C, G. 
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Figure shown below Fig. 33 is the typical scenario of a system undergoing cascading and 
leading to the formation of multiple islands some of which are stable and others are unstable 
and collapse completely. The developed DFS based algorithm keeps track of the different 
islands and performs simulation recursively. The islands formations are detected by a graph 
search algorithm based on breadth first search and kept track of for performing simulation by 
DFS.   
Contingency
occurred
Contingency
results in two 
sub-systems
Contingency
results in a single 
sub-system
Stable system
Cascaded 
system
Note: Contingencies at 
first level are deliberate
 
Fig. 33 A typical cascading scenario 
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CHAPTER 6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Validation of the Dynamic Simulation Tool 
Our dynamic simulation engine is tested on the Ontario Hydro 4 bus test system (see 
Appendix A for details of the system). Since the program builds network model directly from 
EMS’s one-line substation in addition to an initial converged power flow case, 18 breakers 
were added to the test system so that all the lines, generators, load and shunt can be isolated 
by opening the associated breakers. Other parameters of the system stay unchanged.  
Before fault, the statuses of generators are listed in Table 29. These initial generator 
parameters are sufficient to decide all other variables like bus voltages and line flows. The 
exciter model used is a standard ETMSP Type 30 as shown in Fig. 34. The scenario 
simulated is a 3-phase ground fault at bus 5. The fault was cleared by itself after 0.01 second 
without any breaker operation. The ETMSP application is used as a benchmark to our 
program.  
 
Table 29: Initial status of generator for Ontario test system 
No V-abs V-angle P Q 
1 1.03 2.928 790 77.57608 
2 1.01 -7.906 790 188.01250 
3 1.03 0.6634 690 69.85064 
4 1.01 -8.78658 740 85.26508 
 
 
Fig. 34: ETMSP type 30 exciter for Ontario hydro 4-generator 
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The simulation results from the ETMSP application and our dynamic simulation engine 
are presented in Fig. 35 and Fig. 36 respectively. The two figures are almost identical. The 
minimal differences are probably introduced by different algorithm the two programs use. 
The ETMSP application uses fixed step Runge-Kutta algorithm for integration while our 
simulator uses step-variable implicit integration algorithm.  
 
Fig. 35: Response of generator after a temporary fault at bus section 5 (ETMSP) 
 
 
Fig. 36: Response of a generator after a temporary fault at bus section 5 (Developed Simulator) 
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6.2 Decision Event Tree Generation 
The test simulation uses the current system topology to generate an extended contingency 
list as the first tier of event nodes. An iterative programming technique and an LP optimizer 
are then employed to predict and track system response to corrective actions or no action on 
the part of the operator, for each contingency as illustrated in Fig. 37. The branches B1, B3, 
and B5 represent the initial contingency, the system reconfiguration, and the emergency load 
shedding respectively, The branches B2 and B4 represent the “do-nothing” decision. The 
nodes (Si’s) in Fig. 37 represent the status/trajectory of the system after/before the actions 
(Bi’s) are applied to the system. 
 
  
Initial contingency 
(N-1 or N-k) 
First corrective action 
(Redisptach) 
Secondary corrective 
action (Load-shedding) 
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Fig. 37: Dynamic event tree template for the test system 
6.2.1 Test Scenario 
We studied the possible cascading for a one-hour time interval during which the load 
ramped 20% from 900 seconds to 2700 seconds as shown in Fig. 38 for a scenario where the 
system is in a weakened condition due to the outage of a tie line. Line loadings are 
monitored, and the most effective redispatch & load curtailment actions are identified for 
overloaded lines. 
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Fig. 38: System load ramp curve 
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6.2.2 Contingency Event Branch 
We generated a comprehensive list of initiating contingencies including the functional 
group tripping contingencies, stuck breaker contingencies and the inadvertent tripping 
contingencies for the selected scenario. Since both the long-term and transient dynamic 
simulation are done in one application, we assume faults are cleared without any delay. This 
was done as a result of a programming limitation. However, this assumption does not 
seriously compromise our analysis since a close examination of all the NERC’s record [20] 
of major power system disturbances reveals that an initiating fault never causes the 
immediate collapse of system; rather it is always a fault followed by an outage that causes a 
serious problem. 
6.2.3 Decision Event Branch Set and Decision Identification 
The decision set is the combination of all the redispatch of all the available generators 
and, if necessary, load curtailment (Appendix H). We assume any of the available generators 
can generate between zero MW to its maximum output. We use linear programming 
optimization to find the initiating redispatch and/or load curtailment to back off any line 
loading that exceeds a specified threshold. The formulation for this approach is provided in 
Appendix H. It is solved within the time domain simulation process only whenever it is 
necessary, i.e., when the flow on a line exceeds a defined percent its emergency loading. 
After we find the primary redispatch, we set the governor setting of each generator according 
to the redispatch and simulate the response of system to check if the redispatch is effective. 
Since the system total load increases between 900s and 2700s, decisions that are effective for 
now may fail after loading increases to certain level. In that case, we apply the secondary 
decision straightforward: direct load shedding, i.e. shed any increased load(s) that cause new 
problem. Also decisions taken without consideration of the generator protection modeling 
differ drastically from the decisions taken with the generator protection taken into 
consideration. These considerations are further illustrated through examples in the next 
section.  
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6.3 Results Analysis 
6.3.1 Without Generation Protection 
In this section we present the simulation results without the generator protection in the 
simulator. The result of the simulation engine computations for this scenario is a large 
repository of information that includes contingency specification, the response curves of all 
key variables for those contingencies and necessary actions. Of the 322 contingencies we 
analyzed, 10 resulted in fast (within 1 minute) instability and 312 of them resulted in stable, 
but unacceptable performance. Our implementation of the simulator does not generate a 
corrective action for cases resulting in instability within 1 minute since this is not enough 
time to implement operator-initiated actions. Of the other 312 contingencies, all of them 
resulted in overloading problems that were corrected by proper generator and load 
reconfiguration as identified by our optimization approach. Fig. 39 illustrates a representative 
initiating contingency of the loss of a generator (G-102) in the upper area, which serves as 
B1, the initial contingency in the template in Fig. 37. We see that line L118 is the most 
loaded line for the entire system. Fig. 40 shows the time domain simulation results of the 
flow on Line L118 with and without the first and second actions (B3 and B5 in Fig. 37) 
applied. The effectiveness of the first redispatch only holds until time 1100s. After that, load 
increase causes the flow on that line to exceed 100% again. To prevent further loading, an 
emergency load-shedding scheme is identified and executed to prevent circuit loadings from 
exceeding their ratings. The initiating contingency and system trajectory with and without 
actions, as shown in Fig. 40, are mapped to the branches and nodes shown in Fig. 37. 
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ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF THE TEST SYSTEM
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Fig. 39: Branch loading after loss of the largest generator 
 
 
Fig. 40: Line flow response after the loss of the generator G102 
(most severely overloaded circuit) 
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Since our engine has the capability of slow dynamic simulation, we can also observe the 
voltage variation in the test system. We find that, even through the engine for the test system 
is designed to solve the overload problems only, the action taken by the engine solves the 
voltage problems as well. Fig 41 shows the voltage of the most severely depressed bus 
following the same contingency. The voltage collapses after 3200 seconds) if the operator 
does not take any action. Following the system reconfiguration (a redispatch) the system 
behaves well until 3400 seconds, where a low voltage problem shows up. If the secondary 
action is applied, the system will avoid both the overloading and the voltage problems. 
 
Fig. 41: Voltage response after the loss of G102 
 
6.3.2 With Generation Protection 
6.3.2.1  A cascading scenario 
In this section we present the simulation results with the generator protection embedded 
into the simulator. A Depth First Search (DFS) based algorithm is implemented to continue 
Initiating 
Event G102 
trips at 290 
seconds 
First Control 
Action 
(reconfiguration) 
Second 
Control Action 
(Load 
Shedding) 
No control 
action 
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simulation on each island formed as a result of a contingency or a sequence of contingencies 
and being detected by a graph search algorithm based on breadth first search. The DFS 
algorithm is employed to simulate cascading under stressed condition of 20% load ramping 
from 900 seconds to 2700 seconds. The results presented are for the test system in Appendix 
D. Fig. 42 below shows the sequence of events that led to cascading when the system was 
under very stressed condition of heavy loading and one of relays, namely the overexcitation 
relay of the generator which was protecting the generator G101 was set lower than its actual 
setting, a classic case of setting errors. Therefore when there was a fault in line L215 at t= 
300 seconds the generator G101 tripped and further stressed the system and thus causing the 
other generators to be overexcited and a sequence of events happened due to proper generator 
protection and generators G102 and G201 tripped in the next 15 minutes leading a major load 
generation imbalance and the system collapsed. Fig. 43 below shows the simulation result for 
the described cascading scenario. It shows the most loaded line flow on the system with and 
without the generator flow. In Fig. 43, the first line from below show the most loaded line 
flow without generator protection and we identify the point at which generator G101 would 
trip if the generator protection were in service. The next line simulates the flow with 
generator G101 tripped and identifies the point at which the next generator would trip if the 
relay is functional. This is simulated in the next line where the next generator G102 is tripped 
at t= 925.37s and identifies the next generator trip at t = 1260.17s where the generator G202 
trips and blacks out the system. Fig. 44 shows the lowest system voltage for the same 
cascading scenario and it corresponds to the maximum line flow graph in Fig. 43 with respect 
to the sequence of events.     
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ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF THE TEST SYSTEM
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A 
Cascading 
Scenario
 
Fig. 42: Sequence of events leading to cascading 
 
Without Generator 
Protection
First Generator Trip 
at 619.71s
Second Generator Trip 
at 925.37
Third Generator Trip 
at 1260.17
Initiating contingency: L215
 
Fig. 43: Maximum line flow in a cascading scenario 
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Without
Generator 
Protection
First 
Generator 
Trip at 619.71s
Second 
Generator 
Trip at 925.37
Initiating contingency: L215
 
Fig. 44: Lowest voltage in the system for a cascading scenario 
 
6.3.2.2 An islanding scenario 
Fig. 45 shows a different system scenario with the sequence of events that led to 
islanding with the same initiating event as in Fig. 42, i.e., L215. In this case also, the system 
response was simulated under stress condition of heavy loading, and the relay setting of 
generator G101 set below the calculated value. After the initiating event, the four tie-lines 
L301, L302, L401, and L402 tripped very quick succession (assumed simultaneously) due to 
heavy loading and sagging into the tress followed by the generator G101 trip, and separating 
the system into two islands - with the top island having 2 generators and load with deficient 
generation and frequency excursion, and the bottom island with 3 generators and load with 
excess generation. There developed an underfrequency situation on the top island and 
overfrequency situation in the bottom island. The top island collapsed immediately due to 
successive protection actuated generator trips within a few seconds. In the bottom island, the 
generator G201 tripped at t=945.27s, and subsequently, the system recovered by balancing 
the generation and load through governor and other control mechanisms, and was stabilized. 
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Fig. 46 shows the two islands formed after initiating event followed by the tie-line trips. Fig. 
47 show the maximum loaded line flow for the above scenario.   
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF THE TEST SYSTEM
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Fig. 45: Sequence of events leading to islanding 
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Fig. 46:  The two islands resulting from the sequence of events in Fig. 45 
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Without 
Generator 
Protection
Generator Trip and 
four tie-line trip 
at 619.71s leading 
to island formation
Generator Trip 
in bottom island 
at 945.27
Initiating contingency: L215
 
Fig. 47: Maximum line flow in an islanded scenario 
 
In both the scenarios described above - one leading to cascading, and the other leading to 
islanding, we observe that after the initiating event, there is a period of slow progression of 
trip events, which is followed by a fast succession of events, leading to high consequence 
events – like total system blackout, or unstable island formation, which ultimately culminates 
in cascading. This gives a chance to the operator to take corrective actions during the slow 
progression period to avoid the disaster, if he is aware of the complex unfolding of the future 
events.  
6.3.2.3 Some more illustrative examples 
The example below shows the difference in the simulation plots with and without 
considering generator protection in the dynamic simulation of the power system to provide 
decision support for the operators to take corrective action. Fig. 48 and Fig. 49 shows the 
simulation plot for an initial line contingency (L110) at 300 seconds. The most overloaded 
line in the system is the line L112 as a result of the L110 trip. We can see from Fig. 48 that 
with generator protection in place there would be a protection actuated generator trip at 627.9 
seconds which would in reality overload the lines to a much higher than 100% ,as is the case 
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without generator protection being simulated and is represented by the blue line in the figure 
below.  
 
Fig. 48 Circuit loading with and without generator protection 
Similarly we can see in Fig. 49 that the system is apparently voltage stable when the 
generator protection is not included in the simulation modeling, whereas the system actually 
has a long term voltage collapse which becomes evident when generator protection is also 
modeled in the simulation.  
 
Fig. 49 Voltage response of system with and without generator protection 
  
131 
 
In the next example shown in Fig. 50, the initiating event is a generator trip. In this case 
as well, the system is highly stressed, and the simulation results indicate that it would lead to 
cascading. However, if proper control actions are taken at the right time, the long term 
stability of the system can be ensured. Fig. 51 shows the simulation results with the 
corrective actions taken by the operator at t=595.142 and t=1004.60. The first corrective 
action taken at t=595.142 brings the maximum line flow within the desired limits, and the 
system becomes stable after the initiating event and the transients. However, due to load 
ramping, the system again violates the operational constraints at a later time, as can be seen 
in Fig. 51. The second control action initiated at t=1004.60, which involves multiple load 
shedding events at different points of time ensures system stability. Fig. 52 shows the lowest 
system voltage before and after the control actions following the initiating event.  
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Fig. 50: A scenario with the initiating contingency as generator trip 
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Fig. 51: Maximum line flow with corrective actions to prevent generator trip and relieve line 
overloading 
 
 
Fig. 52: Lowest voltage in the system with corrective actions to prevent generator trip and relieve 
line overloading 
Without Generator 
Protection 
First Control Action 
Second Control 
Action 
Initiating Event G102 
trips at 290 seconds 
Without 
Generator 
Protection 
First Control Action 
(redispatch) to avoid 
generator trip at 595.142 
seconds 
Second Control Action 
 (Load Shedding) to 
avoid generator trip 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
In this research we have made significant contributions  “to provide operators with a very 
fast (online) computational capability to predict system response and identify corrective 
actions through analytical modeling and fast numerical simulation studies for low 
probability, high-consequence catastrophic events (blackouts) by exploiting the state of the 
art in software”. 
Around the world, most of the control centers still perform static or steady state 
contingency analysis and very few companies and/or control centers have on-line transient 
instability analysis for detection of early-swing problems. We are not aware of any 
company/control center that has implemented long-term simulation capability for on-line 
purposes. Nonetheless the long-term dynamic simulation of a power system is of interest and 
extremely valuable because it provides ability for the evaluation and analysis of multi 
element events (N-k) which may lead to cascading outages. Such information is not available 
today in control centers with dynamic simulation tools. 
However, in order for such simulation to be of practical utility in an operational context, 
it must be able to perform simulations very fast. This is one of the principal goals of this 
research that we have addressed by making algorithmic improvements to power system time 
domain simulation methods.  
There is still quite a distance to cover in terms of implementing full functional capability 
into the developed simulator apart from technical issues before it can be sitting in one of the 
modern control centers seamlessly integrated with the EMS. However the roadmap to take it 
onsite is clear. The simulator needs to be tested with large systems which would require the 
system model from the EMS with associated dynamic data and development of an interface 
with the software with its associated data format. More complete and rigorous component 
and protection modeling including power electronic devices and controllers, more intensive 
failure detection with a larger array of intelligent and optimal corrective actions including 
adaptive system separation schemes need to be implemented in the proposed simulator for it 
to be put in place and used by the operators. It can be further enhanced with visual and sonic 
translations of its output to make it easier for the operators to appreciate its value in dealing 
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with the impending situations. Companies like Entergy have already shown interest in trying 
out some of our ideas and do field trials as a second phase of this research which strongly 
indicates the relevance of the current research and its scope as a useful addition to an EMS.     
An important factor in any technology being implemented in real life is the adaptive 
considerations of the operators to changes. This would require a comprehensive effort in 
training in these tools to build confidence in the individuals responsible for decision making. 
This becomes easier to achieve when the impact that such a technology would have in 
operation if it were in place, is clear. It motivates operators to learn with enthusiasm. So, in 
essence, education in its importance, impact and efficiency is imperative for it to be widely 
accepted in future.  
On line dynamic simulation of power systems will have significant impact on their future 
design and operation. The contrast of its presence to its absence is too stark. It will enhance 
power system security and reliability and hence customer satisfaction and utility profits, and 
will promote secure power grid expansion. Specifically the research addressed herein will 
have great impacts in reducing the severity and frequency of cascading events. As we pointed 
out previously the blackouts greater than thousand megawatts are doubling every decade. 
This decade is not yet over and with ever increasing complexity in grid operations the danger 
of such events is more imminent in the absence of such a cascading event tracking and 
avoidance decision support tool.  This research can be seen as an enabling technology 
towards a secure and reliable power grid.  
This research has attempted to utilize the state of the art research in numerical algorithms 
and it is customized for power system applications to gain great computational efficiency. 
We are not aware of such applications from the literature. 
Blackouts typically result from low probability events. Corrective control is the 
operational solution to blackouts. It is event-based with actions determined on-line via 
anticipatory computing as decision support for the operator. This research establishes the 
need of such an on-line tracking and blackout avoidance decision support tool for the 
operators.  
The research objectives are achieved through contributions in six major areas as 
described below: 
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A new class of preconditioners based on multifrontal solvers 
is developed for iterative solvers like GMRESR, BiCGStab, 
and QMR to achieve high computational gain. The ILU 
preconditioner based iterative methods are implemented and 
compared with multifrontal preconditioner based iterative 
method called GMRESR.
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CHAPTER 8 FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 
DISCUSSION WITH THE INDUSTRY 
This research lays the foundation for operational defense to cascading events through 
very fast anticipatory computing of the evolution of the system trajectory and its response 
and identifying intelligent and optimal corrective solutions. This can be achieved in an online 
environment with significant improvements and implementation of both the state of the art 
software and hardware technology in power system dynamic simulation. This research has 
made some significant contributions towards that end and opened up many future directions 
for research to make it feasible and more computationally efficient for its deployment in an 
online environment.  
There is a lot of scope for research in the area of modeling improvements in terms of 
development of efficient algorithms to reduce the stiffness of the DAE of the power system 
to gain computational efficiency. This can also be viewed in terms of model reduction 
strategies.  
In terms of numerical algorithms employed in power system, there is scope for 
algorithmic developments in integration schemes and solvers for linear system of equations. 
Development of algorithms for adaptive time stepping and adaptive integration schemes to 
simulate multi scale and multi component power system can be an active area of research. 
Effectively combining the direct methods with the iterative methods can result in huge 
computational saving as shown in this research. 
Field trials and testing with larger real system can be taken up to enhance the robustness 
and its applicability. This would require system model from the EMS with associated 
dynamic data and development of an interface with the software with its associated data 
format.  
Further recommendations for future research are implementation of Out-of-Step (OST) 
Relaying schemes across interregional cutplanes (the California- Oregon flow, or the east-of-
river flow into southern California.) [ 180 , 181 ] and implementation of well designed 
controlled system separation schemes, using special protection systems and/or OST and 
power swing blocking (PSB) functions as they provide a safety net to lessen the 
consequences of major system disturbances.   
  
137 
APPENDIX A: RARE EVENT APPROXIMATION 
Suppose p1, p2, …, pn are the individual probabilities of a group of independent events E1, 
E2, ...E3. The probability of a compound event, i.e., a combination of events E1, E2, …, En, 
can always be expressed as a polynomial of p1, p2, …, pn. For example, the probability of the 
event (E1∩ E2)∪E3 is p3+p1p2-p1p2p3 Further suppose that p1, p2, …, pn are all of 
approximately the same order of magnitude, then the order of magnitude of each product 
term in the polynomial will depend on how many terms are in the product. We call the 
number of terms in the product the probability order. Thus, the probability of (E1∩E2)∪E3 is 
composed of three different terms p3 (probability order 1), p1p2 (probability order 2), and 
p1p2p3 (probability order 3). In many decision problems, knowledge of the “probability 
orders” of the significant events is sufficient to distinguish between alternatives. 
The basic idea of rare event approximation is that, if the individual probabilities of a 
group of independent events are very small, we can always simplify the calculation by 
omitting the higher order terms of the polynomial without much loss of precision [18]. In the 
given example, if we knew that p1, p2, and p3 were very small, then the probability of (E1 ∩ 
E2)∪E3 could be approximated as p3+p1p2, or even as p3.  
Often, the failure probability of an individual component is very small for a well-managed 
system such as a power system. The fault probability of a power system component is usually 
at the magnitude of 10−6 per hour (or <1% per year) [182]. Suppose the fault probability of a 
line is p1 per hour and the failure probability of a breaker is p2/hour. Obviously, they are not 
exclusive events. The probability of a fault (p1), breaker in a failed state (p2), or both can be 
expressed as p1+p2-p1p2, assuming the two events are independent. Considering the small 
nature of p1 and p2, if we ignore the probability component of simultaneous occurrence of the 
two events, the error is only about 10−12.  
The implication is that when dealing with rare events, the probability of a compound 
event is dominated by the lowest order terms, and thus the probability order is a reasonable 
measure of event’s probability. Based on this idea, we focus on the high order events with 
higher probability first, then lower probability, since, as the order of contingency increases, 
the probability of its occurrence decreases sharply to infinitesimal. A complete discussion of 
rare event systems can be found in [18]. 
  
138 
APPENDIX B: PSEUDO CODE FOR GRAPH SEARCH ALGORITHM 
FOR FUNCTIONAL GROUP DECOMPOSITION 
This is a Breath-first search algorithm. 
1. Beginning of decomposition; 
2. Label all components (bus section, non switching components (lines, capacitors, 
generators, transformers etc),switching components ( switches, breakers etc)  as 
unvisited; 
3. Arbitrarily choose one unvisited vertex (bus section) as a starting component; 
4. Initialize functional group and bus indices; 
5. Establish a new empty functional group object without any component in it; 
6. Add the chosen bus section to the functional group object as its first component; 
7. Starting from this vertex, merge the functional group's immediate neighboring 
components (lines, capacitors, generators, transformers and other non switching 
components) into the group and label them as visited; 
8. The step 2 continues until the group expands to its border, where the bordering 
components are all switching components (breakers and open switches); 
9. If all components in the power system are visited, stop searching and go to the 
last step; else choose another unvisited bus section and return to step 2 all over 
again; 
10. End of decomposition. 
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APPENDIX C: PSEUDO CODE FOR GRAPH SEARCH ALGORITHM 
FOR INADVERTENT TRIPPING CONTINGENCY 
1. Graph Search Algorithm outlined in Appendix B finds all the Functional Group; 
2. For each Functional Group we find the interfacing elements (breakers and 
switches) and the components in the Functional Group ; 
3. For a failure/fault in the Functional Group extract the interfacing elements and 
the Functional Group connected to them (step 2); 
4. Check if any of the Functional Groups extracted above have components other 
than a Bus section; then the one with component/components other than only Bus 
section can suffer inadvertent tripping;    
5. If the Functional Groups connected the to faulted/failed Functional Group 
contain only Bus section as their components then we go for second tier of 
search;  
a) Identify the interfacing circuit breaker and Functional Group that connect the 
Bus section and take the union to form the set of Functional Groups excluding 
the failed/faulted Functional Group; 
b) If only one of the remaining Functional Groups has a component other than 
Bus section then only that Functional Group can trip (SB-TB) and stop. 
c) Else if there are more than one Functional Group with component other than 
Bus section then go for the third tier of search; 
6. End of decomposition 
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APPENDIX D: ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF TEST SYSTEM 
 


%'
%




 
%
38
 
53
 
51
 
45
 
)+" )+#
)+$
%

+
'

 
%

+
!

 
%#
%"
%!



 
	






	











	












	 
		 	
		
	
 
	
	





	


	






	
+

	





	

+)+
%+
%!
3 
+
+
+
+
+
%+
%+
%

+


%+
%

+


%

+


%

+


%+"
%+#
%+$
%+
%
%
%+
%+
%+
+
+
+
+ 
+
%+"
%+#
%+$
%+
%
%
%+
%+
%+
%

+
!

%

+


%

+
'

%#
%"
%




%


'

%




%(*+
%(*+
%(*+
%(*+
%(*+
%(*+
%

+


 
+
+ 
+
)+
)+
)+
)+'
)+!
)+
)+
)+'
)+$
)+#
)+"
)+
)+
)+
)+
%+
%

+


+
4 
5 
1 
2 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
14
 
67
 
16
 
17
 
63
 
19
 
20
 
15 
18 21 
68 
64 
22
 
23
 
24
 
25
 
26
 
27
 
28
 
29
 
30
 
31
 
32
 
54
 
55
 
56
 
59
 
61
 
60
 
57 
52
 
49
 
50
 
46
 
47
 
48
 
43
 
44
 
40
 
41
 
42
 
33
 
34
 
35
 
65
 
39
 
37 
36 
66 
62
 
58 
10
1 
10
2 
10
3 
10
4 
10
5 
10
6 
10
7 
10
8 
10
9 
11
0 
11
1 
11
2 
11
3 
11
4 
11
6 
11
7 
11
9 
12
0 
12
2 
12
3 
12
4 
12
5 
12
6 
12
7 
12
8 
12
9 
13
0 
13
1 
13
2 
115 
118 121 
15
1 
15
2 
15
3 
14
9 
15
0 
14
6 
14
7 
14
8 
14
3 
14
4 
14
5 
14
0 
14
1 
14
2 
15
4 
15
5 
15
6 
16
0 
15
9 
157 
13
7 
13
8 
13
9 
13
5 
13
4 
13
3 
136 
15
8 
	
		
		
	 
		
	
	
	
	

	
	
		
		
			
		
		
		

		 		
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	

	
	 
		 
	 
	 	 
	
 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	
 
	 
	 
		 
	 
	 
	 
	 	 
	 
	 	 
		 
	 
	 
	 
	

)+
)+
)+!
 
Fig. 53: One line diagram of a test system 
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APPENDIX E: TEST SYSTEM DATA 
Table 30: The bus-breaker connection data 
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Table 31: Line data for the test system 
NAME F-BUS T-BUS 
L1 42 33 
L2 41 34 
L3 39 29 
L4 53 8 
L5 47 7 
L6 48 9 
L7 11 14 
L8 12 15 
L9 10 16 
L10 13 20 
L11 18 19 
L12 54 24 
L13 30 23 
L14 31 25 
L15 32 26 
L16 40 51 
L17 38 50 
L18 37 49 
L101 142 133 
L102 141 134 
L103 139 129 
L104 153 108 
L105 147 107 
L106 148 109 
L107 111 114 
L108 112 115 
L109 110 116 
L110 113 120 
L111 118 119 
L112 154 124 
L113 130 123 
L114 131 125 
L115 132 126 
L116 140 151 
L117 138 150 
L118 137 149 
L301 105 64 
L302 106 67 
L401 144 58 
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APPENDIX F: IEEE-RTS 24 BUS TEST SYSTEM 
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APPENDIX G: PRECONDITIONED GMRESR ALGORITHM 
In the preconditioned GMRESR algorithm, 0x is the initial guess, m is the number of inner 
GMRES iterations, tol is the tolerance limit, r is the residual vector, u  is an auxiliary vector, 
c is also an auxiliary vector satisfying the orthogonality conditions 
( )jicccr jikk ≠⊥⊥+ for   and 1 , and α  is an auxiliary scalar. 
 
(1) Select 0 , , ;x m tol  
 
0 0
1
0 0
, 1;
,  (  is the preconditioner obtained from direct solver )
r b Ax k
r M r M−
= − = −
=
 
(2)  do until 1 2kr tol+ >  
  1;k k= +  
  
1 ;k kw M r
−
=  
  Solve ( )0  (use  iterative steps of GMRES);k kAu w m=  
  
( ) ( )0 0 ;k kc Au=  
  ( )for max 0, ,......., 1i k j k= − −  
   
( );iTi i kc cα =  
   
( ) ( )1 ;i ik k i ic c cα
+
= −  
   
( ) ( )1 ;i ik k i iu u cα
+
= −  
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
; ;k k k kk k k k k kc c c u u c= =  
  1 ;
T
k k k k kx x u c r+ = +  
  1 ;
T
k k k k kr r c c r+ = −  
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APPENDIX H: OPTIMIZATION CODE FOR REDISPATCH AND LOAD 
SHEDDING (FROM [4]) 
Since branch loading is a slow process and each line usually has its emergency rating in 
addition to its normal rating to allow overloading for a short time period, a system operator 
has the time needed to perform redispatch so that the power flow of related line is adjusted to 
its nominal limit. Load-shedding happens only if it is impossible to bring the power flow in 
each line back to its long-term rating using some other means. In order to simulate the action 
of system operator, we use the following linear program problem to model what a system 
operator will do to avoid overloading. 
:Objective  
{1, ... }
  
ii D
i N
Max Pα
∈
×
                H.1 
:Constraint  
max
max
P 0,     {1,  ... },               The served load at bus i should be less 
                                                                 than the total demand  at bus ; 
i iD D D
P i N
P i
≥ ≥ ∈
 
max
max
0,    {1,  ... } ,                 Each generator generates between
                                                                     0  to ; 
i iG G
P P i N
MW P
≥ ≥ ∈
 
max max
,    {1,  ... } ,      The power flow in each branch (line
                                                                   or transformer) is limited by its rating 
i i ii B B i B B
P P P i Nγ γ≥ ≥ − ∈
 
' ( ) ,                       DC power flow equations; inject G DB P P Pθ× = = −  
( ) 0 ,                              Branch flow equations;B BD A Pθ× × − =  
where  
 is the total number of load buses;DN  
 is the total number of branches;BN  
 is the total number of generating buses;GN  
  is the load demand at bus ;
iD
P i  
 is the price factor to shed one unit  load at bus ;i MW iα  
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 is the total load ( ) served at bus ;iL MW i  
 is the real power generation at bus ;
iG
P i  
max
 is the maximum real power generation at bus , it is the summation of  
        rating of all generators connected to bus ;
iG
P i
i
 
i
 is the real power flow in branch ;BP i  
max
  is the short term rating ( ) of branch ;
iB
P MVA i  
i
i
  is the constant factor to account for the power factor of the power flow
     in branch  and 1 0;i
γ
γ≥ ≥
 
'
  is the  B-matrix used in  power flow and  is the number of buses;B N N DC N×  
  is the M   adjacency (or incidence) matrixA N×  
  is the   diagonal matrix where the  diagonal element is the 
     admittance of the  branch.  
th
B
th
D M M i
i
×
 
  is the 1 vector representing the voltage angles in radius at each bus;Nθ ×  
  is the 1 vector representing the net power injection for 
     each bus, and its element   can be calculated by .
i
inject
i i g i
P N
P P P L
×
= −
 
 
Not all the buses are both generator bus and load bus. It is observed that some buses are 
load bus only, some others are generation bus only, and some others may have no load or 
generator connected to them. If bus i  has no generator connected to it, then we let max
iG
P  to be 
zero so that inequality max 0
i iG G
P P≥ ≥  will force the generation at bus i  to be zero. We do the 
same thing for those buses without load connected to them. 
In order to solve the above linear programming problem, we need to standardize the 
above inequalities and equalities so that we can use the standard LP subroutine in Matlab. We 
will change the object function and the constraint to the following standard format: 
Objective:  
 max Tf x⋅  H.2 
Constraints: 
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 eq eqA x b⋅ =  H.3 
 lb x ub≤ ≤  H.4 
We define  
 
1 1 1
2 2 2
1
2
( 1)( 1)( 1)( 1)
;    ;   ;   
N N MG
G D B
G D B
G D B
NG D B NMNN
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
θ
θ
θ
θ
××××
       
       
       
= = = =       
       
        
  
 H.5 
 
 
1 1 1
2 2 2
max max max
1
max max max
2max max max max
max max max
( 1)( 1)( 1) ( 1)
;    ;   ;   
N N M
G D B
G D B
G D B
NG D M B MN N
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
γ pi
γ piθ
piγ ×
×× ×
       
       
       
= = = =       
       
          
  
 H.6 
 
 
1
2
max
1
max
2min min min min
max
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1)
0 0
0 0
;    ;   ;   
0 0
M
B
B
G D B
N N NM B M
P
P
P P P
P
γ pi
γ piθ
piγ× × ×
×
 −
−     
      
− −      
= = = =      
      
 
−
−      
  
 H.7 
 
 
1
2
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( 1)
0 0 0
0 0 0
;    ;   ;   
0 0 0
G D B
NN M NN
θ
α
α
α α α α
α
× × ××
      
      
      
= = = =
      
      
      
  
 H.8 
 
 ( )TT TDP  T TG Bx P P θ=  H.9 
 
 ( )  T T T TG D Bf θα α α α=  H.10 
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where 
'
( ) ( )
0 0
0
M M M M M N
eq
N N N N N N M N N N M N
I D A
A
I I B
× × ×
× × × + × + + +
− × 
=  
− − 
    H.11 
where the submatrix A, D and B inside eqA  are what we have defined at the beginning of 
this section, and I  is the identity matrix. eqA , ub  and lb  are defined as follows 
 
( ) 1
0
0
eq
M N
B
+ ×
 
 
=  
 
 
     
max
max
max
max
G
D
B
P
P
ub
P
θ
 
 
 
=
 
  
 
                 
min
min
max
min
G
D
B
P
Plb
P
θ
 
 
 
=
 
−
  
 
 H.12 
After solving the LP to obtain a feasible solution for x, we get a new system profile that 
has no overloading problem. The total forced load shedding can be obtained through the 
following formula: 
 
max
{1,2, , }
( )
i iD D
i N
P P
∈
−

 H.13 
We use a simple example to show our method. The following diagram shows a 2-generator 3-
bus system taken from [7]. For this system, we assume each load is of the same importance 
such that the cost to shed 1.0 p.u. of load is uniformly one. The fact device can adjust the 
flow on each line so that power flow factor for each line is 0.8, i.e. 0.8iγ =  for 1,  2,  3i = . 
Since we need the adjacency matrix of the graphic representation of this system, which 
model the topology of the power system as a directed graph, we label each line with an arrow 
showing the reference direction of the active power flow in the line. There is not generator at 
BUS-2 and there is no load at BUS-1 and BUS-3. The constraints in the LP problem 
formulation will force the generation at BUS-2 and the load at BUS-1 and BUS-3 to be zero. 
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Fig. 55: Example system for linear programming illustration 
Objective:  
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
max
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
( , , , , , , , , , , , , )
T
T
G G G D D D B B B
f x
P P P P P P P P P θ θ θ
⋅ =
×  H.14 
Constraints: 
 
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.0 5.0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.5 0 2.5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.0 4.0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 5.0 2.5
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.0 9.0 4.0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2.5 4.0 6.5
G
G
G
D
D
D
B
B
B
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
θ
θ
θ
 
 
 
 
 
−   
   
−   
 
−  
×   
− − −   
 
− − −  
   
− − −  




 
0=






 H.15 
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1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
0 1.0
0 0
0 0.6
0 0
0 1.0
0 0
                      
0.8 0.80 0.8 0.80
0.8 0.30 0.8 0.30
0.8 0.30
G
G
G
D
D
D
B
B
B
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
θpi
θpi
θpi
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   ≤ ≤  
− × ×
  
− × ×  
  
− ×   
  −
  
−   
   
−   
0.8 0.30
pi
pi
pi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 × 
 
 
 
 
 
 H.16 
The solution for the above linear programming problem is listed in Table 32 
Table 32: Solution for the sample LP problem in Fig. 55 
1GP  2GP  3GP  1DP  2DP  3DP  1BP  2BP  3BP  1θ  2θ  3θ  
0.81 0 0.07 0 0.88 0 0.64 0.17 0.24 -0.065 0.063 0.0027 
Substitute the solution of the parameters in Table 32, we find the max load the system can 
serve is 88 MW (0.88 p.u.). 
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